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The overview of contributions to metaphor theory in Chapters 1 and 2, examined in 
reference to recent scholarship, suggests that the current theory of metaphor derives from long-
standing traditions that regard metaphor as a crucial process of cognition. This overview calls to 
attention the necessity of a closer inspection of previous theories of metaphor.  
Chapter 3 takes initial steps in synthesizing views of domains of inquiry into cognitive 
processes of the human mind. It draws from cognitive models developed in linguistics and 
anthropology, taking into account hypotheses put forth by psychologists like Jung. It sets the 
stage for an analysis that intends to further understanding of how the East-West dichotomy 
guides, influences, and expresses cognitive processes. Although linguist George Lakoff denies 
the existence of a connection between metaphors, myths, and archetypes, Chapter 3 illustrates 
the possibility of a relationship among these phenomena.  
By synthesizing theoretical approaches, Chapter 3 initiates the development of a model 
suitable for the analysis of the East-West dichotomy as exercised in Chapter 4. As purely 
emergent from bodily experience, however, neither the concept of the East nor the concept of the 
West can be understood completely. There exist cultural experiences that may, depending on 
historical and social context, override bodily experience inclined to favor the East over the West 
because of the respective connotations of place of birth of the sun and place of death of the sun. 
This kind of overriding cultural meaning is based on the “\typical, frequently recurring and 
widely shared interpretations of some object, abstract entity, or event evoked in people as a result 
of similar experiences. To call these meanings ‘cultural meanings’ is to imply that a different 
interpretation is evoked in people with different characteristic experiences. As such, various 
interpretations of the East-West image-schema exist simultaneously in mutually exclusive or 
competing forms, as the analysis of Gatsby and the reversal of the values of East and West in the 
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Your manuscript is both good and original; 
But the part that is good is not original, 
And the part that is original is not good. 
Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) 
 
Genesis 
For the longest time, I was under the impression that a student of literature is just 
that—someone who studies literature in any of its numerous forms. During my 
intellectual endeavors at various universities in Europe and the United States, I came to 
realize that the separation of linguistics and literature, as it exists in most Departments of 
English on either side of the Atlantic, is not only a highly artificial one, but also an ill-
fated attempt to divorce two areas of study that are intrinsically related. The ordinary 
speaker, the student of literature, the lover of poetry, and the writer of poems—all engage 
in a communicative act of some sort through the same medium—language. How then can 
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anyone with an interest in literature and a desire to comprehend what the words before 
them mean fail to embrace linguistics? How can any linguist look at a text only as a 
corpus for research without being captivated by its artistic quality? These questions echo 
the dictum of Roman Jakobson (1896-1982), who postulates that “a linguist deaf to the 
poetic function of language and a literary scholar indifferent to linguistics are equally 
flagrant anachronisms.” Slowly emerging over the last ten years, these questions urge me 
to reevaluate my relationship to both disciplines.  
Over the course of the last few years, however, I have also come to realize that the 
issues at hand present themselves in a much more complex nexus. To study literature also 
means to study philosophy, history, anthropology, sociology, psychology, politics—in 
other words, all the disciplines that help us humans understand who we are, how we 
function, and what makes us somewhat unique in the animal kingdom. 
Eventually, my reevaluations led me to conclude that the search for the 
understanding of literary texts must follow the paths that the study of the relevant 
cognitive sciences has laid out for it. My subsequently intensified interest in cognitive 
linguistics brought Háj Ross into my life. Suddenly, as happened in the field of metaphor 
studies that this dissertation will attempt to explore from a new perspective, I experienced 
what linguists have come to call “the cognitive turn” for myself and for the way I look at 
things—life, literature, and of course, metaphors. The linguistically naïve assumptions 
many scholars have expressed about the character of metaphor seem to no longer hold, 
even though the traditional view of metaphor as an ornament of language still presides 
prominently in the world at large. But if today only few informed readers have yet to 
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come to terms with the hypothesis that metaphor is a phenomenon of language and 
cognition, why would it be necessary to add yet another scholarly work to the immense 
stock of publications on metaphor, the subject of such varied and rich investigations as to 
provide enough reading for a lifetime? The answer is quite simple: this work hopes to 
shed light on some aspects of metaphor studies that seem to have escaped the notice of 
cognitive scientists and linguists, and especially the major names in the new cognitive 
science of metaphorology, at least thus far.  
More precisely, this dissertation attempts to take an initial step in the exploration 
of myths and archetypes as emergent concepts of bodily experience. This exploration will 
take place in the context of the seemingly mutually exclusive perspectives on metaphor 
cursorily explained in the following pages, and more elaborately described in Chapter 
Two. Instead of presenting empirical research in the field of metaphor studies, this 
dissertation aims at synthesizing a theoretical approach that is based on a secondary study 
of cognitive, linguistic, literary, philosophical, and anthropological theories. This 
approach, which necessitates a role call of writers on metaphor, myth, and the 
imagination, allows for the extraction of valuable insights from various scholarly 
domains. It leads to the investigation of the East/West dichotomy and the interpretive 
analysis of The Great Gatsby, which intend to exemplify the applicability of this 





The Master Tropes: An Excursion 
In the long-standing debate over literal and figurative language (see, for example, 
Hawkes 1972; Mac Cormac 1985), metaphor is traditionally taken to be the most 
fundamental form of figurative language. Figurative language is language that does not 
mean what it says. Language which means (or intends to mean) what it says, and which 
uses words in their standardized sense, derived from the common practice of ordinary 
speakers of a language, is said to be literal. Figurative language is believed to obstruct 
literal usage through the practice of transferring meaning from one word to another, with 
the aim of achieving a new, wider, special, or more precise meaning. The various 
linguistic manifestations of transference are called figures of speech or tropes—that is, 
“turnings” of language away from literal meanings and toward figurative meanings. 
Metaphor is generally considered to manifest the basic pattern of transference involved—
the transfer of characteristics of one object or word to another word or object, as in the 
foundational metaphor “life is a journey.” Metaphor thus can be thought of as the 
fundamental figure of speech.  
The word metaphor comes from the Greek word µetaf ??? [metaforá], and is 
derived from µeta [meta], meaning over or beyond, and f e????  [feréin], meaning to carry. 
Traditionally, its use has largely been in reference to a particular set of linguistic 
processes whereby aspects of the meaning of one word are carried beyond themselves 
and transferred to another object, so that the second word is spoken of as if it were the 
first. There are various types of metaphor, and the number of words involved can vary—
as in “life is a journey” or “death is the mother of beauty,” but the general procedure of 
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transference remains the same, presumably independent of language or context. In other 
words, metaphor is understood as an example of a trope, a non- literal, indirect linguistic 
method of description. 
The other figures of speech tend to be derived from the prototypical figure of 
speech of metaphor, particularly the other three main traditional categories:  
1.  Simile. Where metaphor assumes that the transference is possible or has 
already taken place, simile proposes the transference, and espresses it by means of terms 
such as like or as if. A good example of this trope can be found in the beginning lines of 
T. S. Eliot’s (1888-1965) “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” (1915):  
 Let us go then you and I, where the evening  
Is spread out against the sky, 
Like a patient etherized upon a table. (1-3) 
2.  Synecdoche. The word is Greek, derived from s??e?d??este??  
[sinekthékhestein] meaning to receive jointly. Here the transference takes the form of an 
expression denoting a part of something being carried over to stand in place of the whole 
thing ,as in twenty summers for twenty years, or as in ten hands for ten men. Synecdoche 
occurs on various levels of communication; the German colloquialism 5,- DM Eintritt 
pro Nase,  i.e. 5 German marks admission for each nose—is a synecdoche where the 
nose, as part of the human face, stands for a human being. 
3.  Metonymy. This word comes from the Greek word µet???µ?a  
[metonomía], derived from µeta [meta], meaning over, beyond, and at times, change, and 
???µa [ónoma], meaning name. Here the name of a thing is transferred to take the place 
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of something else with which it is associated—The White House for The President of the 
United States; The Crown for The Monarch, and so on. Clearly, the process often 
involves personification, and is closely related to that of synecdoche.  
Of course, it would be possible to greatly extend and complicate the list of these 
categories, and rhetoric has traditionally done so. However, the traditional rhetorical 
distinctions between the various categories become so finely drawn that something in the 
mind withers at the prospect of unfolding the mysteries of antonomasia, hyperbaton, 
metalepsis, and the rest, and in any case, these categories were designed principally as 
standard formulae to help with composition, not critical response. Nonetheless, interest in 
the phenomenon of metaphor can hardly be said to have diminished over the last three 
thousand years. On the contrary, the twentieth century has witnessed yet another surge of 
attention in the phenomenon of metaphor. 
In recent decades, the scholarly fields of anthropology, literary studies, linguistics, 
and cognitive science, have been concerned with how our brains perceive structure, 
conceptualize reality, and express the results of both of these cognitive processes through 
the medium of language in general, and in the form of literature in particular. Attention to 
these issues is guided by the question of how essential metaphorical concepts serve as a 
basis of human conceptualization and categorization. George Lakoff (1941-) and Mark 
Johnson (1949-) are centrally important in regard to many recent developments in the 
field of metaphor studies. They have repeatedly argued (see, for example, Metaphors We 
Live By, from now on MWLB, and Philosophy in the Flesh, from now on PITF) that 
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traditional Western philosophy, in part because of its metaphysical, introspective 
approach, has reached incorrect conclusions about basic philosophical questions.  
Lakoff and Johnson suggest a view of metaphor which they perceive of as 
essentially different from the traditional outline given above. They state: 
   Most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. 
We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday 
life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary 
conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is 
fundamentally metaphorical in nature. (MWLB 3) 
Metaphors We Live By regards metaphor as an indispensable ingredient of cognition. In a 
later work, Lakoff extends this view to cover metonymy, which he also sees as “one of 
the basic characteristics of cognition,” in which people “take one well-understood or 
easy-to-perceive aspect of something and use it to stand either for the thing as a whole or 
for some other aspect or part of it” (Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, from now on 
WFDT 77). While there are counterarguments to the notion that metaphorical mappings 
are always directed from the better-understood concept to the less-directly understood 
concept (see Grady 1997), the underlying thought processes, the processes of transporting 
a concept from one context to another, are the same in the of metonymy as well as 
metaphor.  
Analysts such as David Lodge (1935-) and Roman Jakobson have identified 
metaphor as one of two master tropes, with analogy and simile as subclasses of metaphor 
(Lodge 1990; Jakobson 1956). The second master trope is metonymy, with synecdoche as 
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a subclass, in which a part or an attribute stands for the whole, or the whole for a part. 
Lodge sees the two master tropes as central to discourse: 
Metaphor is derived from similarity, and metonymy and synecdoche are 
derived from contiguity. As soon as discourse deviates from strictly literal, 
denotative reference, it will tend to do so either in the form of metaphor 
and simile, or in the form of metonymy and synecdoche. (151).  
Umberto Eco (1932-) agrees with the primacy of “metaphoric mechanisms and 
metonymic mechanisms; to these one can probably ascribe the entire range of tropes, 
figures of speech, and figures of thought” (251). Nonetheless, there is also some 
argument about the relationship between metonymy and metaphor.  
In his seminal essay, “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic  
Disturbances,” Jakobson considers metonymy as a different principle of organization in 
comparison to that of metaphor, as do René Wellek (1903-1995) and Austin Warren 
(1899-1986) in A Theory of Literature (1976). Scott Simpkins suggests that Jakobson’s 
article is “perhaps the best-known commentary on metonomy,” where Jakobson 
distinguishes between figurative language based on either metaphor or metonymy 
(Simpkins, Critical Semiotics: Lecture Eight). Jakobson makes the point that metaphor 
and metonymy correspond to two fundamental, and fundamentally different, modes of 
processing symbolic information. As Simpkins clarifies, 
metaphor, he [Jakobson] argues, consists of an operation of selection and 
substitution based on similarity (109). “Similarity in meaning connects the 
symbols of a metalanguage with the symbols of the language referred to,” he says. 
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“Similarity connects a metaphorical term with the term for which it is substituted” 
(113). Metonymy derives from combination and contexture based on contiguous 
associations. This entails “projections from the line of a habitual context into the 
line of substitution and selection” (Modes of Modern Writing 105). 
In one form of aphasia, which Jakobson calls contiguity disorder, patients have problems 
talking about anything that is not present, generating apparent metaphors; in the second 
form, called similarity disorder, patients make ‘metonymic’ mistakes such as substituting 
“knife” for “fork” or “smoke” for “pipe” (Jakobson 58). However, neither Jakobson nor 
Lodge presents any evidence that these patients are using the same processes of metaphor 
and metonymy as those used in normal speech or literature. Indeed, Lodge has some 
difficulty with the extensive use of metonymy in literature, which he sees as essentially 
metaphoric. He explains this by saying that even though metonymy is used, “the literary 
text is always metaphoric in the sense that when we interpret it [. . .] we make it into a 
total metaphor: the text is the vehicle, the world is its tenor” (Modes of Modern Writing 
109). Unfortunately, this explanation does not appear to fully resolve all of the 
contradictions or all of the controversy that surrounds the phenomena of metaphor, 
metonymy, and the other tropes. 
Despite some controversy, however, the primacy of the two master tropes is 
widely recognized as being not only central to discourse but also to the development of 
language, particularly in the case of metaphor. Eco suggests that, 
the majority of our messages, in everyday life or in academic philosophy, 
are lined with metaphors. The problem of the creativity of language 
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emerges, not only in the privileged domain of poetic discourse, but each 
time that language - in order to designate something that culture has not 
yet assimilated [. . .] must invent combinatory possibilities or semantic 
couplings not anticipated by the code. (62) 
In accord with Lakoff and Johnson, other scholars too see the two tropes as central to 
more than just language. As Lodge suggests, “metaphor and metonymy are in fact 
manipulations of two processes that are basic to language, and perhaps to all perception 
and representation - selection and combination. (“Narration with Words” 150).  
There seem, then, to be at least two fundamental views of metaphor. There is 
what might be called the traditional view—today regarded as linguistically naïve—which 
understands metaphor to be a linguistic expression detachable from language—that is, 
one of many figurative devices that may be imported into language in order to achieve 
specific, preconceived effects. These devices are perceived, at best, to aid language to 
achieve what is seen as its major goal, the revelation of the reality of a world that lies, 
unchanging, beyond language; at worst, they are considered to impede language in 
achieving its goal of communicating clearly. To provide a contemporary example of this 
traditional view, one needs to look no further than the guidelines that are supposed to 
concern this dissertation: the University of North Texas, in its March 2001 edition of the 
Toulouse School of Graduate Studies Online Filing Instructions for Electronic 
Documents (Tate et al.) includes a section that states:  
An argument or a study is not a human being and should not be spoken of 
as though it possessed human capabilities or attributes. As the editors of 
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the APA Publication Manual explain, “An experiment cannot attempt to 
demonstrate, control unwanted variables, or interpret findings (35).”  
This notion of metaphor, including the prohibition of its usage in order for aspiring 
scholars to produce nonmetaphorical prose, is certainly in accord with traditional views 
about metaphor. In asking writers to avoid linguistic expressions based on conceptual 
metaphors such as ARGUMENT IS WAR and forbidding any personifications, this 
manual obviously fails to take into account the current status quo of metaphor theory. It 
asks for the impossible—a language without metaphors.  
In contrast to this first view, there is what might be called the cognitive view, 
which sees metaphor as inseparable from a language that is fundamentally metaphorical, 
and a reality that is ultimately the end product of an essentially metaphorical interaction 
between words and embodied experience as an expression of cognitive processes. 
Metaphor, deliberately invoked, intensifies language’s characteristic activity, and 
involves, quite literally, the creation of different realities (MWLB 139-146).  
This possible creation of a new reality is perhaps one of the reasons Plato was not 
at all fond of poets, for a poet—the word is derived from the Greek πο?ιν [poéin], 
meaning to create—is a creator of a fictional reality. For Plato, a poet’s works, imbued 
with the creative power of metaphor, will create a concrete reality that is itself an 
imitation of the concrete imitations that surround humans and their inventions. One can 
clearly arrive at this conclusion after taking a closer look at Plato’s doctrine of ideas: it 
postulates that the materiality of the visible world emanates from a higher ideal realm. He 
believed that the true reality lies in this invisible and universal spiritual realm; thus, 
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poetry is a fictional creation based on our immediately perceived reality, which is in itself 
already the imitation of the Real, and twice removed from the abstract ideal Plato 
believed in.  
 
Outline and Goals 
In his 1993 article “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” published as a new 
contribution to Andrew Ortony’s second edition of Metaphor and Thought, Lakoff states 
that the “contemporary theory that metaphor is primarily conceptual, conventional, and 
part of the ordinary system of thought and language can be traced to Michael Reddy’s 
[…] now classic essay, ‘The Conduit Metaphor’” (203). Alongside the arguments other 
scholars have made (see, for example, Jäkel 1997, Turner 1998), this dissertation 
disagrees with this notion, which seemingly discredits all philosophical considerations of 
the Western tradition since before Plato (427 BCE-348 BCE) as flawed; poets, critics, 
and philosophers of the last three thousand years have issued credible and plausible 
statements about the nature of reason, the nature of humankind, and the potential 
functions of metaphor as underlying cognitive processes.  
Since the inception of their joint endeavors, Lakoff and Johnson have aimed at 
discrediting pre-cognitive science systems of Western thought in general, and pre-
cognitive science treatises of metaphor in particular, as simply false, and not fitting 
human cognitive reality. As a matter of fact, they have invested considerable effort in this 
venture—MWLB (1980) devotes chapter 18 and chapters 25 through 29 to the rebuttal of 
Western philosophical, sociological, and epistemological concepts—assigning over 50 of 
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approximately 240 pages to the construction of their approach as a virtual deus ex 
machina to solve the problem that the “dominant views on meaning in Western 
philosophy and linguistics are inadequate” (ix), asserting that “we can never go back to a 
priori philosophizing about mind and language” (PITF 7). This project continues through 
other publications such as Lakoff’s Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (1987), where 
chapter eight and chapters eleven through sixteen are devoted to what postmodernists 
would call a deconstruction of all principles not in concurrence with cognitive linguistics. 
Finally, in Philosophy in the Flesh (1999), Lakoff and Johnson again devote considerable 
effort and energy to the project of clearly distinguishing and separating their approach to 
metaphor and cognition from so-called a priori approaches that have tried to explain the 
relationship between human language, cognition, and culture (PITF 74-93). The main 
problem here does not necessarily lie in these efforts themselves, but rather in the fact 
that Lakoff and Johnson try to refute the most extreme stances anyone could ever take on, 
say, deconstructionist theory, in order to endow their cognitive approach with more 
plausibility. In other words, they attempt to deconstruct views that hardly anyone 
following the respective schools of thought actually adheres to, while at the same time 
using the methods of deconstruction, thereby seemingly ascribing validity to the basic 
tenets of deconstruction in the process (see, for example, PITF 89-94). 
Clearly, this work does not disagree with the central points of the theory put forth 
by Lakoff, Johnson, and numerous other scholars in the field of cognitive linguistics. 
However, after discerning a strong need for a move away from some of the sweeping 
(and powerful) generalizations made in the name of cognitive linguistics, it seems 
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relevant to take a closer look at some of the influential classical works and authors to 
determine what exactly they have to say about the phenomenon of metaphor before 
anyone can readily dismiss classical notions in the name of the recent trend of cognitive 
science.  Thus, with Chapter Two, this work will begin by briefly revisiting the history of 
the theory of metaphor. Naturally, a detailed revisiting of every major text on metaphor is 
neither possible nor does it appear beneficial. And yet, it is possible to scrutinize some of 
the more influential works on metaphor written in the Western tradition. Upon closer 
study, readers will find that many thinkers throughout the course of the Western history 
of ideas have time and again expressed an understanding of the cognitive metaphorical 
processes governing much of the human mind. It will emerge that much of this pre-
cognitive science understanding of mental processes was offered before Reddy, and that 
cognitive linguistics is not an almighty deus ex machina.  
It is noteworthy, however, that “pointing to potential predecessors of the cognitive 
theory of metaphor is neither an end in itself nor done for the sake of historical justice 
alone” (Jäkel 9) is  a statement true of Jäkel’s study as much as it is true of this 
dissertation. The theories put forth by some of the potential predecessors to cognitive 
theories of language could make substantial contributions and suggest meaningful 
amendments to a cognit ive theory of metaphor (Danesi “Language” 5; Jäkel 10).  
The discussion in Chapter Two will concentrate on some of the major influential 
texts on which traditional—that is—presumably false assumptions (from a cognitive 
science perspective) about metaphor are based. These assumptions are: 
1. All everyday conventional language is literal, and none is metaphorical. 
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2. All subject matter can be comprehended literally, without metaphor. 
3. Only literal language can be contingently true or false. 
4. All definitions given in the lexicon of a language are literal, not 
metaphorical. 
5. The concepts used in the grammar of a language are all literal; none are 
metaphorical. (Lakoff, “Contemporary Theory of Metaphor” 204) 
Discussing some of the more influential classical/traditional Western texts on metaphor, 
language, and language philosophy in Chapter Two will only be the first step taken here. 
It will serve the purpose of showing that cognitive science finds itself progressing along 
an intellectual continuum, illustrating the existence of a thought process that long ago 
realized the necessity to break with parts of traditional Western philosophy, and that 
should be understood as a continuous counter-discourse to what has been perceived as the 
mainstream view on metaphor. Admittedly, no one has yet undertaken such a coherent, 
structured, well-supported, and empirically founded endeavor as have George Lakoff, 
Mark Johnson, Mark Turner (1954-), Eve Sweetser, Ray Gibbs, and Gilles Fauconnier—
just to name a few of the most prolific scientists invested in the rewriting of Western 
philosophy. However, apart from metaphorical concepts based on an existence 
determined by our everyday experience of life on a planet that provides particular living 
conditions, languages, and through their mediation processes, cultures, seem to share 
more than a basic metaphorical conceptualization expressed via linguistic metaphor.  
The suggestion to investigate language and culture—and thus, literature—from a 
holistic perspective certainly calls for an interdisciplinary approach that brings together 
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ideas, theories, and concepts from a number of investigative fields. Anthropologists, 
linguists, psychologists, and other scientists have a long-standing tradition of adopting 
methodologies from other fields. One only needs to think of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-) 
and his work resulting in the publication of Structural Anthropology (1976), the 
methodology of which he derived from theories laid out by the structural linguists of the 
Prague School, as well as Sigmund Freud’s approach to psychoanalysis, to comprehend 
how common and potent these investigations have proven to be (McGee and Warms 
310).  
Similarly, in recent years, cognitive scientists from various fields have argued that 
“cultural knowledge—shared presuppositions about the world—plays an enormous role 
in human understanding, a role that must be recognized and incorporated into any 
successful theory of the organization of human knowledge.” Cognitivists have therefore 
“converged in the study of knowledge, its organization, and its role in language 
understanding, language production, and the performance of other cognitive tasks” 
(Quinn and Holland vii). Obviously, the study of language as well as the study of culture 
will be concentrated in the respective academic fields that propose to investigate these 
phenomena—linguistics and anthropology. These two fields share an inherent historical 
and methodological connection. For example, linguistics was of particular interest to 
Franz Boas (1858-1942), whose method of research, later labeled historical 
particularism, is widely considered the first American-born school of anthropological 
thought (McGee and Warms 128). In “Methods of Ethnology,” Boas refers to the idea 
that language determines the categories we use to think (289). By the same token, the 
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subfield of linguistics known as sociolinguistics has been defined as “the study of 
language in its social [i.e. cultural] contexts; it is a field of study which “clearly lies at the 
intersection of linguistics and [. . .] anthropology” (Coupland and Jaworski 482).  
Furthermore, one of the many direct relations between literary studies—the 
original departure point of my scholarly endeavors—and anthropology lies in the latter’s 
meticulous exploration of narrative structures and stories, which exist in every culture, 
for example, as myths. Lévi-Strauss believes that cultural phenomena such as myths are 
products of underlying logical processes that structure human thought. His interest in 
mythology derives from his belief that studying the mythologies of ‘primitive’ people 
allows him to examine the unconscious universal patterning of human thought (McGee 
and Warms 310-311). Myths have repeatedly been defined as sense-making models of 
the human mind; myths, often enacted through ritual and thus classifiable as cultural 
practices, form “part of the venerable tradition in anthropology concerning the role of 
myth in society” (Hutchins 269). Herbert Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980) and Wilfred 
Watson (1911-1981) are among the scho lars who understand the linguistic expressions of 
archetypes and myths as a “recurring pattern of literary experience” (15).  
If, then, one of the tasks of cognitive anthropologists is indeed to elucidate models 
of “cultural models and the part they play in human language and thought” (Quinn and 
Holland vii), it must appear rather surprising that neither cognitive anthropologists nor 
cognitive linguists, who proclaim their task to be the description of the human 
“conceptual system” by “looking at language” (MWLB 3), have taken it upon themselves 
to look at the nexus formed by metaphors, myths, and archetypes. If Lakoff and Johnson 
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have determined that there are Metaphors We Live By, and Colin Grant has provided 
evidence that there are Myths We Live By (1999), how is it possible that scholars have 
seemingly failed to explore the relationship between these phenomena?  
Indeed, scholars have displayed an intensified interest in the conceptual, 
symbolic, and semantic aspects of metaphor, in addition to the creation of the categories 
of prototypes and a theory pertaining to their relevance for cognitive processes. However, 
no one interested in metaphor seems to even have considered looking specifically at the 
potentially cognitive relationship between myths (as products of a specific culture) and 
metaphors (as products of a specific culture). In February 1999, during a linguistics 
conference at the University of Texas at Arlington, George Lakoff advanced the notion 
that there is no connection between the concepts of archetypes as universal cultural 
symbols and related studies on myths as universal cultural stories, and the way cognitive 
linguistics understands metaphors. And yet, it is prudent to suggest that if metaphor is 
primarily a mode of thought, then evidence for metaphorical concepts cannot be limited 
to linguistic expressions or evidence from neurophysiology, neurobiology, and other hard 
sciences. This is the reason this work intends to set in motion an addition to the 
fundamentally important “convergent evidence” (PITF 82-87) on which the field of 
cognitive linguistics rests; there appears to be sufficient data to regard cultural practices, 
often controlled by cultural models expressed in myths and archetypes, as capable of 
providing possible evidence of metaphorical mental concepts. 
Inspired by readings of several texts that supply reasons to challenge Lakoff’s 
stance on this issue, this dissertation attempts to take a first step in the direction of 
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exploring the relationship of conceptual metaphors and underlying image-schemas in 
comparison to myths and archetypes. There are possible connections between the 
cognitive models expressed through myth, and the cognitive models expressed via 
metaphor with its transferring qualities. This then is the primary endeavor of this work: to 
begin the exploration of how metaphorical concepts and image-schemas, and myths and 
archetypal motifs, as expressions of cognitive processes, may be related.  
Since the study of linguistic expressions falls primarily into the domain of 
linguistics, and the study of myths and archetypes falls primarily into the scholarly 
discipline of anthropology (despite the initial ties archetypal theories have to 
psychology), a chapter will be dedicated to each of these disciplines. Chapter Three 
provides a brief overview of important developments in twentieth-century linguistics—as 
far as the study of metaphor is concerned—and concludes with a more detailed 
presentation of some of the relevant ideas structuring the field of cognitive linguistics at 
the present time. Since many of the ideas and tenets of cognitive linguistics are referred 
to throughout this dissertation, the ideas presented in this section primarily serve as a 
primer rather than as a thorough introduction to the field. Such introductions have 
recently been published (see, for example, Janssen and Redeker 1999, Cuenca and 
Hilferty 1999, and Ungerer and Schmidt 1996), and give much more detailed accounts 
than would be possible here. 
Chapter Four will introduce readers to some of the relevant tenets of 
anthropology, with a concise focus on the study of myth in the hope of finding 
convergent evidence that may allow a deeper comprehension of human mental processes 
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as expressed via myth and metaphor. Subsequently, Chapter Four discusses how 
cognitive linguistics and cognitive anthropology appear to be linked in both goals and 
methodologies. For each discipline reveals important clues to the functions and structures 
of languages related to their respective cultures, and expressive of mental concepts. If 
indeed the domains of language, culture, and reality—with literature as a product of and 
an influence on these three domains—are as interdependent as postmodern thinkers 
claim, then reaching a more thorough understanding of human existence demands from 
researchers the inclusion of not only linguistic expressions of metaphorical concepts as 
one of the bases of conceptualization, but also the providing of a framework for building 
a relationship between cultural practices and language—a project which has already 
begun to take shape in the form of the development of theories about Idealized Cognitive 
Models and Cultural Cognitive Models. 
Chapter Four continues by using the Tale of Jonah as a cursorily examined 
exemplar, for this short narrative provides initial proof for the hypothesis of a correlation 
between archetypes and metaphors: the archetypal motif of the opposition of East and 
West in the text finds simultaneous expression through what Lakoff and Johnson call the 
“spatialization concept” (MWLB 15-19). This concept, as a structuring principle of 
thought that has become ingrained in the very core of language, is based on the binary 
opposition of “up” and “down,” which in return is based on human orientation in space. 
While correlations between metaphorical concepts/linguistic metaphors and 
cultural concepts/archetypes in terms of the binary opposition between East and West can 
be found in modern texts as well, it seems a condition sine qua non for the textual 
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analysis of Chapters Five to limit its focus to the Idealized Conceptual Model (see 
Chapter Four; and also WFDT 68-77) of an East/West dichotomy, for this one conceptual 
model activates a larger number of related conceptual metaphors, as the detailed analysis 
of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s (1896-1940) The Great Gatsby (1925) indicates. 
For example, as John Carlos Rowe suggests, by taking into consideration Annette 
Kolodny’s (1941-) studies in The Lay of the Land (1975) and The Land Before Her 
(1984), where Kolodny concludes that the works she analyzes are guided by the “land as 
woman” metaphor, readers can examine “the various ways writers in the United States 
have feminized nature, thus combining the aims of patriarchal and territorial domination, 
gender hierarchies and the ideology of imperialism” (205). Similarly, in “Cuerpo de 
mujer,” Pablo Neruda (1904-1973) also uses various metaphors based on the ‘woman-as-
land’ mapping, as does Susan Griffin in Woman and Nature. From this perspective, it 
becomes possible to interpret Daisy Fay in The Great Gatsby as a valuable representative 
of the notion that a “woman’s body [that] has often been treated as a territory to be 
‘conquered’” (199). By further developing Kolodny’s perspective with methodologies 
taken from cognitive science, while simultaneously taking into consideration data about 
the structures of archetypes and myths, the following becomes evident: Kolodny fails to 
recognize that in all the authors’ works she deals with, the enactment of the source-path-
goal schema of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor (Lakoff and Turner, More than Cool 
Reason 98-100, from now on MTCR; PITF 60-64; 190-192) is directed westward (in 
terms of archetypes, the symbols of darkness and descent)—and thus negatively charged. 
By the same token, the metaphorically expressed, and materialistically motivated ideas of 
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“patriarchal and territorial domination, gender hierarchies and the ideology of 
imperialism” (Rowe 199) that describe the focus of her project are also negatively 
charged. 
Notably, Daisy Fay’s objectification through the various instances of the “woman 
as object” metaphor is accompanied by Gatsby’s seemingly spiritually motivated 
mythical quest eastward. Gatsby finds “that he had committed himself to the following of 
the grail” (Fitzgerald 116), a holy relic that has been a desired object in Western culture 
for centuries. Gatsby is looking for his holy grail, an archetypal Western symbol of 
redemption, but his redemption can only come through the reclamation of the grail—that 
is, Daisy Fay, who “gleams like silver”—that he once possessed. This way of looking at 
language through literature will not only side with Lakoff and Johnson’s views 
underlying the contemporary theory of metaphor, but it will also supplement their 
endeavor. As much as Lakoff and Johnson claim that metaphor is not only a matter of 
language, and consequently, culture, but also of conceptual structure based on embodied 
reason, myths and archetypes also are not merely a matter of language and culture, but 
seem to be representative of the human brain’s conceptual inventory.  
In addition, exploring The Great Gatsby with this critical inventory seems to 
necessitate highlighting the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A CONQUEST. This 
conceptual metaphor appears to be cognitively real and seems to be activated 
independently of whether the hero/heroine seeks material or spiritual gains, and 
independently of whether movement is directed eastward or westward. This is 
particularly illuminating when considering that spiritual redemption, as in the case of Jay 
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Gatsby, is ultimately worded in terms of material possession, and, more precisely, in 
terms of reclaiming the grail he once possessed.  
The Conclusion will propose possible avenues for continuing this project, and 
suggest possibilities for additional probing into the theories of cognitive linguistics, 
cognitive anthropology, psychology, sociology, and the study of myth, to further develop 
the approach outlined here. 
Humans indeed conceptualize metaphorically—metaphor is a mental process, and 
the metaphorical expressions humans use are just residual evidence of how they think. 
However, if this knowledge is supposed to change the world, and to, as Lakoff and 
Johnson originally claimed, give “an adequate account of [human] understanding” 
(MWLB ix) cognitive scientists will fall short of their goal. Only by using these combined 
insights to further an interdisciplinary approach could it be possible to explore the 
complexities of human cognition. To take a first step into this direction is the high hope 




METAPHOR AS AN ORNAMENT TO LANGUAGE 
Logic is only the Beginning of Wisdom, not the End. 
   “Spock” Leonard Nimoy (1931-) 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter will take readers through some of the most influential Western works 
on the nature of metaphor. Beginning with Aristotle, it proceeds to a brief discussion of 
major Latin works, clarifying their influence on the works produced in the Middle Ages, 
which permeate the ideas of some of the foremost thinkers of the Renaissance and the 
Eighteenth Century. At the beginning of the section on British Romantic poets, readers 
will notice that a brief discussion of Plato’s ideas has been reserved for this part of 
Chapter Two, because his ideas seem to represent the basis for much of the valuable 
insights the Romantics had on the nature of metaphor.  
William Wordsworth’s (1770-1850) premise that real poetry uses “language 
really spoken by man” is only one of the several examples displaying the beginning of 
the deconstruction of what has been perceived as the classical mainstream dichotomy of 
literal and figurative language that had placed metaphor in the corner as an artificial, 
ornamental, and perhaps non-essential, linguistic device. As a result the second part of 
Chapter Two is called “Turning the Tide;” this is where a distinctive movement away 
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from traditional, mostly incorrect, ideas about metaphor emerges more clearly as a 
manifestation of the counter-discourse briefly described in the Chapter One. When 
looking at the various ideas and theories about the nature of metaphor, however, it 
will become evident that “Logic is only the Beginning of Wisdom, not the End.” Without 
the empirical basis of the most recent approaches to metaphor, the great minds of 
classical philosophers—except some of the groundbreaking British Romantic poets, 
perhaps—primarily lacked the ability to provide anything but superficial support for their 
claims. It is no surprise, then, that a modern reevaluation of some of the classical texts of 
Western thought discussed in more detail finds many, albeit not all, of the traditional 
ideas on metaphor wanting, misleading, and in dire need of revision. 
 
Aristotle
The ancient Greek f ???s?f e? [filósofes] were certain that language was one of the 
most distinctive human features. Philosophers even used human speech to define 
humankind; among other things, man was ???? p???t???? [zóon políitkon], a social 
creature or literally, a creature belonging to the polis, as well as a ???? ????? ???? [zóon 
lógon échon], a living creature possessing (speech and) logic. These faculties, as much as 
the faculty of reason, both signified by the word ????? [lógos], distinguished homo 
sapiens from other animals.  
Aristotle (ca. 384-322 BCE) was perhaps the foremost classical philosopher to 
deliberate upon the nature of metaphor. He must have been aware of the radical nature of 
what he was proposing when he divided the arts of language into three distinct categories: 
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logic, rhetoric, and poetic. His philosophy implies that these categories can be considered 
separate entities, because, as Richard McKeon (1900-1985) puts it, “different purposes 
and different criteria select different aspects of language to constitute different wholes 
from different parts” (178). In effect, this means that the language of poetry has to be 
distinct from the languages of rhetoric and logic, for it serves a different purpose. 
For Aristotle, there is a fundamental difference between the ordinary or prose use 
of words and the distinctive or poetic use of them. In fact, the notion of metaphor as 
departure from the ordinary modes of language runs through most of his writings on the 
subject. It is in the Poetics (Chapters 21-25) and the Rhetoric (Book III) that Aristotle 
goes into minute detail on the subject of metaphor. He distinguishes four kinds within the 
general definition that “metaphor is the application to one thing of a name belonging to 
another thing” (Poetics 61). Aristotle carries out his analysis in terms of content, not 
form, and he characterizes the transference involved as follows: 
1. From the genus to the species (Here lies my ship: lying is a genus, lying at 
anchor a species). 
2. From the species to the genus (Ten thousand good deeds: a specific 
number, used instead of many). 
3. From one species to another (Draining off the life with the bronze 
(weapon), draining off used in place of severing. Both are species of 
taking away). 
4. A matter of analogy (ship is to vessel as Athenian is to human). (60-62) 
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 Obviously, the first three types closely relate to each other in ways that type four does 
not. Today, hardly anybody would consider types one through three to be metaphors. 
Aristotle decidedly devoted his time primarily to an account of this last proportional sort 
of metaphor, which he recognized as the most complex and involved kind, since it 
demands the use of analogy as a way of describing one thing in terms of another. 
Aristotle says, “I explain metaphor by analogy as what may happen when of four things 
the second stands in the same relationship to the first as the fourth to the third” (60, 
emphasis added). That is, the four elements of analogy—A, B, C, D—are connected in 
the way that B’s relationship with A is analogous to D’s with C. As an example, Aristotle 
cites the following pair of relationships: a goblet stands in the same relationship to 
Dionysus as a shield does to Ares. Therefore, a goblet could be called “the shield of 
Dionysus” and a shield may be called the “goblet of Ares” (Rhetoric III 230). Old age is 
to life as evening is to day; consequently one may say that “old age is the evening of 
life,” based on what cognitive linguists have identified as the conceptual metaphor LIFE 
IS A DAY. However, transference in the other direction seems rather odd; one cannot 
really say that “evening is the old age of day” without causing eyebrows to rise, for this 
would violate restrictions of the mapping process that underlies metaphoric transference 
(MWLB 52-55; “Contemporary Theory of Metaphor” 212-216).  
Metaphoric transference, as far as scholars can tell today, is always unidirectional, 
occurring in the direction from the source domain, from the thing/concept humans 
experience more directly, to the target domain, the thing/concept about which humans 
know less (but see Grady, “A Typology of Motivation for Conceptual Metaphor” 95). A 
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DAY IS LIFE is not a conceptual metaphor, at least not in English. Consequently, a 
simple schematic of accepted transferences based on Aristotle’s example would look like 
this: 
    LIFE            DAY 
(A) Old age:  (B) Evening 
 (C) Youth:     (D) Morning 
Thus B? A: Old age is the evening of life; but only awkwardly A? B: Evening is the old 
age of the day. 
Thus D? C: Youth is the morning of life; but only awkwardly C? D: Morning is the 
youth of the day. 
When Pericles (495-429 BCE) said that the death of the young men in the 
Peloponnesian War (431 BCE) was “as if the spring were taken out of the year,” 
(Rhetoric III 246) he was using what Aristotle calls the proportional type of metaphor. 
Cognitive Linguistics has found evidence suggesting that expressions like Pericles’ 
statement about the death of the young men have their basis in conceptual metaphors—
that is, basic metaphors created in the cognitive process of cross-domain mapping. Cross-
domain mapping is believed to constitute an essential tool of human cognition, necessary 
for the understanding of complex, relatively abstract concepts, which are relatively 
unknown, in terms of relatively concrete concepts known better or understood better. The 
better-known concept is called the source domain—it is the source for information or an 
image that is transferred, under certain restrictions, to the target domain, the concept 
humans know less about. Any metaphorical mapping, used to project “certain aspects of 
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the source domain onto the target domain, thereby producing a new understanding of the 
target domain” (MTCR 38-39), creates correspondences that are necessarily limited by 
the hypothetical Invariance Principle. The Invariance Principle guarantees that 
“metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema 
structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the 
target domain” (Lakoff, Contemporary Theory” 215). The underlying conceptual 
metaphor for Pericles’ sentence is that LIFE IS A YEAR. A year, with its four seasons 
can be seen as manifesting an inherent structural similarity with a day, which consists of 
the four stages morning, afternoon, evening, and night, is the source domain. From the 
latter, humans map certain characteristics onto life, the target domain, in order to get a 
better understanding of the mysteries of life. Spring corresponds to youth, summer to 
adulthood, fall to old age, and winter to death. It should therefore not at all be surprising 
that Stephen King’s (1947-) short story collection Different Seasons (1982) was 
translated into German with the title Frühling, Sommer, Herbst, und Tod (1992); the 
German title, translated back into English, would be Spring, Summer, Fall, and Death, 
where winter, in the list of seasons, is replaced by its metaphorical equivalent death. This 
is only possible because of the metaphorical transference of meanings from source to 
target domain. 
 Aristotle adds, “metaphor also preeminently involves clarity, pleasantness, and 
unfamiliarity” (Rhetoric III 219). Thus, charm and distinctness are the effects of properly 
used metaphors, as well as the characteristics of well-written poetry, while metaphors are 
suitable for prose only in a limited fashion. One cannot help but recall the ancient Latin 
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proverb that “variatio delectat”—variation [of style] delights—and that, according to 
Horace (65-8), good literature is always able to “prodesse et delectare”—to teach and 
delight. Supposedly, charm, distinctness, and variation of style, through their 
combination of the familiar with the unfamiliar, create beauty, and enhance clarity, 
instead of breeding confusion. Furthermore, Horace’s dictum seems to suggest that the 
more beautifully written an argument, the more persuasive it is—a notion that will 
become relevant again in discussion on Ramus and his thoughts on stylistic 
embellishment later in this chapter (see pages 44-50).  
 Readers may discern two fundamental ideas about language and its relationship to 
the real world behind Aristotle’s view of metaphor: first, that language and reality, words 
and the objective world they refer to, are quite separate entities; second, that the manner 
in which something is said does not significantly condition or alter what is said. Although 
cognitive scientists have taken issue with most of Aristotle’s ideas on the nature of 
metaphor, it is notable that Aristotle recognizes the creative, educational aspect of 
metaphor when he says that  
it is a fine thing to be able to make proper use of all the devices I have 
mentioned, [. . .] but far the most important thing to master is the use of 
metaphor. This is the one thing that cannot be learnt from anyone else [. . 
.]. The proper use of metaphor is the “mark of great natural ability, for the 
ability to use metaphor well implies a perception of resemblances among 
things which appear different. (Poetics 88)  
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Metaphor, Aristotle says, “enables us to ‘get hold of new ideas’; [. . .] strange words 
simply puzzle us; ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor 
that we can best get hold of something fresh” (Rhetoric III 242). In fact, metaphor is part 
of the learning process. The hearer is impressed by the liveliness of the metaphor and the 
new idea it contains. Thus, the idea of old age as a withered stalk conveys the new idea of 
lost bloom. This expression presents us with an extension of the conceptual metaphor 
PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, for human activities can under certain circumstances be 
described as the processes that plants undergo—humans, so to speak, can put down roots, 
grow, blossom, and finally, wither (MTCR 5-6, 8, 12-14). 
Surprisingly enough, however, Aristotle seems unable to extend his view of the 
capacities of metaphor to his concept of the nature of language at large. He does not even 
seem to grasp that the phrase the bare facts is itself metaphorical. Furthermore, when 
Aristotle says, “nobody uses fine language when teaching geometry” (217, emphasis 
added), he seems to suggest that fine language and metaphorical language are similar, if 
not the same. Teachers may not use fine language when teaching geometry or 
mathematics in general, but it seems rather unlikely that they can escape the use of 
metaphors in the language they use. Yet, if one looks at mathematics without considering 
the language teachers may use to instruct students, mathematics proper, which is similar 
to a natural language inasmuch as both are symbolic communicative systems devised by 
humans, one cannot escape the use of metaphor, as recent research in this area suggests. 
The American Mathematical Society has an entire website (http://www.ams.org/new-in-
math/cover/metonymy1.html) dedicated to metaphor and metonymy in mathematics. 
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Additionally, in Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind brings 
Mathematics into Being (2000), authors Lakoff and Núñez trace even the most abstract 
mathematical concepts back to their physical, human sources. They contend that 
mathematics arises out of ordinary cognitive processes, thereby delivering a body blow to 
Platonic notions of mathematics and indirectly suggesting broad new avenues of 
educational research. 
There are a number of obvious problems with Aristotle’s treatment of metaphor. 
Firstly, Aristotle places a strong emphasis on the role of the type hierarchy in metaphor 
production and interpretation, which results in altogether unconvincing metaphor 
derivations that appear overly convenient and contrived. In effect, Aristotle shifts the 
burden of metaphor interpretation onto an omnicompetent type hierarchy, where he 
expects that every metaphor can be resolved in terms of a single ontological traversal. 
This notion, however, adheres to the classicist perspective on the representation of 
knowledge, and Aristotle cannot be unduly faulted for an approach that has survived in 
philosophy for two millennia, failing to incorporate the recent upheavals in categorization 
theory heralded in works such as Eleanor Rosch and C. Mervis’ article “Family 
Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories” and Lakoff’s Women, 
Fire, and Dangerous Things.  
The classical view of categorization suggests that human beings sort things into 
categories based on feature detection—that is, by those features that are necessary and 
sufficient to sort them. Rosch had several objections to the classical view. She pointed 
out that subjects are unable to say which features they are using when they sort items into 
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categories, but they can tell you which items they believe to be most typical for a 
category. Rosch also draws on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) arguments, using the 
often quoted example of the human inability to define a game in terms of its necessary 
and sufficient features. Different games share family resemblances, but there are no 
invariant features common to all games. This led Rosch to build categories around 
prototypes. Rosch and Mervis found that the more prototypical a member of a category is 
rated, the more attributes it has in common with other members of its category, and the 
fewer attributes it has in common with members of contrasting categories. 
Secondly, Aristotle’s theory essentially advocates a substitutionist view of 
metaphor, inasmuch as one term stands for, or replaces another (but see Grady “A 
Typology of Motivation for Conceptual Metaphor”). Metaphor is not seen in Aristotle’s 
framework to be an essential feature of human communication; rather, it is described in 
the Poetics as a formula for achieving more colorful expression. Given a particular term 
one wishes to use, Aristotle’s definition above provides four different ways in which that 
term can be replaced with another.  
Thirdly, because metaphors are resolved as ontological manipulations, they have 
no representational status in themselves, and thus they cannot assume the role of active 
conceptual agents in the structuring of other concepts. For instance, there is no room in 
Aristotle’s theory for the systematic families of metaphors such as the spatial or 
ontological metaphors, which underlie much of the human common-sense understanding 
of the world (MWLB 14-21, 25-32). 
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  In the sections of Aristotle’s work discussed above, one can find the basis for the 
long-held belief in the binary opposition of literal and figurative language. Literal 
language is taken to be devoid of metaphor and other turns of speech; it is felt to be clear, 
precise, and, especially in its written form, it is believed, by some non- linguists, to lack 
ambiguity. Figurative language is then taken to be reserved for the special medium of 
poets and those that try to hide the fact that they have little or nothing to say. With their 
reevaluation of this theory—and according to Lakoff, a theory is all that Aristotle and his 
followers put forth with these claims (“Contemporary Theory of Metaphor” 202)—
cognitive scientists have helped us understand that this binary opposition does not exist in 




Aristotle isolated metaphor, affirming the notion of metaphor as a means for 
special linguistic effects that poets could achieve through language that was employed in 
a special way. Subsequent classical writers on the subject seem largely to reinforce this 
perspective on tropes. They refine the results of his analysis, and increasingly stress a 
principle of decorum, insisting on a necessary harmony or congruity between the 
elements of a metaphor.  
Cicero (106-43 BCE), for whom decorum is, as John William Hey Atkins (1874-
1951) says, “a principle of life transferred to the sphere of art,” (21) sees metaphor as one 
way of giving decorous effect to speech. In metaphor, you take what you do not have 
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from somewhere else—metaphor, so to speak, is a sort of borrowing. Cicero declares 
that, “a metaphor is a short form of simile, contracted into one word; this word is put in a 
position not belonging to it as if it were its own place, and if it is recognizable it gives 
pleasure, but if it contains no similarity it is rejected” (III, 121). The metaphor should 
avoid all unseemliness as well as obscurity. In its decorous form, metaphor is one of a 
group of figures whose role is cosmetic with respect to ordinary language, a most 
effective way of introducing highlights to give brilliance to style. 
 In The Art of Poetry, while giving priority to usage over abstract law in the matter 
of language, Horace nevertheless also advocates decorum in all matters of language and 
speech. Each style should be kept in its properly allotted role and the metaphors used 
should clearly follow suit. The role of metaphor is to present relationships that are 
harmonious and true to life, rather than exploratory or novel. 
 Longinus (213-273 BCE), in his On the Sublime, lists the proper formulation of 
figures of thought and figures of speech among the five sources of the grand style for 
which command of language is the “common foundation,” without which “sublimity” 
would be unachievable. However, it becomes clear that the rhetorical figures remain, 
predictably, separable from ordinary language, since they can readily be added to it as a 
“means of increasing the animation and the emotional impact of style” (108). Metaphors 
should only be used on appropriate occasions, and not more than two “or at most three” 
together in the same passage. It seems prudent here to clarify the following: traditionally, 
the keyword to Longinus’ treatise, the Greek word ?ψος [hapsos, height, elevation], has 
been translated as sublimity. Yet, the word does not, as Longinus uses it, mean precisely 
 36 
what readers may associate with sublimity today—that is, an outstanding and unusual 
exaltation of conception and style. To Longinus, it signifies a certain distinction and 
excellence of expression, the distinction and quality by which authors have been enabled 
to achieve immortal fame. There appears to be no single English word that fully conveys 
all this, but if Longinus’ initial definition is kept in mind, the meaning of sublimity in 
relation to metaphor should be clear: metaphor, as a figure of speech, enables poets as 
well as orators to achieve memorably distinct and exceptional expression if they use 
metaphor discreetly. 
Possib ly the culmination of this sort of approach to language and to metaphor is to 
be found in Quintilian’s (35-95) Institutio Oratoria. It elegantly sums up most of what 
Quintilian’s literary predecessors had expressed before, and is, in Atkins’ words, a 
“restatement of classicism” (66). For Quintilian, art is an aspect of nature, and it reveals 
nature. Hence, although correctness in language has its foundation in ordinary speech, 
language is not limited to ordinary forms of speech, because ordinary speech is 
inadequate in itself, and needs to be raised to a higher power for the purposes of art. 
Figures of speech and tropes have this elevating effect when used in a decorous manner. 
A trope consists of “the artistic alteration of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to 
another,” and “the commonest and by far the most beautiful of tropes” is of course 
“metaphor, the Greek term for our translatio” (literally, to carry (across) to the other side) 
(212). For Quintilian, metaphor’s ultimate decorative value obviously justifies its use of 
words and phrases in ways that are not proper. It is “the supreme ornament of style” 
 37 
(215). This discussion of Quintilian’s work, however, presents only one possible 
perspective. 
In Figurative Language and Thought (1998), Mark Turner addresses the 
relationship between language and thought from the perspective of classical rhetoric.  He 
argues that even Aristotle, to whom is often attributed the belief that metaphor was a 
mere figure of speech, held that metaphoric language was motiva ted by underlying 
conceptual commonalities. Indeed, according to Turner, the classical rhetorical view is 
that rhetorical figures are anchored in conceptual patterns. Citing a number of authors 
including Quintilian, Turner’s attempts show that the distinction between literal and 
figurative language has no real basis in classical rhetoric.  As Quintilian wrote, “Quare 
illo intellectu priore et communi nihil non figuratum est,” (“In the first and common 
sense of the word everything is expressed by figures,” Quintilian [1921]: 352-55, cited by 
Turner).  Turner suggests that it is only because Quintilian chose to focus on “artful” 
figures that figurative language has come to be thought of as ornamental and different in 
kind from the literal expression of meaning. Thereby, contrary to the claim repeatedly 
expressed by Lakoff and Johnson, Turner is willing to acknowledge historical 
predecessors to the cognitive theory of metaphor. 
 Quintilian’s writings are considered representative of the ideas about metaphor 
that had been accumulated by the rhetoricians who preceded him, and his considerable 
influence on theorists and artists in the Renaissance makes his account one of great 
interest. Another, possibly the most exhaustive of such accounts, and one no less 
influential, is the earlier Rhetorica ad Herennium (ca. 86 BCE). Characteristically, 
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perhaps, its emphasis in respect to metaphor is on decorum. The unusual or mixed 
metaphor is to be deplored: “Metaphor occurs when a word applying to one thing is 
transferred to another, because the similarity seems to justify the transference [. . .]. They 
say that a metaphor ought to be restrained, so as to be a transition with good reason to a 
kindred thing, and not seem an indiscriminate, reckless, and precipitate leap to an unlike 
thing” (343-345). Of course, the similarity that seems to justify the transference is, much 
like beauty, in the eye of the beholder, and the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium 
unspokenly implies that any intelligent user of language, any well-trained rhetorician, 
will be able to discern the conditional similarity by him- or herself. 
The value of the taxonomical analysis in the Rhetorica ad Herennium is 
questionable at best; the Rhetorica ad Herennium complicates the matter of metaphor, 
and the matter of figures of speech, beyond any practical level, without furthering the 
explication of what metaphor is and how it works. The prescribed uses of metaphor are, 
however, indicative of the trend that metaphor suffered for centuries—instead of 
engaging in an analysis pertaining to the nature of metaphor beyond its linguistic form, 
rhetoricians lost themselves in taxonomic exercises. In this, these books represent 
perhaps the ultimate refinement of the analysis begun by Aristotle. The Rhetorica ad 
Herennium lists forty-five figures of diction, including ten tropes, of which metaphor is 
one, and nineteen figures of thought, of which simile is one. The ten figures and tropes 
grouped together “all have this in common, that the language departs from the ordinary 
meaning of the words and is, with a certain grace, applied in another sense” (333). Since 
sections of the Rhetorica ad Herennium found their way, as pure Ciceronian doctrine, 
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into English works such as Thomas Wilson’s (1525-1581) Arte of Rhetorique (1553), its 
influence on the discourse about the nature of language in general, and of metaphor in 
particular, is of equal importance as Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria—which, of course, 
was itself influenced by the Rhetorica ad Herennium. 
 Where Aristotle had simply isolated metaphor and distinguished its four types, the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium, and the later works of Cicero, Quintilian, and others, seem to 
primarily reduce metaphor to one of a group of tropes which themselves form part of the 
merely decorative category of figures of speech. From this perspective, metaphor has no 
real claim to positive meaning in its own right, since metaphor works by undermining the 
proper meanings of words. Although metaphor is usually said to be preeminent among 
tropes, there can be little doubt about its perceived isolation—first as a principle of poetic 
language distinct from ordinary language, and subsequently as a slightly suspect device 
available to the stylist only for special ornamental effects. These two ways of diminishing 
metaphor suggest that theoretically, it would be possible, and perhaps desirable, to have a 
language devoid of metaphor altogether, and the general perception of classical treatises 
as such should be what Lakoff and Johnson are opposing.  
 
The Middle Ages and the Renaissance 
The Middle Ages were not notable for the development of literary theory, but 
there was an interest in formalizing and prescribing that derived from the classical 
approach to metaphor. The Middle Ages, however, imagined a different end. A good 
example of medieval thinking is the Anglo-Norman Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s (around 1200) 
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Poetria Nova. It contains a complicated account of sixty-three poetical ornaments divided 
into the categories of difficult and easy, with close definitions for each one, and careful 
prescriptions of the situations and manner in which poets should use them. Concerning 
metaphor, Geoffrey somewhat arbitrarily reduces the animate- inanimate relationship 
stressed by Quintilian to one of human/non-human. Geoffrey prefers metaphors in which 
the transference is from man to thing—flowers are born, the earth grows young—
processes one would simply term personification (55-63).  
Yet it is important to understand the role given to metaphor in a society that is 
almost wholly Chris tian. For a failure to understand the social role of metaphor has even 
led to serious misconceptions in modern times. Many modern readers tend, after all, to 
think of metaphor as a means of achieving a direct linguistic realization of personal 
experience. Even banalities such as the often-quoted “Achilles is a lion” or “this surgeon 
is a butcher” (Grady, et al. 103-108) aim at a vivid, striking, and physical representation 
that relates to events or their perceptions in the world and communicates something about 
them with some degree of accuracy. But in an almost uniformly Christian society, 
particularly before the Reformation, the purely personal experience, perhaps expressive 
of a new, metaphorical exploration of any given concept, tends to be less interesting and 
important than the communal experience of society, which may rest on metaphors that 
serve to affirm social perceptions, understood as “extrapersonal structures” (Strauss and 
Quinn 6). This distinction manifests itself in a society’s general view of the world it 
inhabits. Such a society’s view of metaphor—and, indeed, its metaphors themselves—
will tend to relate to collective experience and will concern themselves less with personal 
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accuracy than with public acceptability (see, for example, Naomi Quinn “The Cultural 
Basis of Metaphor”). 
 For Christian society in the Middle Ages, a foundational metaphor was that the 
world was a book written by God. Moreover, like any other book, it could and may well 
have said much more than is apparent. In fact, the world was full of metaphors, 
constructed by God to communicate a meaning when interpreted properly. According to 
John Freccero, words signified things, but things themselves had significance at another, 
higher level (Intro to the Inferno 179-82). Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), in his famous 
“Epistle to CanGrande della Scala”, which prefaces the Paradiso, gives the best 
exposition of the way readers should interpret metaphors in the light of this situation, 
which concerns levels of meaning in the whole Commedia (Epistle to CanGrande 22-31). 
These are, first a literal meaning (the story of the poem), and then three higher levels of 
meaning: the allegorical (symbolic meanings appropriate to this world), the anagogical 
(meanings appropriate to the spiritual world), and the tropological (meanings appropriate 
to a personal or moral level). 
 Far from expressing his own view of the world and decorating it to suit his own 
delight, the poet’s task is ultimately one of discovering God’s meaning, and his 
metaphors are means to that end. In a Christian world, classical rhetoricians were 
acceptable, but not as authorities in their own right as much as emissaries of a higher 
authority. As Perry Miller (1905-1963) puts it, by the end of the sixteenth century, “it was 
agreed on all sides that rhetoric was derived from God, that Aristotle and Quintilian, like 
the great prophets of Judea, had been essentially scribes merely setting down a revelation 
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from on high [. . .]” (312). After all, in Medieval Christian society, everybody knew that 
“in the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God, and the Word was 
[emphasis added] God” (John 1:1). 
The English Renaissance metaphor of the Great Chain of Being, representing a 
cultural hierarchical system that governs the world under parameters established by God, 
is an example of such generally accepted and widespread, socially dominant, metaphors. 
The metaphor of the Great Chain of Being rests on the presumption that “higher-order 
questions are answered in terms of lower-order descriptions” (MTCR 161). This is how 
Robert N. St. Clair describes the importance of the concept of the Great Chain of Being: 
   It was believed that all living things could be arranged into a great chain 
of beings beginning with God and ending with creatures. Since this was 
the time of the Holy Roman Empire, the Pope was closest in the link to 
God and below him were other members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. 
The farther away that one moved from the Pope, the lower one existed on 
the great chain of being. This religious caste system endured until the time 
of the Great Plague. At this time the Roman class system of Clericus 
(churchmen), milites (soldiers) and labores (workers) had already 
dominated European society. 
 Clericus (closest to God) 
The clergy (Pope, Cardinals, Bishops, etc.) 
 Milites 
The Soldiers (Infantry and Cavalry) 
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 Labores  (farthest away from God) 
The workers (farmers, cooks, smiths, hunters, 
leathermen, fishermen, bookmen, coopers, 
chandlers, millers, etc.) 
  
   What the metaphor of the great chain of being did was to further 
articulate the gradation of human beings who occupied this medieval caste 
system. The Great Plague eventually disrupted the ancient belief in the 
great chain of being. The citizenry of the times witnessed the destruction 
that the plague brought to human life. They also witnessed how the plague 
challenged their beliefs that the clerical class and the aristocratic classes 
were closer to God. They soon found that the clergy and royalty were not 
exempt from the ravages of this disease. The plague brought about an 
epistemic rupture in European thinking. As a consequence of the great loss 
of life in Medieval society, soldiers were allowed to become part of the 
clergy and peasants were allowed to become soldiers. The changes in 
society forced people to replace the metaphor of the great chain of being 
by another social metaphor, individualism (Lasch, 1979; 1984).  
In short, metaphor in Elizabethan poetry represents an act of imposing order on nature. Its 
main principles are decorum and aptness, consistency and coherence. The poet is like the 
gardener whose art helps nature, but the product of the gardener’s labors is not nature, but 
nature methodiz’d.  
 44 
In her influential study, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (1947), 
Rosamund Tuve (1903-1964) takes great pains to establish a function for metaphor in the 
English literature of the Elizabethan Period that derives from these medieval principles of 
personal versus collective experience and the expression thereof. She illustrates the idea 
that one of the major differences between “Elizabethan notions [of poetry] and ours [is] 
the absence of opposition between the ‘artificial’ and the ‘natural’ (35). In the words of 
George Puttenham (1520?-1601?), the poet “furthers her [nature’s] conclusions and many 
times makes her effects more absolute and strange” (The Arte of English Poesie [1589] 
2). In a sense, social metaphors had a didactic role, and were concerned with manifesting 
truths, ideas, and values that carried public assent. Metaphor’s function was to reinforce 
an established view of the world, rather than challenging or questioning that view by 
means of a particular local or singular insight. Poets used metaphors to draw attention, 
not to their own powers, but to God, whose creation or book they were interpreting. To 
the Elizabethan mind, God had in the first place created the relationships that ‘new’ 
metaphors established; poets merely rediscovered them and expressed them in writing.  
 
Ramus 
One of the most formative influences on the perception of the nature of metaphor 
during the sixteenth century was probably the philosopher and rhetorician Peter Ramus 
(1515-72). Ramus was born at Cuth in Picardy, and he succeeded in obtaining a good 
education, graduating from the University of Paris in 1536 as Master of Arts. He was an 
outspoken, uncompromising opponent of Aristotelian philosophy, which was at that time 
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authoritative in every European center of learning. His principal works, Aristotelicæ 
Animadversiones and Dialecticæ Institutiones, both of which were written in elegant 
humanistic Latin and published in Paris in 1543, brought him into sharp conflict with the 
official world of scholarship. Initially condemned by the University of Paris, Ramus’ 
books eventually were widely read and distributed throughout Europe by Renaissance 
scholars, and his method very quickly became virtually unquestioned orthodoxy among 
the learned (New Catholic Encyclopedia Online). 
 Ramus took the elaborate structure of traditional Aristotelian rhetoric and 
methodically imposed upon it an additional division whose implications remain relevant 
to this day. Traditionally, rhetoric had five parts: invention, disposition, elocution, 
memory, and delivery. Each part made an indispensable contribution to the construction 
of a persuasive speech. Ramus simply split these attributes into two groups, re-
categorizing invention, disposition, and memory under the heading of dialectic (i.e. 
logic), leaving rhetoric with elocution and delivery. Metaphor became, in a sense, more 
logical, as poets made more conscious attempts to relate Invention in poetry to logic. 
Metaphors could be usefully constructed on a logical base, itself derived from the logical 
bases on which all comparisons must rely. By this logic, an author could generate 
transferences as they exist in Christopher Marlowe’s (1564-1593) Hero and Leander 
(1598): 
Like untuned golden strings all women are,  
Which long time lie untouched will harshly jar.  
Vessels of brass oft handled brightly shine;  
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What difference betwixt the richest mine  
And basest mould but use? (I, 229-33) 
In Marlowe’s lines, the logical base for all the metaphors is the same: things are found to 
be alike on the basis of certain commonplaces of logic. Common manners of suffering or 
action received result in common effects, so that if A and B are treated in the same way, 
the result C is common to both. Upon closer study, this passage by Marlowe reveals its 
basis to be the conceptual metaphor LACK OF USE IS THE MOTHER OF 
DETERIORATION for the kinship/causation aspect at work in these lines is rather 
evident.  
A detailed, relatively recent account of kinship metaphors is Mark Turner’s Death 
is the Mother of Beauty (1987). As discussed in a review by Donald Freeman (1938-), the 
fundamental task of this book is to explain how human beings understand a rich domain 
of literary expressions. In that understanding, as in the command of language, humans  
make infinite use of finite means. Those finite means, Turner argues persuasively, consist 
of seven basic kinship metaphors coupled with ten ways of interpreting those metaphors 
he calls “metaphoric inference patterns. “Some combination of these conceptual 
inference patterns,” Turner concludes, “accounts for every one of the indefinitely many 
specific kinship metaphors in our language” (195). Of these metaphorical inference 
patterns, the two most important, for Turner, are causation and progeneration, to which 
he devotes an entire chapter, and lineage in the world, mind, and behavior, by which, for 
example, poets often depict feeling as the parent of behavior. These two patterns working 
together, Turner shows, “account for the principal use of kinship metaphor, namely to 
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express paths by which things in the world, the mind, and behavior can spring from one 
another” (143). 
Ramus’ division of traditional rhetoric had an effect on dialectic as well as on 
poetic invention as a newly categorized part of dialectic, but it had no less an effect on 
rhetoric itself. Rhetoric had formerly embraced the totality of the verbal arts—the 
requirements for hard, logical thought together with those for beautifying ornament. 
Ramus’ division, however, reduced rhetoric to mere elocution and delivery, turning the 
art of rhetoric into merely a cosmetic repertoire of figures or trimmings that could be 
added to discourse after the logical arguments had been established. Rhetoric after Ramus 
becomes, in the words of Perry Miller, the “sugar on the pill of logic” (315). 
 The Ramist division separates content from form, and the logic of an argument 
from the  stylistic embellishment writers may apply to it to make an argument persuasive. 
Furthermore, the Ramist division turns metaphor into a merely pleasing device, serving 
only to beautify the message of an utterance, but not contributing to it or representing 
mental processes. Ramists and others, particularly Puritans, were well aware of the 
absurd excesses to which this notion of rhetoric’s function could give rise. The Ramist 
method of formal explanation of an argument laid great emphasis on qualities of clarity 
and distinctness that metaphor could do nothing but appear to disrupt. Walter Jackson 
Ong (1912-1998) has noted that consequently the written text, rather than the spoken 
utterance, was favored; the visual abstraction of writing was preferable to the oral reality 
of speech—at least in the minds of Early Renaissance European scholars, and, according 
to Háj Ross (1938-), to various trends of current linguistics as well (Ross pers. comm.). 
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Compared to the printed word, the invisible, non-visual, spoken word began to appear 
ephemeral and fugitive.  
As a result, the new Renaissance technology of print was gradually invested with 
the sense of permanence denied to living language; the maxim verba volant, scripta 
manent [words fly away, writings remain] seemed irrefutable: “At the heart of the Ramist 
enterprise is the drive to tie down words themselves, rather than other representations, in 
simple geometrical patterns. Words are believed to be recalcitrant insofar as they derive 
from a world of sound, voices, cries; the Ramist ambition is to neutralize this connection 
by processing what is of itself non-spatial in order to reduce it to space in the starkest 
way possible” (Ong 89). 
 Communication in the pre-Ramist world was “richly sonorous rather than merely 
‘clear’ for it was the echo of a cognitive world experienced as if filled with sound and 
voices and speaking persons” (212). However, the Ramist “pedagogical juggernaut” 
eliminated sound and voice from human understanding of the intellectual world, and 
created a situation in which “speech is no longer a medium in which the human mind and 
sensibility lives. It is resented.” As a result, “[b]y its very structure, Ramist rhetoric 
asserts to all who are able to sense its implications that there is no way to discove ry or to 
understanding through voice, and ultimately seems to deny that the processes of 
person-to-person communication play any necessary role in intellectual life,” which 
shrinks linguistic competence and its importance (288). The resentment of speech is a 
condition that the modern world has inherited in the form of a dichotomy between speech 
and writing, which invests the latter with an authority in matters of correctness, grammar, 
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and ultimately, logic that it systematically denies to the former. Metaphor is seen as a 
function of spoken language, whereas clarity (as the opposite of metaphor) is believed to 
be inherent to printed language (see, for example, Neal Ward Gilbert, and Frank 
Pierrespont Graves). The section on the Eighteenth Century elaborates on the nonsensical 
idea that written language is inherently clearer than spoken language.  
Given this division—of spoken language, seemingly plagued by metaphors and 
imprecision, and of written language, seeking and embodying clarity—and the role 
implicit in it for metaphor, it is hardly surprising that the Puritan mind, anxious to rid 
itself of the merely decorative in all spheres, should conceive the notion of a literary style 
that makes little or no use of metaphor at all. The modern demotion of rhetoric and its 
adjective, rhetorical, to the sense of the merely verbose and flowery comes directly from 
this idea. Ong describes the seventeenth-century configuration of Ramus’ division in 
terms of man’s fundamental activity, speech: “Rhetorical speech is speech which attracts 
attention to itself as speech - the showy, the unusual [. . .]. Dialectical or logical speech is 
speech which attracts no attention to itself as speech, the normal, the plain, the 
undistinguished, [and] the reporter of ‘things’” (129). The Puritanical style of preaching 
that emerged from this opposition was called Plain Style and has been meticulously 
traced and analyzed as a phenomenon on both sides of the Atlantic in chapters eleven and 
twelve of Miller’s The New England Mind. When Thomas Sprat (1635-1713), in his 
History of the Royal Society (1667), condemning all use of tropes and figures, expressed 
his fears that the “whole spirit and vigour of their design had been soon eaten out, by the 
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luxury and redundance of speech,” one can reasonably sense the beginning of another age 
(qtd. in Hawkes, 30). 
 
The Eighteenth Century 
In terms of language, the Ramist revolution meant a reduction from the richly 
ambiguous multileveled meanings of the voice engaged in dialogue to the presumably 
evenly-spaced single- level clarity of the written word. In literary terms, it involved a shift 
of emphasis from the oral mode of drama to the literary mode of the printed book. Much 
of the best Elizabethan and Jacobean poetry, often read out loud by one of the few literati 
present during social gatherings, is fundamentally dramatic dialogue, even if, as in 
William Shakespeare’s (1564-1616) sonnets, dialogue becomes dramatic monologue in 
the form of a question posed by the speaker of a poem and his subsequent reply. After all, 
the majority of the population of any Renaissance nation was illiterate; literacy, at least 
until the mid-seventeenth century, was largely a privilege of the clergy and the 
aristocracy. In terms of a larger outlook, this shift marks the transition from an ancient 
world to a recognizably modern one (see, for example, Marshall McLuhan’s “The Effect 
of the Printed Book on Language in the 16th Century”).       
These Ramist notions are echoed in French theorist Jacques Derrida’s (1930-) 
ideas explaining Western logocentrism and phonocentrism. Derrida uses the term 
logocentric to describe Western thought, language, culture, and discursive practice since 
the time of Plato. Ross Murfin and Supryia M. Ray summarize Derrida’s concept as 
follows: 
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   To understand what Derrida meant by logocentric, it is important to 
know that the root word, logos (which in Greek means “word,” “speech,” 
and “reason”), has in Western philosophical and theological tradition 
come to signify law, truth, and even ultimate Truth. The suffix –centric is 
generally used to suggest the privileged status of that to which the root 
refers. Thus defined narrowly, logocentrism means centered on and 
revolving around the word (or speech or reason). More broadly, the term 
implies a belief in the centrality and, more important, the determinability 
of ultimate Truth. It is this latter meaning that Derrida uses when he at 
once characterizes and critiques Western traditions as being hung up on 
the notion that words contain present truth or Truth. (191-192) 
Furthermore, Derrida emphasizes that Western logocentrism is due in part to 
phonocentrism—the Western tendency to privilege the spoken over the written. Derrida 
argues that “the privileging of speech [. . .] cannot be disentangled from the privileging of 
presence. We write postcards, for instance, when people with whom we wish to 
communicate are absent; similarly, we read Plato because he cannot speak from beyond 
the grave” (192). Derrida views Western practices of phonocentrism as a tradition to be 
condemned, seemingly taking a stand—perhaps unintentionally—in support of the 
Ramist movement to mold a predominantly ambiguous oral mode of discourse into a 
supposedly clearer printed mode of discourse. In the New Fontana Dictionary of Modern 
Thought (1999), however, Derrida’s theories are summarized in a way that clarifies the 
following: for Derrida, both spoken and written language, with their respective promises 
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of providing “privileged access to expressive intentions or ideas- in-the-mind” and 
“permanence, transmissibility, [and] the capacity to signify or communicate meaning 
from one context to another,” are inherently bound to the same characteristics of 
ambiguity and communication failure (490). In other words, written language cannot 
communicate more clearly than spoken language, and neither one would—even if this 
condition were possible—benefit from a metaphor- less state. 
The previously mentioned pursuit of clarity and distinction took its toll on the 
perception of metaphor. Turning to Thomas Sprat, readers find a characteristically 
unequivocal statement—itself permeated with the metaphors swellings of style, close, 
naked way of speaking, and clear sense, suggesting the folly of Sprat’s endeavor—in 
praise of the members of the Royal Society: 
They have therefore been most rigorous in putting in execution, the only 
Remedy, that can be found for this extravagance: and that has been, a 
constant Resolution, to reject all the amplifications, digressions, and 
swellings of style: to return back to the primitive purity, and shortness, 
when men delivered so many things, almost in an equal number of words. 
They have exacted from all their members, a close, naked, natural way of 
speaking: positive expressions; clear senses; a native easiness: bringing all 
things as near the Mathematical plainness, as they can. (qtd. in Hawkes 
30-31) 
The precise relationship between words and things that Sprat obviously hopes for can 
only reinforce the notion of metaphor as some kind of special, added ornament to a 
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language which, if left without metaphor, would carry its meanings simply, naturally, and 
more efficiently. This was a persuasive outlook, and it carried the day, no matter how 
much scholars may shake their heads in disbelief from a cognitive science perspective. 
Indeed, in 1670, Samuel Parker (1640-1688) went so far as to advocate an Act of 
Parliament forbidding the use of “fulsome and luscious [sic] metaphors.” Ultimately, 
even so perspicacious a critic as Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) could take a somewhat 
cynical view of the metaphors of the previous century. His comment of the wit of the 
Metaphysical Poets is well known: “the most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence 
together; nature and art are ransacked [sic] for illustrations, comparisons, and allusions; 
their learning instructs and their subtlety surprises; but the reader commonly thinks his 
improvement dearly bought and, though he sometimes admires, is seldom pleased” (The 
Life of Cowley 20). Oddly enough, in this passage, Johnson, without realizing, uses the 
verbs yoked, ransacked, and bought, in a fashion that is, by his own standards, 
prohibitively metaphorical. Nowhere does Johnson seem to realize that the concept 
motivating his use of language here is that IDEAS ARE OBJECTS as discussed by 
Michael Reddy in his article “The Conduit Metaphor: A Case of Frame Conflict in our 
Language about Language” (1979). 
In the definition given in Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language (1755), 
there is the sense of metaphor as an abuse of language. It is “the application of a word to 
an use to which, in its original import, it cannot be put” (n. p.). Again, language was the 
dress of thought and metaphor was part of the sheer mode of expression that the writer 
chose to embellish the thought. In Alexander Pope’s (1688-1744) terms, taken from An 
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Essay on Criticism (1711), true wit itself should manifest this division. It should be “what 
oft was thought, but ne’er so well expressed” (247). Or, to use terms made current by the 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), the faculty of judgment exercised a controlling 
role in deciding what a poem was to be about, and then another faculty, Fancy, took on 
the task of decorating the poem with suitable metaphors. Fancy is also one of the most 
prominent concepts in the theoretical writings of British Romantic poets; in comparison 
to their poetic predecessors, they took a diametrically opposed stand on metaphor. 
 
Turning the Tide: The Romantic View 
 In sharp opposition to the primarily Aristotelian thinking of the preceding century, 
Romantic poets tend to proclaim metaphor’s organic rela tionship to language as a whole, 
and to lay stress on its vital function as an expression of the faculty of imagination. Percy 
Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822), William Wordsworth, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-
1834, the three main proponents of this view, all claimed, at some time or other, to be 
followers of Plato (428?–348?). 
 
Plato 
Being a follower of Plato is rather like being a follower of Karl Marx (1818-1883) 
or Sigmund Freud (1865-1939), in that it does not presuppose, or apparently necessitate, 
any knowledge of what the relevant luminary actually said. In the case of Plato, the 
position is perhaps excusably complicated by the existence of a large body of what has 
(often loosely) been termed neo-Platonic writing, which was available to and certainly 
 55 
read by the Romantic poets. In fact, unlike Aristotle, Plato gives no overt general account 
either of language or of metaphor. However, he does express some views of an 
apparently casual nature that may contain a clue as to why the Romantic poets felt drawn 
to the philosopher who, above all others, professed to be the enemy of poets. 
The dialogue “Cratylus,” for example, centers on the origin of names. The 
argument turns on whether language may be said to be fundamentally conventional and 
arbitrary in its relationship to the world, or whether there exists some sort of inherent 
correctness in names; whether the determining factor in the ascription of words to things 
is ordinary usage, or whether there are natural laws governing the process. What emerges 
from the argument is a surprising readiness to give custom and convention their due, an 
active and informing awareness that language is concretely governed by organic 
principles springing from within itself, as much as by any laws conceived in abstraction 
and imposed from outside. In addition, this awareness can seem to inform the views Plato 
expresses on the major art of language, poetry (12-17). 
One of the principles of art most clearly enunciated by Plato is that of organic 
unity. Every discourse, he says in the “Phaedros,” should be constructed like a living 
creature. Discourse cannot profitably be divided into its constituent parts any more than 
these parts, in conjunction, can simply constitute the whole. Similarly, language is a 
whole; Plato, as opposed to Aristotle, does not seem to want to overtly violate its unity: 
he does not separate poetic language from the language of rhetoric (45-49). 
It is possible that the Romantics found in this the basis of and justification for 
Plato’s apparent animus against poets. If language is governed by organic principles, it is 
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misleading to abstract any so-called part of it from the whole. Yet, this is exactly what the 
poet covertly proposes to do. According to Plato, poets propose to abstract the poetic, or 
what has been considered the metaphorical part of language, and to claim it as their own. 
This claim to this particular element of language, elevates all poets to masters of a 
specific segment of language, while robbing ordinary speakers of the right to poetic 
language and to metaphor. The truth is, however, that the poet has no special access to 
any particular kind of language or knowledge that is denied to other people. This case, 
presented in the “Ion,” could be considered a first attempt to collapse the dichotomy of 
literal versus figurative language before it even became accepted as a classic tenet about 
language; much in the spirit of recent cognitive scientists’ claims, Plato rather clearly 
argues that there is neither a linguistic nor a conceptual difference between the language 
of ordinary speakers and the language poets use, and thus presents another instance of a 
possible intellectual predecessor some cognitive scientists tend to ignore. 
In fact, the poet’s art preempts just those aspects of language, which, in an oral 
community, are vital to ordinary, rewarding interaction. Rhythm, rhyme, metaphor, 
myths and archetypes—the necessary elements in the mnemonic structures by whose 
means an oral society transmits its own identity from generation to generation—are 
powerful agents in the preservation and reinforcement of a society’s way of life. 
Countless narratives, from the Mesopotamian Epic of Gilgamesh to the Greek epics of 
The Iliad and The Odyssey and the Germanic  Epic of Beowulf, stories that existed for 
centuries in the oral tradition, through mythology, archetypes, and metaphors, functioned 
as foundations of cultures, became shaping forces for and expressive of cultural values, 
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and exert influence even today. The absence of such powerful elements obviously deals 
the abstract reasoning of philosophy a severe blow. Abstract reasoning, in its attempts to 
eliminate the poetic from its discourse, is denied access to the most effective way of 
making complex contact with the non- literate mind (see, for example, Mircea Eliade 
Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, 1961). 
Truth for Plato resides in the activities of the philosopher, the dialectician, whose 
language derives from that fundamental model of all human communication, ordinary 
oral dialogue. The existence of poets not only presupposes the absence of the vitalizing 
metaphorical elements of language from ordinary oral dialogue and written text, but it 
also necessitates the existence of poetry as a language peculiar to poets. Consequently, 
only poets that strive to employ language really used by men can close the rift that 
centuries of distinguishing between the rhetorical, analytical, and clear meaning, and the 
poetical, metaphorical, and distinctively meaningful have opened (MWLB ix). Only a 
surrender of the traditionally perceived separation between literal and figurative language 
will allow for a more holistic approach to and understanding of language and its 
expression of cognitive models. The British Romantic Poets were the first to launch a 
full-blown assault on the abovementioned separation, clearly claiming an understanding 






Shelley, Herder, and Vico 
If this is not what Plato actually meant, it is perhaps what the Romantics wanted 
him to mean, particularly in connection with their ideas of language, metaphor, and the 
working of the imaginative faculty. It is important to understand that the Romantic notion 
of imagination establishes and stresses this faculty’s connective power, and sets it against 
the seemingly divisive analytical character of the faculty of reason in a fashion similar to 
the description Lakoff provides in Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (7-9, 31-32). 
This faculty discerns the differences between things, and their different relations to each 
other. Aristotle’s analysis of metaphor is a good example of the faculty of reason in 
action. On the other hand, the imagination is an active force of tremendous power, 
sufficient, in William Wordsworth’s words, “to produce such changes even in our 
physical nature as might almost appear miraculous” (Preface to the Lyrical Ballads 261). 
The characteristic ability of the imagination is drawing things together, establishing 
powerful and unifying interrelationships, similarities, and links. It perceives and creates 
unity of the sort that concerned Plato, and that repeatedly has been discussed by cognitive 
linguists (see, for example, Grady 1997; Grady et al. 1997) 
Thus, for the Romantics, the difference between Plato and Aristotle could be 
thought of—with breathtaking oversimplification—as more or less the same as the 
difference between imagination and reason. As Shelley, who considered himself a 
Platonist, puts it in his Defence of Poetry (written 1821, published 1840), “Reason 
respects the differences and imagination the similitudes of things.” He adds that poetry 
“may be defined to be ‘the expression of the imagination’” (480). Herein lies the 
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imagination’s central connection with metaphor. Poetry nourishes, it enlarges the 
circumference of the imagination by means of new combinations of thoughts which form 
“new intervals and interstices” in it. The process, which “strengthens that faculty [. . .] in 
the same manner as exercise strengthens a limb,” (481) is one of metaphorical 
transference. The act of unifying, of forging sameness, which is metaphor’s 
stock- in-trade, both stimulates and manifests the imagination. 
From Shelley’s statements, it follows that imagination will embody itself in man’s 
distinctive feature—language—in the form of metaphor. Shelley asserts that “poetry is 
connate with the origin of man” and that it “springs from the nature itself of language” 
which in turn is “produced by the imagination and has relation to thoughts [emphasis 
added] alone” (481). Lacking substantial empirical evidence, Shelley nonetheless seems 
to believe that metaphorical expressions, as found in all language, are related to cognitive 
processes. He adds that in the “infancy of society,”—a time that is metaphorically 
understood as that of primitive minds, and thus, the time of myth-creation, by Lévi-
Strauss (see, for example, The Savage Mind)—all authors are poets “because language 
itself is poetry. In the youth of the world” those who are “poets in the most universal 
sense of the word” speak a language which “marks the before unapprehended relations of 
things and perpetuates their apprehension until the words which represent them become, 
through time, signs for portions or classes of thoughts instead of pictures of integral 
thoughts.” It is a language he terms “vitally metaphorical” (482). 
These primitivist notions found expression much earlier and elsewhere in Europe. 
The German critic and philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) for example, in 
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his Essay on the Origin of Language, Abhandlung uber den Ursprung der Sprache 
(1772), conceives of primitive man thinking in symbols, and connects metaphor with the 
beginning of speech itself. The earliest language was a dictionary of the soul, and in it, 
metaphors and symbols combined to create mythology and a marvelous epic of the 
actions and speech of all beings. The modern poet is thus also a primitive man, and he 
does not merely present meaning, or imitate nature, he creates these, as the savage 
creates fable and myth. This suggested connection between myths and archetypes as 
expressive of the primitive mind of humans is more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 
Four. 
Although virtually unnoticed by his contemporaries, the distinguished Italian 
jurist and rhetorician Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) had published his Nova Scientia 
(1725), in which he had similarly pictured primitive man as possessed of an instinctive 
poetic wisdom, sapienza poetica, which evolved through metaphors, symbols, and myths 
toward modern abstract and analytical modes of thought. Vico seems to suggest that 
language is not simply a way of voicing ideas but is the very thing that shapes those 
ideas. This idea of linguistic determinism, that language determines reality, has become 
popular under the name Sapir-Whorf-Hypothesis. 
 In the world proposed by Vico, the principle of verum factum pertains. The true 
(verum) and the made (factum) are the same. Society is made by man, and contains in 
itself the only truth he can really hope to know. In order to obtain a proper historical 
perspective for this truth, and to avoid imposing on it our own quite relative standards, 
Vico proposed an examination of the way in which the kinds of language men used, and 
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the myths and fables they invented, led to the societies in which they were formed. This 
strikingly modern approach is the first systematic exposition of what has been lately 
termed the principle of cultural relativity, according to which an attempt is made to 
understand a culture in its own terms and not by reference to some abstract model of how 
men in general are thought to behave. 
These interests led Vico naturally to the study of children. The movement from 
childhood to maturity is a version, he argued, of the movement from primitive societies to 
civilized ones. Furthermore, the language of children is essentially robust, vigorous, and 
concrete compared to the abstract distinctions and categories of adult rational speech. 
Consequently, primitive legends and myths were not lies, so much as poetic, 
metaphorical responses to the world. The metaphors often fossilized in current speech 
were once the live embodiments of vivid perceptions whose existence humans are 
unaware of in their anaesthetized rational world. Indeed, the very distinction between the 
literal and the metaphorical is only available in societies that have acquired the capacity 
for abstract thought. It is unavailable where thought is concrete, as in the case of children 
or in what the modern French structural anthropologist Lévi-Strauss terms The Savage 
Mind (1996). 
Metaphor, in short, is not fanciful embroidery of the facts. It is a way of 
experiencing the facts. It is a way of thinking and of living, an imaginative projection and 
extension of the truth. As such, it is at the heart of the world humans create and invent, 
and re-create and re- invent if need be—when social, cultural, or scientific metaphors 
change (see, for example, Evelyn Fox Keller’s Refiguring Life). One of Keller’s topics is 
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the central metaphor of the manikin—the little man—in the gene, the “homunculus,” the 
“demon,” or the “signal man.” What Darwin still called “Being” in 1844 is the beginning 
of a line which Keller continues or follows via Maxwell’s “demon” metaphor in 1870, to 
Schroedinger’s metaphors of “soldiers” or “local government stations” in 1944. This 
cognitive metaphor implies that a gene directs the development of cells according to a 
coded script, as if it were an authoritative entity with a will and intentions of its own. 
This view allows for concrete scientific progress. At the  same time, the metaphor inhibits 
scientists from thinking about the gene as part of a feedback system. Nowadays, 
biological organisms are largely defined as a message in a system of messages. 
Molecules, for example, are metaphorically understood as giving orders to, or responding 
to orders from, other molecules.  
The importance of metaphorical thinking, evident from these developments in the 
discourse of biology, is a phenomenon that also deeply concerned scholars and poets 
prior to the advent of the cognitive sciences, as presented, for example, in the writings of 
Wordsworth and Coleridge. 
 
Wordsworth 
Wordsworth’s commitment to the language really used by men certainly suggests 
a feeling on his part that this type of language is vitally metaphorical, and his Preface to 
the Lyrical Ballads (1800;1802) confirms this. His interest in low and rustic life derives 
largely, he tells us, from “the plainer and more emphatic language” which it manifests, 
itself a product of hourly communication with “the best objects from which the best part 
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of language is originally derived.” This results in “simple and unelaborated expressions,” 
and in poetry, ideas that “are expressed in language fitted to their respective importance.” 
Furthermore, Wordsworth asserts that, “such a language arising out of repeated 
experience and regular feelings is a more permanent, and a far more philosophical 
language than that which is frequently substituted for it by Poets” (243). And while this 
Vico-esque concern “has necessarily cut me [Wordsworth] off from a large portion of 
phrases and figures of speech which from father to son have long been regarded as the 
common inheritance of Poets,” he is content to do without such poetic diction in favor of 
metaphors organically related to and arising from “the language really spoken by men” 
(251).  
According to Wordsworth, when reading good poetry, the reader finds himself 
firmly “in the company of flesh and blood,” and he hears the voice of “a man speaking to 
men” (255) whose sensibility differs only in degree, but not in kind, from that of other 
men. Indeed, a poet’s language is defective if it seems to emanate from that “body of men 
who, from the circumstance of their compositions being in metre, it is expected will 
employ a particular language” (266). One can conclude that, if there is no special 
language for poets, there can be no special linguistic devices reserved for poetry.  
This is at the heart of Wordsworth’s argument that there exists no essential 
difference between the language of prose and that of verse. Prose and verse “both speak 
by and to the same organs [. . .]. Poetry sheds no tears ‘such as Angels weep’ but natural 
and human tears; she can boast of no celestial Ichor that distinguishes her vital juices 
from those of prose; the same human blood circulates through the veins of them both” 
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(253-54). Only when this is accepted will the chief pleasure of poetry be achieved, the 
sense of a particular human process in action. This process is obviously felt by 
Wordsworth to occupy a central place in human experience. It is part and parcel of his 
interest in tracing in his poems “the primary laws of our nature,” chiefly in regard to “the 
manner in which we associate ideas in a state of excitement” (245). It is a process, as he 
described it in The Prelude (1850), of “observation of affinities / In objects where no 
brotherhood exists / To passive minds” (II, 384-6). In the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, 
Wordsworth had already stated that it is a process which constitutes  
the great spring of the activity of our minds, and their chief feeder, [since] 
from this principle the direction of the sexual appetite and all the passions 
connected with it, take their origin: it is the life of our ordinary 
conversation; and upon the accuracy with which similitude in 
dissimilitude, and dissimilitude in similitude are perceived, depend our 
taste and moral feelings. (265)  
This principle is, of course, the linking, unifying process of metaphor. The perception of 
“similitude in dissimilitude” and “dissimilitude in similitude,” perhaps clumsily and 
somewhat vaguely expressed here by Wordsworth, seems indicative of the selective 
mental mapping process involved during the metaphorical transference of semantic 
qualities from the source to the target domain as discerned by cognitive linguists (PITF 
187-193). If so, Wordsworth’s statement is an early understanding of what cognitive 




 Coleridge’s interest in the perception of similitude in dissimilitude and, more 
generally, the entire “manner in which human beings associate ideas” is well known, and 
could be said to lie at the center of his thinking about the human faculty of the 
imagination. By its very name, the imagination is connected with the making of images, 
and its relationship to the concept of metaphor is foundational. The fundamental notion 
that emerges from Coleridge’s thinking and practice as a poet and critic is that the 
ultimate realization of the imagination will take linguistic form and that that form is most 
obviously manifested in the associations of ideas which generate metaphor. One of the 
first Englishmen to have read and pondered the work of Vico, Coleridge conceives of 
metaphor as imagination in action. 
Coleridge’s notion of the mind was genuinely revolutionary. He saw it as “an 
active, self- forming, self-realizing system” (Richards, Coleridge on Imagination 59), 
which, far from being passive in the face of reality, actually imposed itself on the world, 
and creatively adapted and shaped it. Imagination acts as the chie f instrument in this 
process. An obvious and ideal instance of this process in human beings is, certainly, the 
poet: 
   The poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of man 
into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other according 
to their relative worth and dignity. He diffuses a tone and spirit of unity 
that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and 
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magical power, to which I would exclusively appropriate the name of 
Imagination. (Biographia 151) 
The function of this faculty is to connect, to fuse, to blend, and to reconcile in a process 
of unification for which Coleridge coined the term esemplastic, which he said means, “to 
shape into one.” It is a process which, to use the account Shelley gave of vitally 
metaphorical language, “marks the before unapprehended relations of things and 
perpetuates their apprehension” (482). In addition, of course, in poetry, the process is 
exactly discernible: 
This power, first put into action by the will and understanding, and 
retained under their irremissive, though gentle and unnoticed control, laxis 
effertur habenis, reveals itself in the balance or reconcilement of opposite 
or discordant qualities: of sameness, with difference; of the general with 
the concrete; the idea with the image; the individual with the 
representative; the sense of novelty and freshness with old and familiar 
objects; [. . .]; and while it blends and harmonizes the natural and the 
artificial, [it] still subordinates art to nature; the manner to the matter and 
our admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry. (Biographia 
151-152) 
It is quite easy to see this process as coterminous with that of metaphor, especially when 
considering the approach that Fauconnier and Turner have taken with their theory of 
conceptual blending.  
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Coleridge is careful to distinguish two aspects of the imaginative process: that of 
the so-called Primary Imagination, which perceives and operates within the ordinary 
world, and that of the so-called Secondary Imagination which re-works this world, and 
impresses its own shape upon it. Words are the means to this end. The process whereby 
words construct a reality from within themselves, and impose this on the world humans 
live in, is the process of metaphor. In short, Coleridge’s idea of the imagination, and the 
way in which it differs from the fancy, lead us directly to language, and spoken 
language—“language really used by men”—at that. The idea of fancy leads, almost as 
directly, to a language reduced to its isolated elements, each with its meaning carefully 
and separately defined. In a sense, and certainly to Coleridge, the model for this almost 
condemnable sort of language derives from David Hartley’s (1705-1757) doctrine of the 
association of ideas. In his Observations on Man (1749), Hartley suggests that words, like 
ideas, are associated with each other in the way that bricks are brought together to build 
up a wall. Each word has a carefully established relationship to a thing that it represents 
physically. Properly so, Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) had neatly satirized exactly this 
notion of language in his own day in Gulliver’s Travels (1726) where the scientists in 
Laputa hold objects up to each other as a substitute for talking. 
It is this artificial distinction between language and reality, words and things, that 
Coleridge’s idea of imagination is designed to break down. “I would,” he wrote to 
William Godwin (1756-1836) on September 22nd, 1800, “endeavour to destroy the old 
antithesis of Words and Things: elevating as it were Words into Things and living Things 
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too” (Collected Letters 626), expressing his desire to materialize the concept that 
WORDS/IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, which is, of course, impossible. 
 The poet, Wordsworth reminds us, is a human being speaking to human beings. 
Images, however beautiful, only become proofs of original genius when a human and 
intellectual life is transferred to them from the poet’s own spirit. Language, says 
Coleridge, “is framed to convey not the object alone but likewise the character, mood and 
intentions of the person who is representing it” (160). Language indicates utterance: it 
utters, or outers, the inner reality and, by imagination, imposes this on the world beyond. 
This process, which has occupied the attention of modern linguists and anthropologists, 
intimately relates language and reality. 
This is probably the process that had Plato so concerned when it came to poetic 
activity. Imagination is the shaping spirit that projects the human mind onto the world, 
making it interact with the world, as the elements of metaphor interact with each other. 
Reality is thus the product of the imagination and that upon which it plays. Its most 
obvious manifestation is linguistic, and, as Coleridge wrote to James Gillman (1782-
1839) in 1827, in terms that reveal the full extent of his opposition to the view of 
language promulgated by Sprat, 
   It is the fundamental mistake of grammarians and writers on the 
philosophy of grammar and language to suppose that words and their 
syntaxis are the immediate representatives of things, or that they cor-
respond to things. Words correspond to thoughts [emphasis added], and 
the legitimate order and connection of words to the laws of thinking and to 
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the acts and affections of the thinker’s mind. (qtd. in Hawkes, Metaphor 
54-55) 
Imagination stretches the mind because it stretches reality by the linguistic means of 
metaphor. Given this, metaphor cannot be considered merely a cloak for a pre-existing 
thought or an obsolete ornament to language, and there is evidence that Romantic poets 
such as Coleridge and Wordsworth were aware of this fact. A metaphor is a thought in its 
own right, and, as Chapter Three will show in more detail, a linguistic representation of a 
metaphorical cognitive process. 
There is no way humans can clear language of metaphor. Language, both in its 
spoken and its written forms, is largely, yet not solely, metaphorical. Sprat’s own 
pronouncements against swellings of style, and in favor of a way of speaking that is close 
and naked, are riddled with linguistic metaphors expressive of cognitive metaphorical 
processes. Style can only swell metaphorically, and this is the only way in which speech 
can be close and naked. Language may attempt to come near mathematical plainness, but 
it can only do so by means of a metaphor of proximity in spatial relationships that is far 
from plain. 
We live in a world of metaphors, out of which we construct myths. We make the 
world up (within the limitations established by embodied reason), in other words, as we 
go along, and we experience it concretely. Only if we are mistaken do we think of 
ourselves as separate beings and place nature in antithesis to the mind, as object to 
subject, or thing to thought. This is abstract knowledge, or the science of mere 
understanding. It is of vital importance for the Romantic Revolution to have stressed the 
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concrete links between humans and the natural world. Coleridge, in giving these links an 
indelible linguistic stamp, thereby places metaphor at the center of human concern, 
making it something far more important than an object of idle speculation for 
classification and taxononomical evaluation by literary critics. The words of perhaps his 
greatest interpreter, Ivan Armstrong Richards (1893-1979), indicate the scope of this 
achievement: “With Coleridge we step across the threshold of a general theoretical study 
of language capable of opening to us new powers over our minds” (Coleridge on 
Imagination 232).  
At this point of the preceding deliberations, it should have become clear that the 
study of metaphor is closely involved with the study of language, and the study of the 
mind, and that numerous texts preceding Reddy seminal article, or Lakoff and Johnson’s 
seminal book Metaphors We Live By, have discussed this phenomenon. In 1997, Olaf 
Jäkel engaged in an enterprise similar to the one this chapter has undertaken. Jäkel, 
primarily focussing texts by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Hans Blumenberg (1920-
1996), and Harald Weinreich (1927-), reached the conclusion that some “forgotten 
works” have “more to offer to the cognitive approach than mere anticipation. Their 
genuine contributions to methodology as well as to the epistemological framework 
should not be ignored by a cognitive theory of metaphor that can still be amended” (23). 
The historical overview presented here joins Jäkel in his project and in his suggestions 




TRENDS IN LINGUISTICS: MAINSTREAM AND  
COGNITIVE APPROACHES 
Reality is a cliché from which we escape by metaphor. 
                    Wallace Stevens (1879-1955) 
 
Introduction 
The twentieth century has produced more than one general theoretical study of 
language capable of opening to us new powers over and understandings about our minds. 
Controversies, such as the Linguistics Wars between generative semanticists and 
interpretive semanticists from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, have greatly influenced 
and shaped the field of linguistics as it presents itself at the beginning of a new 
millennium. The main problem within the field of linguistics has been well expressed by 
Gilles Fauconnier at the beginning of his article “Methods and Generalizations:” 
Linguists agree on one thing - that language is diabolically hard to study. 
They do not always agree, however, on the how’s, the why’s, and the what 
for’s: how one should go about studying it and how speakers manage to do 
what they do; why it is so hard and why exactly we bother to study it; 
what language is for, and what linguistics is for. (1-2) 
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This statement cleverly sums up the status quo of linguistics since the days it emerged as 
an identifiable field of inquiry. Nonetheless, a few generalizations are possible; for 
example as the scientific study of languages, linguistics often is divided along the 
following, more or less generally accepted lines: 
1. Phonetics (physical nature of speech)  
2. Phonology (use of sounds in language)  
3. Morphology (word formation)  
4. Syntax (sentence structure)  
5. Semantics (meaning of words and how they combine into sentences)  
6. Pragmatics (effect of situation on language use).  
An alternative categorization often distinguishes linguistic subfields along these 
parameters: 
1. Theoretical linguistics (pure and simple: how languages work)  
2. Historical linguistics (how languages got to be the way they are)  
3. Sociolinguistics (language and the structure of society)  
4. Psycholinguistics (how language is implemented in the brain)  
5. Applied linguistics (teaching, translation, etc.). 
6. Computational linguistics (computer processing of human language).  
Depending on the school or tradition a linguist considers him- or herself to belong to, 
various other models are also possible. Additionally, linguists also study sign languages, 
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non-verbal communication, animal communication, and other topics besides natural 
languages. 
 Rather than discussing the various schools and developments linguistics has 
undergone in the twentieth century, the following debate focuses on some contributions 
specifically made in the attempt to analyze the phenomenon of metaphor. Neither is the 
presented overview complete, nor is it authoritative. Regardless, it brings readers closer 
to a richer understanding of the developments the discipline of linguistics experienced 
before the genesis of the field—diverse as it may be—that now calls itself cognitive 
linguistics. 
 
Ivor Armstrong Richards 
Perhaps more than any other linguist or language philosopher in the early 
twentieth century, Richards has proven the importance of language function assigned to 
metaphor in Western societies. His arguments in The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936) grow 
to a considerable extent out of those of Coleridge and of Vico, and they constitute a 
formidable and formative statement on the subject of metaphor, which has had a radical 
influence in the modern world. 
Richards begins from the proposition that all meanings are universally relative, 
only appropriate to and valid in the cultural context in which they occur: “any part of a 
discourse, in the last resort, does what it does only because the other parts of the 
surrounding, uttered or unuttered discourse, and its condition, are what they are” 
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(Philosophy 10). Consequently, for Richards, meaning is not a stable or fixed quality, but 
one which words or groups of words acquire in use. In Reality Isn’t What it Used to Be 
(1990), Walter Truett Anderson (1933-) makes it abundantly clear that most of the 
concepts guiding and determining human behavior are not founded on transcendental 
concepts as Plato would have us believe. Instead, codes of conduct, moral values, 
religious and secular systems of belief—all of these were once created by humans. 
However, somewhere in the mists of history, humans lost any recollection of ever 
having created these belief systems, forgot that they are the creators of their own realities. 
This practice of creating and forgetting is of paramount importance not only for 
understanding human history at large, but also for cognitive linguistics and the study of 
metaphor in particular, for constructivism “studies not only the processes of thought, but 
also the processes of reality creation.” It “explores the operations by which we explore 
our experiential world” (69). Furthermore, Anderson says “according to the constructivist 
view, people may have not only different political opinions and religious beliefs, but 
different concepts of such basic matters as personal identity, time and space” (xi).  Lakoff 
describes this process in the following way: 
From the time of Aristotle to the later works of Wittgenstein, categories 
were thought to be well understood and unproblematic. They were 
assumed to be abstract containers, with things either inside or outside the 
category. Things were assumed to be in the same category if and only if 
they had certain properties in common. And the properties they had in 
common were taken as defining the category. 
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This classical theory was not the result of empirical study. It was not 
even a subject of major debate. It was a philosophical position arrived at 
on the basis of a priori speculation. Over the centuries it simply became 
part of the background assumptions taken for granted in most scholarly 
disciplines. In fact, until very recently, the classical theory of categories 
was not even thought of as a theory. It was taught in most disciplines not 
as an empirical hypothesis but as an unquestionable, definitional truth. 
(WFDT 6) 
Just as human beings create reality by imposing concepts of things, so they impose 
meanings covertly and without being aware of the process on sounds which themselves 
have no objective or real meaning.   
In the course of this process, language imposes its own particular shape on the 
world of those who speak it. Language and experience interact and are proven to be fun-
damentally involved with each other to an extent that makes it difficult to consider them 
as separate entities. The use of language involves getting at one kind of reality through 
another, and the process is fundamentally one of transference. In other words, metaphor 
is not simply an example of a trope, the rather inadequate dictionary definition of which 
is a “figure of speech.” Today, many linguists agree that tropes are more than parts of 
speech; they are, perhaps following Richards’ definition without being aware of the fact 
that he understood the cognitive nature of metaphor almost fifty years before the thrust of 
cognitive linguistics became recognized. As early as 1936, Richards wrote: 
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The Traditional theory [. . .] made metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a 
shifting and displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a 
borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between 
contexts. Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the 
metaphors of language derive there from. (Philosophy 96, emphasis 
added) 
Richards also introduced what is now a standard terminology for the components of a 
metaphor: 
1. Tenor: the original concept  
2. Vehicle: the second concept ‘transported’ to modify or transform the tenor  
3. Ground: the set of features common to the tenor and the vehicle  
4. Tension: the effort demanded to span the gap between the tenor and the 
vehicle. 
For Richards, metaphor involves a certain linguistic, and implicitly cognitive, process: in 
the simplest formulation, when humans use a metaphor, they have two thoughts of 
different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose 
meaning is a resultant of their interaction (93). Interaction is the significant word here. 
Richards distinguishes the elements involved as the tenor, the general drift, the 
underlying idea which the metaphor expresses, and the vehicle, the basic analogy which 
is used to embody or carry the tenor. These elements interact, and their transaction 
generates the only genuine meaning of the metaphor: “the co-presence of the vehicle and 
tenor results in a meaning (to be clearly distinguished from the tenor) which is not 
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attainable without their interaction. The vehicle, Richards adds, “is not normally mere 
embellishment of a tenor which is otherwise unchanged by it but [. . .] vehicle and tenor 
in co-operation give a meaning of more varied powers than can be ascribed to either” 
(100).  
While today there is empirical evidence that Richard’s claim is too extreme and  
impossible to prove, he originally claimed that no use of language can ever be 
straightforward, that is, free of metaphor, since language makes use of metaphor even 
while making the claim of being straightforward. For Richards, metaphor is the only way 
language works, for, after all, metaphor’s transferring quality is even used to convey the 
sense of direct purposeful undeviating movement in a particular direction through space, 
transferred to a way of speaking or writing. Language is thus perceived as a channel of 
communication, and readers have Michael J. Reddy’s article “The Conduit Metaphor: A 
Case of Frame Conflict in our Language about Language,” to thank for re-creating this 
knowledge which scholars seemingly had forgotten. In this article, Reddy explains how 
Western communication theory is based on the conduit metaphor, which sees informa tion 
as being transmitted by putting messages into linguistic containers, and then sending 
them through channels (the conduit), where they are decoded by the receiver who 
retrieves the messages (for other communication metaphors, see for example, St. Clair).  
Richards takes to task the poet and philosopher Thomas Ernest Hulme (1883-
1917) for his distinction between language and reality in poetry. Hulme says that, “plain 
speech is essentially inaccurate. It is only by new metaphors [. . .] that it can be made 
precise” (Speculations 129). Hence poetry, and consequently, metaphor, is a 
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“compromise for a language of intuition which would hand over sensations bodily. It 
always endeavours to arrest you, and make you continuously see a physical thing” (134-
135). As the 1980 publication of Metaphors We Live By  reminds us, the notion that 
language, and most conceptual processes, exist separately and independent ly of bodily 
sensations is systematically misleading. This misleading notion asserts a distinction 
between language and experience that can hardly be upheld, and has an effect to which 
Richards objects. The idea claims for poetic language in general, and for metaphor in 
particular, a special and visually accurate picture-making quality supposedly denied to 
plain speech, reinforcing the notion of separate literal and figurative language, which we 
have already seen to be inaccurate.  
The idea that poetic language in general, and metaphors in particular, have a 
unique image-making or image-evoking quality, however, has been explored in recent 
works by various cognitive linguists. Lakoff and Turner discuss the image-evoking 
quality of metaphors in their analysis of Emily Dickinson’s (1830-1886) “Because I 
Could not Stop for Death” (MTCR 6, 8, 20); they describe image-metaphors as “a 
mapping of one conventional image onto another” with the effect that “image-metaphors 
and conceptual metaphors are mutually reinforcing” (20). Another example they offer is 
the mapping of a woman’s waist onto an hourglass, made possible “by virtue of their  
common shape” (90). Lakoff and Turner view this kind of metaphor as having a special 
status since conceptual structure and inferences are not mapped from one domain to 
another. Instead, the source and target domain of this metaphor share some features in a 
single perceptual domain, such as color or shape (Grady 89).  
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In other words, image-metaphors are linguistic realizations of an underlying 
conceptual metaphor—a metaphor turned flesh and bone, using the specific image of a 
house and projecting it onto the grave, or projecting a woman’s waist onto an hourglass; 
in Dickinson’s poem, the grave becomes the house of the body after death. It is also 
noteworthy here that Lakoff’s and Johnson’s latest collaboration, Philosophy in the 
Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (1999) is an elaborate 
testimony to the empirically validated idea of embodied reason, language, and perception; 
This work is referred to in more detail in subsequent sections. 
 
William Empson, Owen Barfield, 
and Phillip Wheelwright 
Aristotle’s assertion places poets in the position in which the Romantics saw 
them, at the frontiers of reality, as far as culture is concerned. Poets, by their conscious 
use of metaphor, are actively engaged in a stretching process whereby new areas of 
reality are enclosed in language, new dimensions of experience recorded, and made 
available within its confines. Such stretching of the language means that stability in the 
area of meaning will not be something with which a poet will be overly concerned.  
Richards’ best-known pupil, William Empson (1906-1984), has contributed an 
important monograph on exactly this topic. His Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930) strongly 
reinforces the notion that ambiguity is a necessary aspect of language , which enables the 
process of metaphor to operate most fruitfully. Ambiguity in this extended sense makes 
metaphor possible. If each word has only a single (or One True) meaning, then the 
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meaning of one word can in no way be affected by or transferred to another. Ambiguity 
implies a dynamic quality in language which enables meaning to be deepened and 
enriched as various layers of it become simultaneously available. Thus, “what often 
happens when a piece of writing is felt to offer hidden riches is that one  phrase after 
another lights up and appears as the heart of it; one part after another catches fire” (xi). 
All good poetry, Empson argues, is ambiguous in this sense. It contains “a feeling 
of generalisation from a case which has been presented definitely” (xiii). Empson’s 
concept of metaphor differs from that of Richards to the extent that Empson fails to 
maintain the clear-cut distinction between tenor and vehicle when the number of possible 
meanings offered by any metaphor expands, without any of them becoming necessarily 
dominant over the others, and thus discernible as tenor. Empson’s major contribution 
does not lie in the fact that, just like Richards, he recognized ambiguity as inherently 
characteristic of language. Empson takes this insight one step further, asserting that 
metaphor is fundamentally part of the same process of ambiguity, “because metaphor, 
more or less far- fetched, more or less complicated, more or less taken for granted (so as 
to be conscious), is the normal mode of development of a language” (36). From this  
perspective, it becomes possible to argue that by using metaphor’s multiple ambiguities, 
poetry in fact exploits the central characteristic of language itself. 
 The notion that language is by nature fundamentally metaphorical in mode, and 
thus potentially ambiguous in content, has proven to be a central one for many modern 
writers. Owen Barfield (1898-1997) found that the metaphorical process was, in fact, in 
the form of what he called tarning (from the German word Tarnung, originally meaning 
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to disguise or camouflage, but here used as if meaning to say one thing and mean 
another), found everywhere in language, not just in officially designated metaphors. 
Tarnung was a necessary linguistic process to which humans must resort in the field of 
law as much as in that of poetry: 
If therefore he [the speaker] would say anything really new, if that which 
was hitherto unconscious is to become conscious, he must resort to 
tarning. He must talk what is nonsense on the face of it, but in such a way 
that the recipient may have the new meaning suggested to him. This is the 
true importance of metaphor. (123) 
In his studies The Burning Fountain (1954) and Metaphor and Reality (1962), 
Philip Wheelwright (1901-1970) also finds myth and metaphor at the center of language, 
and thus at the center of human understanding. Wheelwright argues that “religious, 
poetic, and mythic utterances at their best really mean something, make a kind of 
objective reference, although neither the objectivity nor the method of referring is of the 
same kind as in the language of science” (Burning Fountain 4). With the distinction 
between mythic and scientific language, Wheelwright may well be referring to the 
distinction between literal and figurative language, which was discussed in much detail in 
Chapter Two. If so, Wheelwright is also suggesting an inherent connection between myth 
and metaphor—a relationship further analyzed in Chapter Four. 
 Wheelwright constructs a definition of language so as to bring out and reinforce 
metaphor’s modus operandi of the transference of meaning, of getting at one thing 
through another: “In this broadest possible sense of the word language I mean to 
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designate any element in human experience which is not merely contemplated for its own 
sake alone, but is employed to mean, to intend to stand proxy for something beyond 
itself” (Metaphor and Reality 29). Critics such as Barfield and Wheelwright are so 
concerned to stress this tarning aspect of metaphor, that they are largely content to ignore 
many old rhetorical distinctions, particularly that between metaphor and simile. Barfield, 
arguing that the “essential nature of figurative language is most clearly apparent in the 
figure called metaphor,” (106) is prepared to call a long and elaborate metaphor “a simile 
with the word ‘like’ missed out” (107). Wheelwright no less authoritatively urges that, 
“the grammarians’ familiar distinction between metaphor and simile is to be largely 
ignored” (71), pointing out that the line “My love is like a red, red rose” is grammatically 
a simile and yet has far more metaphoric vitality than, “Love is a red rose,” which is 
grammatically a metaphor.  
Wheelwright is also prepared to discount words such as image and symbol as 
tending to prejudice one’s attitude toward, and one’s theory of, poetry. He concludes that 
“the test of essential metaphor is not any rule of grammatical form, but rather the quality 
of semantic transformation that is brought about” (71). Wheelwright refers to Wallace 
Stevens, who employed a somewhat different vocabulary, speaking of “the symbolic 
language of metamorphosis” (Stevens, Angel 117), the purpose of which is to modify or 
intensify one’s sense of reality. The world of science and politics may provide us with 
another illustrative example: biologist Scott F. Gilbert (1949-), in his essay “The 
Metaphorical Structuring of Social Perceptions” (1979), examines imagery dealing with 
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diseases of the body politic. He discusses political metaphors in which foreign ideologies 
are depicted as external, infectious contagions.  
The rhetoric of the Cold War, for example, warned against the dangers of foreign 
‘infiltration’, utilizing standard transference of meaning from the semantic vehicle to the 
semantic tenor. Now that cancer has replaced infection as the chief medical worry of our 
age, political imagery that has undergone a metamorphosis tends to speak of internal 
threats, usually depicted in terms of growing cancer as a surprising extension of the 
previously known conceptual metaphor FOREIGN IDEOLOGIES ARE DISEASES. In 
his open letter to the internet entitled “Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to 
Justify War in the Gulf,” first published as an e- letter in 1990, George Lakoff analyzes 
the various metaphors used in the politicians’ and the military’s language in their efforts 
to convince the public of the necessity of military action against Saddam Hussein. 
Lakoff’s essay goes beyond Gilbert’s work and clarifies how “metaphors can kill.” 
That the process of metaphor is located at the heart of language, and indeed 
defines and refines it, remains the central position of most twentieth-century writers on 
the subject. This position is also many critics’ overriding preoccupation—one that often 
tends to find itself opposed to scrupulous analysis on these very grounds. John Middleton 
Murry (1889-1957) argues that, “metaphor is as ultimate as speech itself, and speech is as 
ultimate as thought. If we try to penetrate them beyond a certain point, we find ourselves 





One of the major contributions of early modern linguistic studies to the question 
of metaphor lies in the area of the relationship of the language of poetry to ordinary or 
standard language. At its depths, the issue seems to be that formulated by the Czech 
linguist Jan Mukarovský (1891-1975), “Is poetic language a special brand of the 
standard, or is it an independent formation” (21)?  Mukarovský’s concept of 
foregrounding (an English version of the term aktualisaçe) touches upon most of the 
issues that have sparked debate. In his view, “the function of poetic language consists in 
the maximum of foregrounding of the utterance [. . .] it is not used in the services of 
communication, but in order to place in the foreground the act of expression, the act of 
speech itself” (43-4).  
As concepts of deviation obviously depend a good deal upon an established norm 
or background that throws deviation into relief, in the study of metaphor, a central 
problem consequently has been how to characterize the standard structures from which a 
metaphor supposedly deviates. This is an important matter, to the extent that when a 
metaphor loses its deviant character, and becomes part of standard language, it is said to 
be dead. It ceases to be part of the foreground and merges into the background, as in the 
case of a metaphor like the leg of the table. Standard language is hardly metaphor- less, 
but its metaphors have a more or less inert quality that requires definition. The poet has to 
have access to linguistic devices that indicate that the metaphors he constructs are by 
comparison to be taken as foreground and alive. Various linguistic methods have been 
applied to this issue (see the survey by Seymour Benjamin Chatman (1928-) and Samuel 
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R. Levin in their article “Linguistics and Poetics” in The Encyclopedia of Poetry and 
Poetics—and seemed to have proven relevant in various degrees before the emergence of 
cognitive linguistics. 
For instance, statistical counts of the incidence of various kinds of combinations 
of words gathered from some corpus of normal language will obviously provide a crude 
index of the extent to which any metaphor is overtly deviant in terms of the relative rarity 
or frequency of its particular structure. The same process could also, and more easily, be 
applied to an individual poem, where the metaphorical norm within the poem might be 
established statistically, and the degree of deviation in some metaphors thereby 
computed. In a poem where the metaphor was normally formed by, say, a transitive verb 
(“the ship ploughed the waves”), a metaphor formed by means of the copula (“the ship 
was a plough through the waves”) might be distinctly deviant. 
Information theory treats the question of deviation not in terms of frequency of 
occurrence, but, rather, in terms of the probability of occurrence, based on an analysis of 
what normally occurs. As noted, some co-occurrences of words in terms of potential 
metaphorical constructs, such as white and snow, or ship and plough, have a high degree 
of probability in English. Others, such as pugilistic and bicycle, obviously have a much 
lower one, although they could occur together in an adjective-noun construction. The 
notion of lexis, as a level of patterning on which words participate over and above the 
syntactic structures in which they exist, seems to be a useful one in this connection.  
In Papers in Linguistics (1957), John Rupert Firth (1890-1960) suggested the 
concept of collocation as a means of expressing the normal probability of the co-
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occurrence of words within a span of utterance. The difference between the combinations 
of ship and plough on the one hand, and pugilistic and bicycle on the other, could be 
stated, to use the phraseology of Angus McIntosh, by saying that the latter combination 
does not exhibit the same potential of collocability as the former (327-328). The words’ 
ranges do not normally include each other.  
Obviously, this procedure offers a means of assessing the extent to which a 
particular metaphor occupies foreground or background. In the case of a metaphor like 
“the leg of the table,” one would say that the collocation of leg and table had a fairly high 
degree of probability of occurrence. In the case, however, of Eliot’s metaphor,  
Let us go then, you and I  
Where the evening is spread out against the sky  
Like a patient etherised upon a table (Prufrock 1-3),  
the elements proposed for transference, “evening” and” patient, spread out” and 
“etherised, sky” and (operating) “table” have a much lower potential of collocation both 
as pairs and in the larger units of tenor (evening spread out against the sky) and vehicle 
(patient etherized upon a table). On the principle that the higher the degree of potential 
collocation, the more this makes the metaphor part of the background, and the lower the 
degree, the more this pushes the metaphor into the foreground, one could then say that 
Eliot’s metaphor exhibits a considerable degree of foregrounding. These characteristics 
could even be positioned, should anyone wish to do so, on an appropriately calibrated 
scale (McIntosh 327-30). The problems with this approach to metaphor, however, are 
rather apparent, because  
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[I]t is a prerequisite to any discussion of metaphor that we make a 
distinction between basic conceptual metaphors, which are cognitive in 
nature, and particular linguistic expressions of these conceptual metaphors 
[. . .] At both the conceptual and linguistic levels, we have the resources to 
construct an indefinitely large range of metaphors, that is, metaphorical 
concepts and ways of expressing such concepts in language. Given any 
well-structured concept, an inventive person can probably find a way to 
understand another concept using it. For example, we could probably all 
find some way or other to make sense of “Death is a banana,” that is, to 
understand the concept of death in terms of what we know about bananas. 
There are important differences between such random, idiosyncratic 
conceptualizations of death and so basic a metaphor as DEATH IS  
DEPARTURE. (MTCR 50-51) 
Analyzing unusual linguistic expressions solely based on how likely lexical items are to 
appear in a semantic relationship fails to incorporate a discussion of the phenomenon on a 
conceptual level. Furthermore, an approach based on the notion of ‘deviation’ from 
‘standard’ language rests on the assumption that standard language is emphatically not 
metaphorical. The possible results of such an approach are rather limited in informing 






The modern concept of generative grammar, being neither descriptive—that is, 
derived from an account of actual linguistic occurrences—nor prescriptive—derived from 
a set of presuppositions about what ought to occur in the language—but rather concerned 
with supplying a set of rules for generating all the sentences of the language, also fails to 
offer any helpful contributions to the debate on metaphor. Noam Chomsky (1928-), 
widely recognized as the founder of the linguistic theory of transformationa l grammar, 
received his linguistic training under Leonard Bloomfield (1887-1949), whose 
behaviourist empiricism dominated American linguistics during the 1930s and 1940s, and 
from Zellig Harris (1909-1992), whose political stances during the 1950s pleased 
Chomsky more than his version of linguistic structuralism.  
Chomsky’s contribution to linguistics, and thereby to modern thought, has been 
broadly threefold. In the first place, he moved the emphasis of linguistics from the strictly 
descriptive and inductive level, the level of the endless cataloguing of utterances from 
which conclusions about grammar could then be drawn, to the ideal level of competence 
and deep structure, the level which opens up a creative aspect in language. In short, 
Chomsky showed, within his technical expertise in linguistics, that language was more 
than its material execution. Second, he brought about a reconsideration of language 
learning by arguing that language competence is not acquired inductively through a 
behaviorist stimulus-response conditioning, but is the consequence of an innate cognitive 
capacity possessed by humans. In other words, linguistic freedom and creativity is not 
acquired, but always already exists as a governing a priori. Third, the distinction between 
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competence and performance, even when it was poorly understood, has served as a 
metaphor for structural studies in other disciplines such as philosophy and sociology (see, 
for example, Jürgen Habermas’s (1929-) notion of communicative competence, which 
echoes Chomsky’s conception of agency).  
Chomsky initially set out to explain how an ideal language-user could generate 
and understand new and unique grammatical sentences without ever having encountered 
them in practice. As a result, he set out to show that a finite and describable set of 
transformational rules constituted the competence of the ideal language-user, and that this 
competence could generate grammatical sentences. Performance, which is equivalent to 
the finite number of grammatical sentences realized by actual language-users, provides 
evidence for an investigation of competence, and Chomsky added that competence did 
not imply a conscious appreciation and invocation of generative rules on the part of the 
language-user. Instead, it had to be seen as equivalent to the mode itself of the speaker’s 
being in language. In other words, competence is the very condition of possibility of 
language: competence is constitutive of the speaker rather than the other way around.  
Chomsky was able to show that both phrase structure grammar and 
transformational grammar are more powerful (i.e. can do more) than finite state grammar, 
and that transformational grammar is a more powerful grammar than phrase structure 
grammar. Transformational grammar is essentially Chomsky’s own contribution to a 
general theory of grammar. Although previously not formalized, phrase structure 
grammar and finite state grammar existed in linguistics prior to Chomskys work. Only a 
transformational grammar can derive the basic rules constitutive of the ideal speaker-
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hearer of, for example, English. The logic behind transformational grammar is that if 
every utterance implied a unique rule as a condition of its acceptability, there would be 
too many rules to deal with. Clearly, the number of rules is not equivalent to the number 
of utterances; this is what any grammar implies.  
On the other hand, Chomsky points out that if one cannot show that many 
sentences—apparently different at a surface level of phrase structure grammar—are in 
fact transformations of the same rule, the grammar becomes almost infinitely complex 
and contains little explanatory power. Phrase structure grammar would thus become too 
complex if it alone were charged with providing all the rules of the ideal speaker-hearer’s 
sentence formation. In sum, then, a transformational grammar is a way of reducing 
sentence formation to the smallest number of rules possible. From a slightly different 
angle, the transformational grammar, providing the rules of competence, is equivalent to 
Chomsky’s notion of deep structure.  
One further facet of Chomsky’s theory of language needs to be considered before 
briefly assessing the relevance of his work for the study of metaphor. It concerns his 
attempt to bolster his theory of generative grammar by linking it to a notion of cognitive 
capacity. Because Chomsky believes that humans cannot explain language acquisition 
and language competence (which presupposes language creativity) inductively, or in 
terms of any version of stimulus-response theory, he resorts to the notion of an innate, 
specifically human, language capacity as a way of explaining the nature of human 
language. In particular, he has been largely taken with the Cartesian view that language 
and mind are so inextricably linked that knowledge of language would open up a 
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knowledge of the human mind. For the inventor of generative grammar, therefore, 
language is fundamentally part of human psychology—psychology to be understood as a 
theory of the faculties of the human mind. Language competence is thus less linguistic 
than psychological in origin.  
In these views, Chomsky has been particularly influenced by Descartes and the 
seventeenth-century rationalist, scientific tradition. Instead of giving language 
autonomous status, as came to be the case in the twentieth century with Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s (1857-1913) structuralist view of language, seventeenth-century rationalism 
saw language as an expression of the psychological subject. Apparently, Chomsky 
believes that only by identifying with this tradition can justice be done to the dynamic 
and creative essence of language, and a relapse into some form of empiricist explanation 
of it avoided. Indeed, in Chomsky’s eyes, Saussure’s incipient empiricism makes him 
unacceptable to generative linguistics. According to Chomsky, Saussure ended up 
privileging parole-speech over langue-grammatical structures (Lechte 49-53). 
 Lakoff and Johnson indeed admit that  
Chomsky deserves enormous credit for helping to bring into cognitive 
science the idea of the cognitive unconscious as it applies to grammar. It 
was largely through Chomsky’s influence that first-generation cognitive 
scientists became aware of the enormous range of phenomena composing 
the cognitive unconscious. (PITF 472) 
At the same time, however, they continue criticizing Chomsky’s ideas in a way that is 
reminiscent of the Linguistics Wars (see, for example, Randy Allen Harris 1993) of the 
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late 1960s and the 1970s. After what appears to be a careful and thorough review of 
Chomsky’s theory of language, Lakoff and Johnson conclude that “the philosophical 
assumptions behind Chomsky’s linguistic theory are almost entirely inconsistent with 
empirical research on mind and language coming out of second-generation cognitive 
science” (PITF 478). Then, summarizing some of the findings of cognitive linguistics in 
contrast to Chomsky’s theories, they state: 
  The research indicates that the syntax of a language is structured: 
1. Not independently of meaning, but so as to express meaning 
2. Not independently of communication, but in accordance with 
communicative strategies 
3. Not independently of culture, but often in accord with the deepest 
aspects of culture 
4. Not independently of the body, but arising from aspects of the 
sensori-motor system. (480) 
Their criticism continues to assert that “Chomsky appears to doubt that all that other 
stuff—meaning, pragmatics, discourse, cultural constraints, processing—can be precisely 
studied in a scientific manner at all” (481). Partly because Chomskyan linguistics is based 
on the Cartesian notion of disembodied reason, it is inconsistent with findings about the 
embodiment of the mind. 
Even outside the cognitive linguistics paradigm, Chomsky’s primarily formalist 
approach to language has been heavily criticized over the last four decades. However, the 
problem with many contemporary criticisms of Chomsky and linguistic nativism is that 
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they are based upon features of the theory that are no longer germane; aspects that have 
either been superseded by more adequate proposals, or that have been dropped altogether 
under the weight of contravening evidence. It is notable that, contrary to the misguided 
opinion of many of his critics, Chomsky has been more willing than the vast majority of 
psychological theorists to revise and extend his theory in the face of new evidence. 
Supposedly, his resistance to the proposals of those of his early students and 
colleagues who banded together under the name of generative semantics was not, as it is 
widely believed, a matter of his unwillingness to entertain evidence contrary to his own 
position. Rather, it was a matter of his unwillingness to entertain vague, ambiguous, and 
inconsistent theoretical claims. His ultimate victory over generative semantics was 
grounded squarely in his willingness to alter his theory to bring it more in line with new 
evidence, and the theory now bears only a modest resemblance to that he developed in 
the 1950s and 1960s (Green and Vervaeke 149-150). Nevertheless, in the advent of the 
cognitive revolution since the early 1980s, cognitive linguistics has gained an incredible 
following, and has seemingly managed to eliminate much theoretical inconsistencies of 
its predecessor generative semantics. 
 
Cognitive Linguistics 
Based on the discussion presented thus far, it is probably no exaggeration to say 
that most contemporary grammatical frameworks take perception, thought, and language 
to be only tangentially, and not directly, related to one another. In the world view of such 
theories, these three pillars of the human mind constitute quite different types of 
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knowledge and therefore belong, at least in theory, to distinct parts of our meticulously 
tidy cognitive architecture: the various sense modules coordinate perceptual input, and a 
central processor handles thought, reasoning, and other executive functions. Such an a 
priori philosophical commitment to the well-worn computer metaphor has no doubt been 
a very productive working strategy. But it is in no way the only plausible conception of 
the mind that one might adopt in the study of language. 
Proponents of cognitive linguistics take an alternative approach to the matter. The 
mind is believed to be structured, to be sure, but the basic assumption is that the 
relationship between language and other areas of cognition is often very intimate. The 
body and its perceptual processes serve as an important source of grounding for concept 
formation and imaginative reasoning, especially, metaphor and metonymy (Johnson 
1987, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). Basic cognitive abilities, such as 
prototype categorization or the imposition of figure/ground alignment, are also held to 
play a pivotal role in linguistic competence (see, for example, Ronald W. Langacker, 
1987, 1991). These fundamental abilities may undergo specialization through language 
usage, but they are not specific to language. Language simply recruits these embodied 
processes, and builds upon them in systematic ways. Radical modular architecture of the 
language faculty, as proposed by Chomsky, is thus avoided. 
As Dell Hymes and John Fought have argued, in the century-old history of 
linguistics the idea of a mainstream approach eventually crystallized shortly after the 
publication of Chomsky’s influential Syntactic Structures in 1957. As never before, 
linguistics came to restrict its specific purview to the elaboration of procedures and 
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algorithms for separating grammatical from ungrammatical sentences. The study of any 
other phenomena in human languages was considered to be either marginal or to fall 
outside of the domain of linguistics proper. Figurative forms of communication in 
particular were relegated to the status of anomalous strings, easily explainable in terms of 
some semantic deviation from a more fundamental literalist system of meaning patterns 
(Hymes and Fought 19-32).  
The abandonment of this mainstream mindset can probably be traced to 1971 
when Hymes demonstrated how the larger human and social context was an active 
participant in shaping the rules of grammar, which Chomsky and his followers thought of 
as being immune to such external forces. In the 1950s and 1960s, grammatical systems 
were conceived of as being machine- like generators of infinitely well- formed sentences, 
independent of the vagaries of human and social experience. Hymes argued masterfully 
that the specific capacities of people, the organization of speech categories for socially-
defined purposes, and the sensitivity of rules to situational parameters all had decisive 
roles to play in determining grammatical behaviors. Hymes persuasive case against the 
status quo triggered heated epistemological debates on the nature of language and on the 
goals of linguistics proper that lasted throughout the 1970s.  
What originally began as a break with Chomskyan generative grammar later 
turned into a revolt against those traditions that analyze linguistic semantics in terms of 
truth conditions and discrete bina ry features. In the context of cognitive linguistics, 
semantic structure is not seen as a truth-conditional relationship between an utterance and 
objective reality (or possible worlds, for that matter), nor is it seen as a discrete entity that 
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is the literal sum of its component parts. Instead, semantics is deemed to be gestaltic in 
nature and is equated with such cognitive abilities as conceptualization, construal, 
categorization, and subjacent knowledge structures. This is an important point. One of the 
tenets that lies at the very heart of cognitive linguistics is the hypothesis that natural 
language is a non-autonomous, non-modular cognitive faculty that draws greatly upon 
other, more general, psychological processes. Because linguistic theory under 
structuralism and Chomskyan generative grammar has, for the most part, assumed 
exactly the opposite, this claim is indeed highly controversial.  
 
Metaphors We Live By : Changing Linguistics 
One of the by-products of this debate has been the emergence of an extensive and  
intensive interest in metaphor. The first token of this new Zeitgeist was the publication of 
Metaphors We Live By, a small book, repeatedly referred to in this study, on the primacy 
of metaphor. The authors, sharing the same interest, were George Lakoff—a linguist 
trained in the Chomskyan tradition (see, for example, Lakoff 1970)—and Mark Johnson, 
professor of philosophy. Lakoff and Johnson are concerned with how people understand 
their experiences and express them in language. Based upon their findings they believe 
that metaphor is not merely a poetical or rhetorical device, but that our language is 
metaphorically structured, and as such, provides evidence for similarly me taphorical 
mental processes.  
In common perception and in most scholarly research, metaphors have only been 
ascribed peripheral importance. In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson set out to 
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correct this fallacy. They attempt to oppose the constant search for meaning with the 
search for and the understanding of the meaningful. Instead of looking at what 
expressions of language mean in terms of objective truth (which is an unattainable 
endeavor), they approach language in a structural way to gain an insightful perspective on 
how words or phrases in form of metaphors express our experiences as human beings. 
Metaphors are not limited to their use in poetry or rhetoric; they are part of our everyday 
speech.  
The essence of metaphor is the understanding of one thing in terms of another. 
This means that if there is one thing that humans do not fully understand in its nature—
say, time—they ascribe to it qualities of another thing—in Western culture, mostly 
money—to get a grip on the understanding of the less known thing. In this case, when we 
say TIME IS MONEY, we turn time into a valuable commodity; since money is a rare 
thing to have and it is something we need in order to acquire what we want, time 
becomes understood in the same terms of value and rarity. However, it is important to 
realize that any metaphorical structuring is always only partial. Metaphorical systemacity 
must obviously highlight one aspect of a thing used as a reference and hide other aspects 
inherent to it. Because money can be manufactured, because it exists in bills and coins, 
and can be transferred from one person to another, it does not mean that people  can do 
the same things with time. If metaphorical structuring were not partial, one thing would 
actually be the other.  
The book Lakoff and Johnson have produced is an “experientalist approach” (x), 
revising central assumptions of Western thought. The thirty chapters of Metaphors We 
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Live By proceed in small, easy to follow steps in this revisionary endeavor. They begin 
with introducing the reader to new insights about the nature of metaphors, always 
illustrating every claim with understandable and well-explained examples. The first 
chapters guide the reader from basic metaphorical concepts such as up-down 
spatialization through orientational to ontological metaphors. Then the book moves from 
being predominantly an account of what kinds of metaphors exist to what can concluded 
from the observations of metaphor in language. Here, philosophical insights join the 
results of linguistic analysis and further an understanding of the consequences of these 
findings. For Lakoff and Johnson, looking at metaphors is not a means self-sufficient in 
itself; it is not an activity simply revealing insights about language, but about our human 
conceptual system.  
From the systemacity and coherence of metaphorical structure and the 
inconsistency of metaphorical structuring, researchers can derive numerous conclusions. 
Human thought is structured metaphorically; moreover, we define our reality in terms of 
metaphors and then act accordingly. If we intend to understand our existence and the 
perception of our existence, we must look at language as metaphorically structured 
because this structure expresses how we think. The discussion of these ideas is centered 
in Chapter 22, the chapter announced to be the key chapter of the book. The authors make 
the postmodern claim that experiences shape our realities, and that they do so through the 
expressions we give our experiences in language. Here, the philosophical argument based 
on linguistic data reaches its peak in clear and well-organized statements. 
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Lakoff and Johnson repeatedly illustrate that metaphors are “pervasive in 
everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action” (3) as well. They are used 
permanently in everyday communication, politics, education, science, and all other fields 
of human activity. Most universal and basic concepts of the world we live in are 
comprehended via metaphorical mappings, such as time, state, and quantity. They derive 
from our concrete daily experience and our knowledge of the world and are projected 
onto abstract concepts, thus acting as a pattern for the formation of such. For instance, the 
conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP (23) mirrors a mapping process, in which quantity is 
associated with vertical movement, such as “Prices are high, the demand of fresh 
vegetables is rising” or “I’m feeling up” (23). 
Most of our cognitive processes, the ways we think, act, perceive, and view the 
world, are based on metaphorical concepts which structure and influence our language: 
“Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our  everyday realities” (3). 
Of course, these concepts and metaphorical processes vary to a certain extent from 
culture to culture, from society to society, and range from universally applicable to 
language-specific metaphorical mappings. 
Although much of what humans  say and express is metaphorical, a majority of 
metaphors is used unconsciously and automatically. Most people are not aware of the 
metaphorical character of much of their simple vocabulary, since many metaphorical 
expressions are so deeply embedded in our everyday communication, thought and 
culture. That is, they have acquired a high degree of conventionality, so their 
metaphorical use remains virtually unnoticed.  
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Metaphor is the use of one notion to understand or describe another. In other 
words, it is the application of elements from one context of experience to another one. 
We thus transfer the meaning from one concept to another on the basis of perceived 
similarities, which are anchored in the ubiquitous concepts determining our thoughts and 
their structure. As far as terminology is concerned, it is important to note that  
the word metaphor has come to be used differently in contemporary 
metaphor research. The word metaphor has come to mean a cross-domain 
mapping in the conceptual system. The term metaphorical expression 
refers to a linguistic expression (a word, phrase, or sentence) that is the 
surface realization of such a cross-domain mapping (this is what the word 
metaphor referred to in the old theory). (Lakoff “The Contemporary 
Theory of Metaphor” 202). 
Human cognition is largely dependent on metaphors. Without metaphors, the 
possibilities to communicate in our world would be cognitively limited, since the outward 
structure of the words we use literally is minimalist inasmuch as we use metaphorical 
expressions to extend the repertoire of possibilities to express ourselves. When using 
metaphorical expressions we fill in lexical gaps and largely extend our cognitive 
capacities. In doing so, complexity is reduced and the context is made more abstract. 
Moreover, metaphorical expressions contribute to the construction of the reality 
surrounding us. The basic contexts and situations based on cultural experience are called 
source domains. These are clear, simply structured, and concrete (e.g. WAR), whereas 
the more abstract and complex contexts, to which the words are applied, are called target 
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domains (e.g. ARGUMENT). This systematic identification of source and target domain 
is expressed by the term ‘metaphorical mapping.’ It links two different domains, thus 
structuring our experience, reasoning, and everyday language. 
The experience that leads to the formation of our metaphorical concepts can be 
different in nature. They either relate to our physical or to our cultural environment. The 
physical environment refers to all static things around us (objects) as well as to living 
things (animals) and—most of all—to our own body. The cultural environment, however, 
includes the various kinds of interaction between human beings and, more importantly,  
our personal philosophy of life. It is, above all, tradition and customs that control these 
ways of interacting and thinking.  Lakoff and Johnson also challenged the approach of 
linguistic relativity, the so-called Sapir-Whorf-Hypothesis named after the linguists Sapir  
and Whorf, who worked in the early twentieth century. In their view, it is language which 
ultimately determines the worldview of its speaker; only the words spoken give shape to 
the concepts of our mind. Accordingly, the concepts are highly dependent on the 
language we speak and therefore on our cultural background. 
These assumptions are compelling—they force readers to think about language in 
a way that is supposedly completely new. The arguments attempting to support the 
assumption that language is metaphorically structured is presented in a sophisticated 
way—well written, well researched and certainly worthy of the readers’ time and 
attention. As a study based on empirical grounds, it claims that it does not try to bend the 
findings of its research into a previously established theoretical framework. Rather, the 
authors manage to establish a sound theory based on their findings. Metaphors We Live 
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By provides even more than may be assumed from its title: it does not simply give the 
reader valuable insights on language, but by looking at language, it derives fundamental 
conclusions about our conceptual system and the way we think. 
As our overviews in Chapters One and Two thus far have shown, the awareness 
of metaphor as an important phenomenon is at least as old as Aristotle. However, in 
making it the primary target of investigation for linguistics proper, Lakoff and Johnson 
broke radically with the long-standing tradition of viewing meaning as grounded on a 
literalist cognitive substratum. For linguistics, therefore, Metaphors We Live By did 
indeed chart a new course.  
Not everyone has readily adopted the Lakoff and Johnson paradigm, but a glance 
at the recent literature shows how profoundly they have influenced the current generation 
of linguists, whether these linguists adopt the basic tenets proposed by Lakoff and 
Johnson or not. Never before has there been such an intense interest in the role played by  
figurative structures in language and thought. Additionally, cognitive linguistics 
questions much of the conventional wisdom that most current linguistic theories take for 
granted.  One of the criticisms occasiona lly leveled at cognitive linguistics as a 
movement has to do with its use of the term cognitive: why is cognitive linguistics any 
more cognitive than other mentalist frameworks? The question, or reproach, has a simple 
answer: cognitive linguistics is especially cognitive because it attempts to put language 
and grammar into direct contact with other cognitive abilities and conceptualization 
processes.  
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Because “deep features of our thinking, cognitive processes, and social 
communication need to be brought in, correlated, and associated with their linguistic 
manifestations” Fauconnier concludes that “the cognitive linguistics enterprise [. . .] has 
already been remarkably successful.” However, even if the “methods and results [of 
cognitive linguistics] have been quite novel,” it is also true that, as has been indicated 
thus far, cognitive linguistics “espouses the age-old view that language is in the service of 
meaning” (12). Indeed, the claim that cognitive linguistics makes about its 
‘revolutionary’ exploration of the inherent connection between mind and body, and 
language and embodied reasoning, is not as revolutionary as one may think. When the 
anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss writes that 
language does not consist in the analytical reason of the old-style 
grammarians nor in the dialectic constituted by structural linguistics. 
Language, an unreflecting totalization, is human reason which has its 
reasons and of which man knows nothing. And if it is objected that it is so 
only for a subject who internalizes it on the basis of linguistic theory, my 
reply is that this way out must be refused, for this subject is one who 
speaks: for the same light which reveals the nature of language to him also 
reveals to him that it was so when he did not know it, for he already made 
himself understood, and that it will remain so tomorrow without his being 
aware of it, since his discourse never was and never will be the result of a 
conscious totalization of linguistic laws (The Savage Mind 252), 
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He clearly shows that the study of the relation of language and thought, and of language 
and culture, has a long-standing tradition in the various fields of anthropology. This is the 
domain of inquiry on which Chapter Four focuses in order to illustrate not only the 
inherent connections between linguistics and anthropology, but also to pave the road for 




CULTURE AND METAPHOR 
Language does not exist apart from culture, that is, from the 
 socially inherited assemblage of practices and beliefs that  
determines the texture of our lives. 
     Edward Sapir (1884-1939) 
 
Introduction 
Lakoff and Johnson would probably agree on the fact that the way metaphorical 
concepts are formed varies from culture to culture, sometimes even from subculture to 
subculture. However, compared to culturally variable concepts, some metaphorical 
concepts tend to be more universal than others. This chapter seeks to build upon the link 
that cognitive scientists have already established between metaphor and culture, and will 
provide some evidence for the hypothesis of the existence of a connection between the 
cognitive models expressed through myth, and the cognitive models expressed via 
metaphor with its transferring qualities. By beginning the theoretical investigation into 
how metaphorical concepts, and myths and arche typal motifs are inherently connected as 
expressions of cognitive processes, this chapter lays the ground work for the detailed case 




Universal Metaphorical Concepts 
Certain physical principles are invariable with regard to cultural influence. They 
do not change from one place to another but are basic and fundamental parts of reality. 
We can draw a “distinction between experiences that are ‘more’ physical [i.e. universal; 
my comment], such as standing up, and those that are ‘more’ cultural, such as 
participating in a wedding ceremony” (MWLB 57). Orientational metaphors, for example, 
tend to be based on universal concepts that are derived from the fact that human beings 
are shaped as they are and perceive the world in a similar way, namely by using their 
senses. Within this group of metaphors, the body itself and our sense of spatial 
orientation plays an important role. The central concepts emerging from this concern 
orientations like UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, FRONT-BACK, NEAR-FAR (57), expressing 
either the posture of our body (UP-DOWN), seeing our body as a container (IN-OUT) or 
correlating the body and the space around us (FRONT-BACK). Since these concepts also 
represent metaphorical concepts, we can assume that they are used universally.  
The concepts introduced by scholarship as the more universal ones are understood 
more directly than others. They can be called emergent concepts as they are based on 
direct experience that is based on direct interaction with the physical world. They “allow 
us to conceptualize our emotions in more sharply defined terms” (58). They are 
potentially transferable from one culture to another, although they emerge out of 





Culturally Variable Concepts 
It would be misleading to separate the more universal concepts completely from 
the culturally variable ones. This is because even the more universal concepts are formed 
in a cultural-specific environment. Lakoff and Johnson claim that “all experience is 
cultural through and through [...] we experience our ‘world’ in such a way that our 
culture is already present in the very experience itself” (57). They continue by stating that 
our concepts are based on cultural presuppositions which have a tendency to be more 
physical, that is, universal, or more cultural. 
As discussed above in connection with HAPPY-SAD, the metaphorical concept 
HAPPY IS UP is rather universal. However, if we take the system RATIONAL-
EMOTIONAL, it is not as obvious which attribute is assigned to which orientation. The 
way we understand these two concepts is based on two separate and different experiential 
bases, both referring to the metaphorical concept of UP-DOWN (20). Whether 
RATIONAL IS UP or EMOTIONAL IS UP depends on the cultural and personal 
presuppositions of the particular person and the cultural environment. In our Western 
industrial society, the tendency is definitely toward privileging the concept RATIONAL 
IS UP as we need a rational way of thinking and handling our emotions to be successful 
in our society. This leads us to the fact that material value is very important in Western 
industrial societies. We attach a high value to resources as they serve the purposeful end 
of material enrichment. 
Resources can be quantified by being given a certain materialistic value. This 
becomes obvious by looking at the metaphorical concept TIME IS A RESOURCE. 
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Expressions such as we run out of time underline the existence of a concept influenced by 
certain values of a society, while in other parts of the world this may be seen differently. 
Cultural values are therefore coherent with the metaphorical system. Metaphorical 
concepts like TIME IS A RESOURCE are called structural metaphors as they allow us to 
use a highly structured and definite concept like RESOURCE to structure a less definite 
or abstract one like TIME (65). Generally speaking, structural metaphors have a higher 
degree of cultural variance than orientational or ontological ones. 
If one also takes into account geographic circumstances, all metaphor types may 
vary locally. How humans experience the world is strongly influenced by outer physical 
and social characteristics of the region they live in. Topography, climatic zones, and 
therefore different kinds of vegetation and animal life affect our mental concepts as much 
as the structure of our society. It also makes a considerable difference whether we have 
an urban or a rural background. While concepts based on buildings and transport are 
likely to be more readily available to an urban person, a rural person would prove to be 
more inclined to incorporate concepts of landscape and animal species. Urban people, for 
instance, would rather take the concept of a machine to express strength, while others 
might prefer a strong and huge animal like a bear for this. In reality, however, traditional 
metaphorical expressions which once emerged on the countryside have survived even in 
the speech of people living in a city. These expressions are still determined by historical 
aspects, although they may have been subject to a change of meaning. Even if the 
linguistic expression survives, its conceptual background may have changed (Blank 347). 
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Only if new mappings occur, the thesis above can be applied, otherwise traditional 
expressions are most likely to have survived. 
Considering this, any concept—spatial, ontological or structural—can 
additionally be filled with variable forms of objects and circumstances with respect to 
geographically and socially variable principles. Through this, metaphorical concepts shift 
toward cultural specifications. This seems to suggest that a shift of the more universal 
concepts toward cultural variability is noticeable, depending on how the concepts are 
expressed in cultural terms. No clear-cut boundary can be drawn between universal and 
cultural concepts only. Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that, if cognitive 
linguistics intends to draw correct inferences about cognitive processes, it cannot rely 
solely on linguistic evidence. The relation of linguistic metaphors to the cultural contexts 
in which they are created, as well as cultural practices that may be expressive and/or 
formative of mental concepts, must become parts of the analytical paradigm. Of course, 
the most prominent field of inquiry into human culture is that of anthropology. 
 
Anthropology 
Perhaps the most famous definition of culture is the following one by one of the 
founders of anthropology, Edward B. Tyler (1832-1917). Culture, in his words is “that 
complex whole which includes belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities 
and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (1). Literally, ?????p?????a 
[ánthropología] is the science or study of man, but the field of anthropology more 
generally has developed into the study of things humans do. The discipline of 
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anthropology arose in the second half of the nineteenth century, combining two long-
existing streams of thought. The first was the study of what scholars have come to call 
cultural differences among societies, and the second dealt with the biological origins of 
humans and other species. Today, anthropology is widely understood as the study of 
cultures; as a discipline, it has undergone numerous transformations largely based on the 
development of different theories, which are at the core of anthropological inquiries, 
because they determine the types of questions anthropologists ask and the sort of 
information they collect  (McGee and Warms iii). 
In “Theories of Culture” (1974), Roger Keesing (1935-) outlines three ‘ideational’ 
theories of culture—discussed in reverse order in the remainder of this chapter—that 
anthropologists came to adopt during the 1960s and early 1970s. These are:  
1.  Cultures as cognitive systems as proposed in the work of Ward 
Goodenough, according to whom “a society’s culture consists of whatever 
it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable 
to its members;”  
2.  Cultures as structural systems as proposed by Lévi-Strauss, who “views 
cultures as shared symbolic systems that are cumulative creations of mind; 
he seeks to discover in the structuring of cultural domains—myth, art, 
kinship, language—the principles of mind that generate these cultural 
elaborations;”  
3.  Cultures as symbolic systems as proposed by Clifford Geertz, who, like 
Lévi-Strauss, views cultures as semiotic, but wants to study them as 
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shared codes of meaning underlying symbolic action. For Geertz, 
“meanings are not in people’s heads; symbols and meanings are shared by 
social actors—between them, not in them.” Adopting the post-structuralist 
idiom, he also viewed culture as “an assemblage of texts” (43-50).  
In respect to Geertz’s post-structuralist approach, one cannot help but be struck by the 
persistence of the central concerns of language and culture studies—the enduring 
preoccupations of scholars with the creative tens ion between linguistic relativity and 
language universals, and the effort to enrich cultural studies by borrowing aspects of a 
‘developed’ semiotics from linguistic study (for a brief discussion of the heterogeneous 
character of semiotics, see, for example the introduction to Scott Simpkins’s Critical 
Semiotics). The influence of the latter appears the more comfortable, even the more 
natural development, since influential postmodern formulations, such as those of Jacques 
Derrida, Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and Roland Barthes (1915-1980), themselves 
“derive in a quite direct intellectual pedigree from the semiotics of Saussure” (Shaul and 
Furbee 209). Although frequently the dialogue takes the character of challenging some 
presumed dictate of Saussureanism, it is nonetheless the case that Saussure’s ideas set an 
agenda still pursued under the postmodern paradigm. The enterprise of extending models, 
methods, and concepts from linguistics into cultural analysis proceeds almost unabated. 
Nevertheless, since cultures express their perceptions of reality through art and 
other practices as well as the practice of language, it is not at all surprising to find 
anthropologists continuing to research languages, using linguistic methodologies in order 
to achieve a better understanding of a culture. Numerous books on language and culture, 
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or perhaps culture and language, point at this widespread practice, which has come to be 
called linguistic anthropology (see, for example, Herbert Landar 1966; Goodenough 
1981). In fact, the close relationship between way of talking and way of life, between 
language and culture, has been one of the major preoccupations of both linguists and 
anthropologists since the inception of both disciplines. Boas described the structure of 
language as reflecting psychological, that is, cognitive, reality. To him, facts about the 
structure of a language indicated the basic tools of thought, and the main purpose of 
anthropological research was “to describe as clearly as possible those psychological 
principles of each language which may be isolated by an analysis of grammatical forms” 
(Boas, Race, Language, and Culture v). Boas considered language a particularly good 
reflection of the cultural reality of native concepts because it is largely unconscious. His 
belief that “linguistic phenomena never rise into the consciousness of [. . .] man” (39) 
appears somehow reminiscent of the postulate that metaphors are largely unconscious 
cognitive phenomena.  
The language-thought relationship also was a major concern of the American 
linguists and ethnographers Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897-1941) and Edward Sapir, who 
were both trained in the Boasian tradition. Sapir believed that 
language is a guide to social reality [. . .]. Human beings do not live in the 
objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as 
ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular 
language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It 
is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without 
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the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of 
solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the 
matter is that the ‘real world’ is to a large extent built on the language 
habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be 
considered as representing the same social reality [. . .]. We see and hear 
and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language 
habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. 
(“The Status of Linguistics as a Science” 162) 
While not directly relevant for the present discussion, what has become known as the 
Sapir-Whorf-Hypothesis as well as the general concepts of linguistic determinism and 
linguistic relativity are still prevalent and hotly debated topics in both linguistics and 
anthropology. As strict claims about the relationship between language and culture, these 
concepts have been described as the “interface between language and thought” (Gumperz 
and Levinson v), suggesting their relevance for cognitive linguistics at large (WFDT 322-
325, 328-330). Works such as Madeleine Mathiot’s Ethnolinguistics: Boas, Sapir and 
Whorf Revisited (1979), Paul Friedrich’s The Language Parallax (1986), and John J. 
Gumperz and Stephen C. Levinson’s Rethinking Linguistic Relativity (1996), have 
recently discussed the ideas of Sapir and Whorf in minute detail.  
As already noted, there is a vast consensus among scholars that metaphors 
unconsciously reflect a particular perception and conception of reality. We speak of 
reaching a point, coming to or drawing a conclusion, and higher education, without 
recognizing the implicit linear notions of movement, along a graduated path or up a scale 
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and toward a goal, which these and similar structures metaphorically presuppose. Yet, 
these presuppositions affect our lives as part of a reality that exists, concretely, directly, 
and, to some extent, beyond our bodies, because of the language and the actions they 
motivate. However, the concern here is not a question, ultimately, of there being different 
realities. What is at issue is the existence of different perceptions of the same reality. 
Different encodings of the same event—for example, the death of a person, as in DEATH 
IS DEPARTURE, DEATH IS DELIVERANCE, or DEATH IS REINCARNATION—
are expressed through metaphors based on culturally determining factors such as the 
prevalent religious doctrine (MTCR 23-25, 51-53). Dorothy Lee puts it well when she 
states that “the assumption is not that reality itself is relative but that it is differently 
punctuated and categorized, by participants of different cultures, or that different aspects 
of it are noticed by, or presented to, them” (“Lineal and Nonlineal Codifications of 
Reality” 105). 
If the process of interpretation of a phenomenon such as death is largely a 
perceptual operation, it nonetheless proceeds according to a cognitive plan described as 
scripts or cultural schemata (see discussion below on Idealized and Cultural Cognitive 
Models), a plan updated and revised to accord with experience. One proposed means of 
building concepts is generalization, an idea developed out of the work of Lev Vygotsky 
(1896-1934) and Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945). Outside of linguistics and anthropology, it 
is Vygotskyan psychology which attempts to bring language, culture, and cognition into a 
common focus. Rejecting both rationalist and behaviorist approaches to linguistic and 
cognitive development, Vygotsky, working in a socialist Soviet milieu, began to view 
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verbal thought and intellectual speech as resulting from the historical-cultural evolution 
of man, beginning with the institution of collective labor. Vygotsky claimed that from the 
time when human activity and speech come together, in the growing child or in human 
evolution, man leaves behind a purely biological course of development and enters the 
stage of cultural-historical development, aided and abetted by laboring social contexts. 
Inverting the rationalist faith that speech is a mere garb of thought, Vygotsky asserted 
that thought can only come into existence through speech (Shaul and Furbee 204-205). 
Vygotsky believed that for a concept to be characterized, it must be placed within 
two continua, which he likened to the longitude and latitude lines of a globe. One of these 
represents objective content, the other, acts of thought-apprehending content. While the 
more recent basic color term research of Brent Berlin and Paul Kay (1969), and Eleanor 
Rosch’s prototype research (1973, 1981) have shown Vygotsky’s claim to not be entirely 
accurate, he was still correct in assuming a net of coordinate, superordinate, and 
subordinate categories as structuring mental concepts as is evident from the earlier 
discussion of prototype theory in Chapter Two. Vygotsky’s assumption of a horizontal 
and a vertical parameter as guiding conceptualization is resembled in Rosch’s approach 
that makes the distinction between vertical and horizontal levels of categorization (Rosch 
and Mervis 1975). 
A characteristic Romantic and post-Romantic tendency in defining myth is the 
denial of euhemerism, the theory that myths can be explained historically or by 
identifying their special objects or motives. The resistance to such reductionism is 
perhaps strongest in the work of the philosopher Ernst Cassirer, whose monumental 
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Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1925) is given over in its second volume to the 
proposition that “myth is a form of thought.” By this, Cassirer means to insist that myth is 
a fundamental “symbolic form” that, like language, myth is a means of responding to, 
and hence creating, our world. But unlike language, or at least the language of 
philosophy, myth is nonintellectual, nondiscursive, and typically imagistic. It is the 
primal, emotion- laden, unmediated “language” of experience. As a consequence, for 
mythic consciousness there is no reflective separation of the real and the ideal; the mythic 
“image does not represent the thing; it is the thing” (Vol. 2, 38).  
Cassirer proposed that the prime intellectual capacity of human beings is 
conceptualization, a process that always ends in symbolic expression. Conceptualization 
and symbolic expression are both embodied in myth and language. Furthermore, 
conceptualization and symbolic expression precede logical reasoning—in other words, 
the human ability to reason is modeled from conception and symbolic expression. 
Language, unlike myth, is not bounded but is expansive because it has developed a new 
mode—reasoning—via the intellectual mechanisms given to human beings. Cassirer’s 
ideas came out of his discussion of metaphor, in which he defined two sorts of metaphor: 
metaphor in the narrow sense (which seems to correspond with Lakoff’s definition of a 
partial mapping of characteristics of one concept onto another concept), where part of one 
fixed concept is made to stand for another fixed concept via the process of metaphor. 
Cassirer believed that radical metaphor, on the other hand, is not only a 
transformation/transference of characteristics, but actually involves the creation of a new 
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category (in contemporary terms, the creation of a ‘blended space’ as described, for 
example, by Fauconnier and Turner 1995).  
In the context of this dissertation however, Cassirer’s possible understanding of 
the metaphorical cognitive processes of transference and blend ing is less relevant than the 
fact that he sensed a link between the cognitive, concept-shaping and concept-expressing 
functions of metaphor and myth. Cassirer, who sees myths as expressions of early 
thought patterns, believes that “language, myth, art, and science [. . .] function 
organically together in the constitution of spiritual [i.e. cognitive; my comment] reality” 
(9). In the preface to Language and Myth (1946), Susanne Langer writes, “Cassirer 
realized that, language, the symbolization of thought, exhibits two entirely different 
modes of thought. Yet in both modes the mind is powerful and creative. It expresses itself 
in different forms, one of which is discursive logic, the other (myths) creative 
imagination” (x). In other words, both language and myth are representations of human 
thought, of human cognitive processes. While the anthropological data that Cassirer had 
access to was not always assembled in a critical manner—as becomes apparent to anyone 
reading his essays on myth today—the fact remains that he clearly recognized the 
importance of myth, as well as the connection between language and myth and the 
importance of language and myth to human cognition.  Even though Cassirer’s inquiry 
into myth consciousness has only been dealt with in a few rather brief essays, scholarship 





Myth and Cognition 
The English word myth comes from ancient Greek µ???? [múthos], which has 
been associated with a variety of meanings and different concepts since antiquity. 
According to one interpretation, this word originated from the Indo–European root 
*mau/mou and is closely related to the Lithuanian mausti (“to long for something,” “to 
wish something”) and the Serbo-Croatian misao (“thought”). According to another 
theory, it is derived from the old Greek onomatopoeic mu, for example, in the verb 
mudzo—“to murmur”, “to complain” (Boškovic 1). 
 In ancient Greece, as well as in interpretations of the ancient Greek thought, this 
word came to be contrasted with another one, ????? [lógos], which gradually assumed 
the meaning of thoughtful or rational speech or discourse. It is widely recognized today 
that the distinction between mythos and logos did not take place until late antiquity, 
despite the fact that our modern everyday usage could be dated to the distinction made by 
the Ionian philosophers from the sixth century BCE. The word mythos is recorded for the 
first time in Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey (ca. 750-650 BCE), where it has a variety of 
meanings, although the main meaning seems to be “word” or “speech.” However, it also 
means “a public speech” (Odyssey I, 358), “excuse” (Odyssey XXI, 71), “conversation” 
(Odyssey IV, 214), “fact” (Odyssey IV, 744), “threat,” “order” (Iliad I, 388), “task” (Iliad 
IX, 625),  “advice” (Iliad VII, 358), “intention” or “plan” (Iliad I, 545; Odyssey IV, 676), 
“reason” (Odyssey III, 140), and “story” or “tale” (Odyssey III, 94).   
 After the beginnings of Ionian philosophy in the sixth century BCE, mythos was 
used to denote a “fictitious story,” something that has been made up (Pindar, Olympians 
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I, 29; Plato, Phaedo 61b), or a “legend” (Herodotus, Historae II, 45). It is this set of 
meanings that comes close to the modern dictionary translations of the word “myth.” As 
Walter Burkert (1931-) puts it, the great change comes with the age of classical Athens in 
the fifth century BCE: “Myth is left behind. The word mythos, obsolete in Attica, is now 
redefined and devalued as the sort of story that the old poets used to tell and that old 
women still tell to their children” (312). It is from this period forward that the now 
famous distinction between “real” versus “mythic” takes place (Boškovic 2-3). 
Dictionaries such as The Penguin English Dictionary (1985), or the Oxford 
Dictionary of Current English (1989) usually define myth as something that is not true or 
something that should be taken only as a figure of speech. According to the Oxford 
Dictionary of Creation Myths (1994),  
myth is a narrative projection of a given cultural group’s sense of its 
sacred past and its significant relationship with the deeper powers of the 
surrounding world and universe.  A myth is a projection of an aspect of a 
culture’s soul.  In its complex but revealing symbolism, a myth is to a 
culture what a dream is to an individual. (vii)  
The dictionary further informs that a particular culture’s creation myth is  
a true metaphor for an ultimate reality that transcends science.  A creation 
myth conveys a society’s sense of its particular identity; it reveals the way 
the society sees itself in relation to the cosmos.  It becomes, in effect, a 
symbolic model for a society’s way of life, its world view—a model that is 
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reflected in such other areas of experience as ritual, culture heroes, ethics, 
and even art and architecture. (vii)  
These definitions could suggest that, as a metaphor transcending science, myth functions  
as an illustration and explanation of natural phenomena that, albeit experienced directly, 
are not directly intelligible. In this sense, myths operate along the same parameters as 
metaphors—they make intelligible one phenomenon in terms of another. This is the case 
because, according to Susan Nall Bales, president of the FrameWorks Institute, “myths 
are the stories we tell ourselves to make sense of the world,” and because “myths and 
metaphors, parables and paradigms are the way that real people process information and 
experience to make sense of the world” (Bates 1).  
This understanding of myth is similar to the ideas that Karl Otfried Müller (1797-
1840), one of the first scholars who began a critical study of myth, held in his 
publications. In Introduction to a Scientific System of Mythology (1825), Müller 
suggested that the nature of myths can only be found through a general historical and 
cultural study. In order to achieve this, one must know the Greek language, as well as the 
geography, history, religion, and society of ancient Greece. In this way, one could see 
how myths refer to various events: an invasion, emigration, construction of a city, 
establishment of a colony, or, in cases of more ancient myths, their connection and 
correlation to religious rites. One myth could explain why some rule is in place (see for 
example the Oedipus myth and its prohibitive assertion toward incest), yet another rule 
may refer to the origin of a phenomenon (see, for example, the myth of Prometheus 
explaining the origin of fire). Müller claimed that reality is the origin of mythology. As 
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myths present the sum of “the real” and “the ideal,” they explain facts that are clear and 
easy to observe in the human life (4). Another highly influential, nonreductionist theory 
of myth comes from the field of anthropology, influenced by then current theories in 
linguistics and psychology. As one of the most acknowledged and widely-read myth 
scholars of the twentieth century, French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss almost 
single-handedly founded the modern field of anthropological structuralism. 
 
Lévi-Strauss 
As early as the 1940s, Lévi-Strauss proposed that the proper area of study for 
anthropologists was not how people categorize the world, but the underlying patterns of 
human thought that produce those categories. Pursuing this quest, he has invested his 
efforts into conducting cross-cultural studies of myths and religion in an attempt to 
understand the fundamental structure of human cognition (Structural Anthropology Vol. 
1, 186-205). Consequently, Lévi-Strauss is not interested in the specific meaning of the 
symbols of a myth; rather, he is concerned with the patterning of elements, the way 
“cultural elements relate to one another to form the overall system” (208).   
Lévi-Strauss, whose extensive work with South American tribal societies has 
yielded extraordinary analyses, argues that the meaning of myths lies not in their manifest 
content but rather in their underlying structure of relations. These structures typically 
work to mediate between polar extremes (raw and cooked, agriculture and warfare, life 
and death), an analogy of the linguistic concept of binary oppositions. In other words, the 
purpose of myth is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction or 
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an otherwise incomprehensible phenomenon. Ultimately this leads Lévi-Strauss to the 
notion that the structure of myths is identical with that of the human mind. Thus the 
mythopoeic (mythmaking) imagination, its structure and operations, is reflected in the 
structure and symbols of actual myths. 
Lévi-Strauss and his disciples determined that the adaptation of Saussure’s 
linguistic model to problems of human science was sound because, as they believed, 
Saussure had followed a rigorous, objective scientific method, which identifies and 
defines constituent parts, studies relationships within a system, and accepts mathematical 
analysis. Language and culture are alike because they are composed of “oppositions, 
correlations, and logical relations” (xii). To Lévi-Strauss, the structures of myth point to 
the structures of the human mind common to all people—that is, to the way all human 
beings think. Myth thus becomes a language—a universal narrative mode that transcends 
cultural or temporal barriers and speaks to all people, in the process tapping deep 
reservoirs of feeling and experience and often invested with divine origins. To Lévi-
Strauss, even though we have no knowledge of any entire mythology, such myths as we 
do uncover reveal the existence within any culture of a system of abstractions by which 
that culture structures its life.  
In The Savage Mind (1966), Lévi-Strauss suggests the term bricolage as an 
account of the means by which the non-literate, non-technological mind of so-called 
primitive peoples respond to the world around them. He argues that the process 
constitutes a “science of the concrete,” as opposed to the civilized science of the abstract, 
which carefully and precisely orders, classifies, and arranges into structures (i.e. myths) 
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the minutiae of the physical world in all their profusion. The myth structures, 
“improvised” or “made-up” (these are rough translations of the process of bricoler), as ad 
hoc responses to events in an environment, then serve to establish analogies between the 
ordering of nature and that of society, and so to satisfactorily “explain” the world and 
make it able to be lived in. “Nature” and “culture” are thus caused to mirror each other 
(77-78). 
A significant feature of bricolage is the ease with which it enables the 
non-civilized bricoleur to establish satisfactory metaphorical relationships between his 
own life and the life of nature instantaneously and without puzzlement or hesitation. 
Lévi-Strauss asserts that, 
the mythical system and the modes of representation it employs serve to 
establish homologies between natural and social conditions or, more 
accurately, it makes it possible to equate significant contrasts found on 
different planes: the geographical, meteorological, zoological, botanical, 
technical, economic, social, ritual, religious and philosophical. (93) 
In other words, the savage mind has its own ‘socio- logic’ which operates by means of an 
immense number of possible metaphorical transformations in a ‘totemic’ mode (the totem 
providing the means of transcending the oppositions between nature and culture). It is a 
mind which is “multi-conscious”—able and willing to respond to an environment on 
more than one level simultaneously, and constructing in the process an elaborate and 
bewilderingly complex “world picture” out of its images (96-99): “The savage mind 
deepens its knowledge with the help of imagines mundi. It builds mental structures that 
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facilitate an understanding of the world inasmuch as they resemble it. In this sense savage 
thought can be defined as analogical thought” (263). Analogical thought necessarily 
imposes on the world a series of contrastive orderings to which all members of the 
culture tacitly assent. These orderings are analogically related to each other. Thus, an 
analysis of the analogical nature of the distinctions made between the contrasts of hot and 
cold, raw and cooked, and so on, will provide insights into the nature of the reality that 
each culture perceives.  
Lévi-Strauss draws a distinction between the ‘savage’ and the ‘civilized’ that 
cannot be maintained. More recent scholarship, such as the work of Goody, has argued 
that any suggestion that there are “two different modes of thought, approaches to 
knowledge, or forms of science” is inadequate, largely because “both are present not only 
in the same society, but in the same individuals” (148). He elaborates this statement by 
further arguing that whenever we try to precisely define any feature of Western—that is, 
cilivlized—thinking that can be clearly distinguished from forms of thought in traditional 
oral cultures, we can invariably locate examples of Western thought in ‘their’ cultures. 
Whenever we try to identify a distinctive feature of ‘their’ thinking, we can find cases of 
it in ‘our’ culture (146-150). However, for this dissertation, the more relevant aspect of 
Lévi-Strauss’ work and his conclusions resides in the fact that he discerned the kinds of 
orderings that myths produce as analogical, thus linking myth to metaphor, since 
“similarity and analogy are relations which play obvious roles in many conceptual 
integration networks” which are largely metaphorical (Grady et al. 111). 
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And so it is possible to suggest that what we can learn from anthropology and 
from the study of myth is that reality, determined both by our embodied experience and 
cultural parameters, becomes ultimately the fundamental source of our metaphors, myths, 
and imagines mundi—that is, archetypes—as a result of the potential transference from 
one conceptual ordering of nature, to another that is the respective reality’s central 
characteristic. For it is clear that the way of life of all cultures springs from the particular 
system of differentiations, contrasts, opposites and the range of possible analogical 
transferences between these to which assent is tacitly and uniformly given in the 
language. As Lévi-Strauss argues, 
the operative value of the systems of naming and classifying commonly 
called totemic derives from their formal character: they are codes suitable 
for conveying messages which can be transposed into other codes, and for 
expressing messages received by means of different codes in terms of their 
own system. (75-6)  
In other words, the process is the metaphoric one of speaking of A as if it were B or of 
comprehending A through B. To understand the form of the system is to understand the 
way of life which creates the system and thereby guarantees the “convertibility of ideas 







Where the Rubber Meets the Road 
What the research into myth and metaphor discussed thus far may suggest is that 
myth and metaphor in all societies will have a normative and reinforcing aspect, as well 
as an exploratory one. Myth will be as much concerned with what humans know as it is 
concerned with what they do not know; it will retrench and corroborate as much as it will 
expand human understanding of the world. In many ways, what myths and metaphors 
apparently enable is the categorization and confirmation of knowledge, and thereby, they 
enable processes of knowing—that is, cognitive processes. 
In discussing the power and uses of metaphor in the prehistorical development of 
“the modern mind,” Merlin Donald’s Origins of the Mind (1991) argues for the very early 
appearance of stories in human cultures:  
The most elevated use of language in tribal societies is in the area of 
mythic invention – in the construction of conceptual "models" of the 
human universe ... These were not late developments, after language had 
proven itself in concrete practical applications; they were among the first. 
(213) 
Donald compares this prehistoric use of language for constructing conceptual models to 
that of contemporary !Kung societies. He believes that “their mythical thought, in our 
terms, might be regarded as a unified, collectively held system of explanatory and 
regulatory metaphors” (214). Donald deconstructs the binary opposition of primitive-oral 
and civilized-literate societies, much in the same fashion and reaching much the same 
result as Cassirer had before him. Cassirer and Donald seem to agree that, as far as myth 
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and language are concerned, the “same form of mental conception is operative in both. It 
is the form which one may denote as metaphorical thinking” (Cassirer, Language and 
Mind 84). 
It then seems possible that myth, as a form of cultural practice enacted through 
rituals, and the telling of mythical stories, is one of the means through which humans 
both create and express mental concepts. “Myths, like metaphors, are an attempt to make 
sense of one thing in terms of another” (Danesi, personal comm.). Indeed, it is quite 
possible to understand myths as metaphors, or as structured and reoccurring collections 
of metaphors. This appears to be a plausible explanation for the fact that Lakoff and 
Turner cite mythological stories as examples of the DEATH IS DEPARTURE metaphor. 
They state: 
   Life is a journey with a stopping point, and that stopping point is death’s 
departure point. Consequently, death too can involve a journey with a 
destination. So we speak of going to the great beyond, a better place, our 
final resting place, the last roundup. In Greek mythology, when you die, 
the ferryman Charon carries you from the shore of the river Styx across to 
the underworld. In Christian mythology, you ascend to the pearly gates or 
descend to the gates of hell. Other religious traditions, such as ancient 
Egyptian, also conceive of death as a departure on a journey. (MTCR 4) 
These stories all serve the same purpose: they endeavor to explain what exactly happens 
to the human body, and to the human soul, after it has departed. As explanations of the 
phenomenon of death, these stories are culture-specific manifestations of the DEATH IS 
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DEPARTURE metaphor; they are more or less elaborate narratives that explain the 
metaphorical concept, and serve in a sense-making function, just as the metaphorical 
process of transference helps humans to make sense of one concept in terms of another. 
In The Literary Mind (1996), Mark Turner, perhaps unknowingly, also points to a 
distinctive correlation between the cognitive functions of myth and metaphor. As Alan 
Richardson suggests in his review, “Turner begins by emphasizing the importance of 
story—“narrative imagining”—as the ‘fundamental instrument of thought,’ crucial for 
planning, evaluating, explaining, for recalling the past and imagining a future (4-5)” (41). 
Richardson asserts that Turner could find allies among artificial intelligence researchers, 
such as Roger Schank and Jerry R. Hobbs, who similarly place narrative forms—stories, 
scripts, schemas, and consequently, myths as a cultural narratives—at the center of 
human cognition. What differentiates Turner’s approach is his insistence on the 
“embodied and ecological character of cognitive procedures—‘acts of a human brain in a 
human body in a human environment,’ as he puts it in Reading Minds [viii]—his interest 
in the neural substrates of cognitive activity, and his conviction that the seemingly 
messier, more ‘literary’ aspects of language, particularly metaphor and other rhetorical 
tropes, are central rather than marginal to cognition and communication” (Richardson 
42). Turner’s narrative imagining, for example, relies extensively on what he calls 
“parable,” our capacity, usually effortless and frequently unconscious, to project one 
story onto another, to organize the story of a life, say, in terms of the story of a journey 
(v). The Literary Mind develops this basic idea in various ways, detailing the many and 
complex forms of parable and projection, and showing their pervasiveness in various 
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kinds of conceptual, linguistic, and literary activities, while failing to point out that myth, 
serving the same function as metaphor, could indeed be a manifestation of metaphorical 
cognitive processes. 
  A recent analysis of some of the metaphors underlying several stories of Greek 
mythology, Sweetser’s “Metaphor, Mythology, and everyday Language,” holds the 
possibility of being an account that looks at the correlation between myth and metaphor. 
Sweetser states that “it has long been a familiar fact that mythologies involve 
metaphorical and symbolic structures” (585). Furthermore, she asserts that  
certain mythological structures seem based on particular metaphorical 
mappings of images onto other domains. Although some of the specific 
mappings are different from ones we might use in everyday language, the 
kinds of mappings are no different. (590)  
Sweetser obviously understands myths as structured by metaphors, and follows in the 
now traditional footsteps of the view on metaphor made popular by Lakoff and Johnson. 
It is, however, rather surprising that Sweetser fails to question the ‘long familiar fact’ that 
mythologies merely involve metaphorical structures. After all, the entire enterprise of 
cognitive linguistics developed out of the questioning of old, traditional assumptions; yet 
here, Sweetser deliberately settles for the exercise of merely analyzing another literary 
corpus, the corpus of select Greek mythological stories, á la Lakoff and Turner’s analysis 
of “Because I Could not Stop for Death” in More than Cool Reason. As such, Sweetser’s 
analysis is unable to understand the clearly analogical relationship of metaphor and myth 
that her essay is based upon. If indeed mythological structures are of the same kind as 
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metaphorical structures, then is it not possible to understand myths as culturally variable 
metaphors or scripts as “well-developed belief systems about the world” (Schank and 
Abelson 132)—a phrase that is a part of the definition of a cultural model? With all these 
observations in mind, it seems possible to understand Sweetser’s statements as expressing 
that metaphorical structure is mythical structure; if so, then this fact may seem so obvious 
and ubiquitous that scholars, including Sweetser, have not yet pointed it out, let alone 
analyzed the underlying mapping process.  
Nonetheless, Sweetser’s analysis of mythological structures and metaphorical 
structures seems to clearly suggest that both myths and metaphors serve the same 
purpose—they illustrate and explain one culturally mediated bodily experience, be it the 
female menstruation cycle, the four yearly seasons, progeneration on a cosmic as well as 
on an individual level, in terms of a concept from another domain.  
Of course, myths can also function as narrative establishing normative regulations 
or patterns of behavior for a society—the Oedipus myth, describing the consequences of 
incest and father-slaying is such an example. In this sense, myths can be understood as 
providing regulatory descriptions for how a specific event, or life in general, is supposed 
to occur. In this role, myths, on a larger scale, serve the same purpose as scripts, which 
are understood as a “stored mental recipe for how a particular event or procedure usually 
or ideally occurs” (Shaul and Furbee 151). Scripts and schemas are directly related to the 
concept of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs) and Cultural Cognitive Models (CCMs) 
as proposed by Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn (1987), but the development of a 
theory of CCMs and ICMs can be traced to theoretical work dating back at least as far as 
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the 1960s—for example, in the form of Weinreich’s model hypothesis, and his metaphor-
based “’(hypothetical) cognitive models’ indisputably matching matching Lakoff’s [. . .] 
metaphorical ICMs exactly” (Jäkel 19). 
 
Cognitive Anthropology 
In the 1960s, an anthropological approach called ‘ethnoscience’ was gaining 
increasing popularity. This approach was based on the underlying assumption that culture 
was a mental model that people acted out. One goal of ethnoscience was to recreate these 
models so that anthropologists could understand the world in the same way as their 
informants (McGee and Warms 295).  
In the context of the more contemporary cognitive sciences—the 
multidisciplinary field comprising linguistics, philosophy, psychology, neurosciences, 
anthropology and Computer Science—one can find promising proposals linking 
language, culture, and cognition. In opposition to the earlier ‘classical’ models, many 
scholars in the cognitive sciences today believe that mental representations are not 
arbitrary, discrete propositional structures belonging to an ideal mental world, formed 
independently of the activities of the individual subject. Instead, many scholars endorse 
the position that these representations have a strict bearing on the experience of living 
with a human body in a natural and social world.  
As a continuation of and a development out of ethnoscience, recent work in 
cognitive anthropology has led to a growing recognition of the role of cultural models, 
which have their basis in cognitive schemata shared by a cultural group (D’Andrade 
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1990). Cognitive anthropologists have argued that much of our everyday social life is 
mediated by these cultural models: they organize experience, create expectations, 
motivate behavior and provide a framework for people to remember, describe and 
reconstruct events (see, for example, D’Andadre, 1990; Dougherty, 1985; Holland and 
Quinn, 1987). The word schema is often used in cognitive anthropology to designate 
fuzzy set models, and there is overwhelming evidence that multiple models of social 
experience are possible, and that many competing and contradictory values can coexist in 
the same cultural systems (see, for example, Geertz, 1973; Shore, 1996; Sperber, 1985).  
Both phenomenologically-oriented philosophers and researchers in neurosciences 
have rejected the mind-body dualism of Descartes’ rationalism, as well as the associated 
psychological ‘functionalism’ that advocates the study of purely mental ‘software’ in 
disregard of the neural and cultural ‘hardware’. They affirm that the mental properties 
‘emerge’ as a result of the dynamical processes of neural excitation and inhibition during 
the sensory-motor interactions of an individual with the environment. These excitations 
take place at neural junctions known as synapses, owing to which connectivities and 
larger neural maps are formed inside the brain. Cognitive scientists have labeled these 
emergent mental concepts Cultural Cognitve Models (CCMs) and Idealized Cognitive 
Models (ICMs). 
 
Idealized and Cultural Cognitive Models 
In part, cognitive research aims at creating a ‘map’ of the cultural models that 
people use to reason about an issue—the hidden patterns that explain how they think, in 
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addition to what they think. Cognitive scientists study ways in which a great deal of 
everyday thinking is guided by simple metaphors and analogies, and on many issues 
finding the right metaphors can be the key to filling in the gaps in public understanding 
and a culture’s ways of representing concepts. When people reason about a topic, 
whether it is as simple as dogs or as complex as democracy, they use what cognitive 
scientists call ‘cultural models’—deeply held understandings that motivate thought and 
behavior in largely unconscious and automatic ways. For example, thinking about dogs 
may activate understandings of companionship, expense, or allergies. Thinking about 
democracy may activate understandings of voting rights, the separation of power, or 
individualism.  
Yet, there are limits to how much researchers can learn about these unconscious 
patterns by directly asking informants as members of a culture: when asked, people may 
produce cultural theories, explicit stories about how the world works that match common, 
stereotypical ways of talking in public but that do not reflect how individuals immersed 
in social parameters actually understand a given topic (see, for example, Strauss and 
Quinn1997). Methods such as cognitive elicitations and rapid ethnographic assessment 
are designed to surface cultural models by observing people in situations where they are 
actually using their understandings, and then ‘reading between the lines’ to discern the 
unspoken patterns. From the cognitive perspective, framing a topic means reinforcing 
particular associations elicited by that topic or in some cases, creating new connections.  
When a topic is complex and poorly understood by the public, a simplifying or 
idealized model may help create a bridge between what an expert is thinking and what a 
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layperson is thinking. For example, the title of Lakoff’s Women, Fire, and Dangerous 
Things. The title of Lakoff's book refers to a convention reflected in the Australian 
aboriginal Dyirbal language that classifies women, fire, and dangerous things within the 
same category. Lakoff designates this as a radial category, “reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s 
(1953) view of categories as definable only by family resemblance” (Danesi, “Language” 
4). In a radial category there are central members which link up all the others by a 
principle of chaining. To support his experientialist position, Lakoff enlists the mounting 
evidence of psychology which suggests that the formation of concepts depends on such 
experimental parameters as basic- level categories and prototype effects.  
In this way, Lakoff is able to argue convincingly that knowledge is not organized 
by means of abstract categories, but “by means of structures called idealized cognitive 
models” (WFDT 68), and which can be described as a simplifying model typically taking 
the form of a vivid, concrete analogy that captures the essence of an expert model. These 
models are not mere representations of the world; they emanate from within the 
conceiver. In other words, concepts emerge in the context of language, not apart from it. 
Among the various manifestations of these models, those based on metaphor are 
especially dominant in cognition.  
Similar to a script, an ICM consists of a standardized sequence of events in a 
pared-down world. Although ICMs are widely shared among culture members, they need 
not correspond to anything concrete in the external world. The main point of Lakoff’s 
argument is that lexical categorization does not depend on any logical, objective set of 
criteria. It is intrinsically tied to experience:  
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Experience here is taken in a broad rather than narrow sense. It includes 
everything that goes up to make up actual or potential experiences of 
either individual organisms or communities of organisms—not merely 
perception, motor movement, etc., but especially the internal genetically 
acquired makeup of the organism and the nature of its interactions in both 
its physical and its social environments. (xv) 
An example for Lakoff’s idea can be found in Sweetser’s (1987) discussion of 
what she calls the simplified speech act world.  In this world people speak in order to 
communicate information which might be helpful to one another; their beliefs are 
adequately justified (and, as a result, are true); finally, people say what they believe (22-
30). 
Obviously, the simplified speech act world is an idealized construct. People do 
not always say what they believe, nor do they always speak with the intention of 
providing helpful information. Nonetheless, the simplified speech act world is an 
efficient representation for scholars to use in the definition of speech acts that do not fit 
into the model.  Sweetser provides a unified account of the semantics of the word lies and 
some related phrases (e.g. social lies, white lies, and mistakes) by showing how speakers 
might employ the speech act model to note deviations from its component parts (37-54). 
Moreover, one can see from its resemblance to Grice’s (1975) maxims, that speakers use 
this model implicitly to understand the pragmatic implications of each other’s statements.   
As should be apparent from the above explanation, in one sense cognitive models 
are an old product wrapped up in a new package. Echoing one of the general tasks of 
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cognitive science—to determine how knowledge is organized—the definitions of both 
ICMs and CCMs retain essential elements of scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1975), frames 
(Minsky, 1975), and schemas (Rumelhart, 1980), while emphasizing that “cultural 
models are intersubjectively shared cultural schemas that function to interpret experience 
and guide action in a wide variety of domains including events, institutions, and physical 
and mental objects” (Gibbs “Taking Metaphor” 153).  
Robert Abelson refers to the difficulty of incorporating preexisting cultural 
knowledge into a computer simulated model of understanding as the “size problem,” 
concluding that there is “too much common sense knowledge of the world in even the 
humblest normal human head for present computer systems to begin with” (“Concepts” 
276). Recognizing that most artificial intelligence research has avoided the problem 
either by dealing with very restricted domains, or by modeling very general cognitive 
mechanisms that work in principle but never operate in actual situations, Abelson has 
attempted, together with Roger Schank, to design a more knowledgeable ‘understander.’ 
Schank and Abelson begin with the notion of scripts as basic building blocks of 
everyday understanding. Scripts, derived from daily routine, are standardized sequences 
of events that fill in our comprehension of frequently recurring experiences. Derived 
from the notions of scripts, frames, and schemas, cultural cognitive models are defined as 
representational structures which are shared by members of a given culture. Scripts are 
hierarchically structured so that elements can often be expanded into their own models. 
Because of their efficiently structured organization and their status as shared 
representational structures, cultural models figure widely in both language and thought 
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processes. The notion of representational structure appears to go hand in hand with the 
issue of metaphorical representation in the cognitive sciences, and is understood as the 
link between linguistics expressions, cultural practice, and mental representation.  
Cognitive scientists have repeatedly pointed out that linguistic expressions only 
form one possible corpus for the exploration of cognitive processes and conceptual 
metaphors (MWLB 3). “Because we are beings of the flesh,” human conceptual categories 
and metaphors are motivated and grounded more or less directly in experience—our 
bodily, physical, social, and cultural experiences (Mark Johnson, “Philosophical 
Implications of Cognitive Semantics” 347; emphasis added). Many mental concepts also 
find expression in cultural practices, because our mental concepts are linked to our 
behavior, our beliefs, and our ideologies in fundamental ways (MWLB 8-9; 14); many 
mental concepts are culture-specific (19); mental concepts, as expressed through 
metaphorical language and cultural practices, can vary both inside a culture and among 
cultures (19; 22-24). Moreover, from the very dawn of the project of cognitive linguistics, 
Lakoff and Johnson believed that  
every experience takes place within a vast background of cultural 
presuppositions. It can be misleading, therefore, to speak of direct physical 
experience as though there were some core of immediate experience 
which we then “interpret” in terms of our conceptual system. Cultural 
assumptions, values, and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we 
may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more 
correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, and that 
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we experience our “world” in such a way that our culture is already 
present in the very experience itself. (57) 
Although Schank and Abelson have never addressed the cultural origins of scripts, in 
Cultural Models in Language and Thought (1987) Quinn and Holland argue convincingly 
that scripts are cultural knowledge.  The lack of variation among culture members’ 
description of scripts shows their cultural origins.  For if personal experience constituted 
the basis for the knowledge of scripts, then one would expect more diversity than is 
evidenced by informants (Quinn and Holland 14-17; Keesing “Models” 370-379).  
Quinn (1985, 1987) has illustrated the presence of multiple cultural variations in 
her analysis of American cultural models of marriage. These studies analyze narratives of 
subject’s accounts of their marriages, and identify different underlying metaphors. These 
metaphors reflect an underlying cultural model of marriage and in turn seem to be based 
on four abstract schemas: 
1. RELATION: marriage is something between two people; 
2. CONTAINER: we sailed into the marriage; 
3. TRAJECTORY: that was a turning point in our marriage; 
4. ENTITY: marriage is an institution. 
Quinn shows how each model highlights different aspects of the experience of marriage, 
and different speakers may use different schemas, and this has important consequences 
for whether a couple thinks of their relationship as something that can be fixed or as a trip 
that has come to an end (Balaban 127-128). Quinn’s analysis identifies stable 
proposition–schemas and schemas of chained propositions used in reasoning about 
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marriage. As she shows, it is necessary first to decipher the metaphorical speech in which 
propositions are cast, the referencing of earlier propositions by later ones, and the causal 
construction linking one proposition to another, in order to reveal the underlying schemas 
in this talk (Quinn and Holland 16-19).  
It seems possible to conclude that both cognitive and cultural models are to some 
extent similar in that each is assumed to provide the substrate for various linguistic and 
nonlinguistic phenomena. That is, cultural models are not epiphenomenal, but are 
presumed to do real work for individuals and collective communities in shaping what 
people experience (Gibbs “Taking Metaphor” 154-155). Gibbs believes that “recognizing 
that what is cognitive and embodied is inherently cultural should be a fundamental part of 
how we do our work as cognitive psychologists, linguists, and anthropologists” 
(“Metaphor and Culture” 156). As the present discussion of the concepts of scripts, and 
idealized and cultural cognitive models has shown, these concepts bear a striking 
resemblance with the notions of the functions, structures, and organizational principles of 
myths and archetypes as one of the elements constituting myths. While further 
investigation is certainly necessary, the hypothesis pointed to earlier, that myths may very 
well be metaphors—as opposed to merely being metaphorically structured—enables 
further contemplation about how particular aspects of mythical stories may pertain to 
human cognition. More precisely, it may become possible to investigate specific 
archetypes and their probable functions as source domains for specific metaphorical 
concepts. One such archetypal pattern presents itself in the East-West dichotomy, which 
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appears to be linked to the UP-DOWN orientational schema as discussed earlier in this 
chapter. 
 
Metaphors, Myths, and Archetypes 
While it is beyond the scope of this work to thoroughly discuss the history of the 
theory of archetypes, and the critical tradition that developed from the works of Swiss 
psychologist Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961), it is still necessary to cursorily explain some 
basic aspects of his ideas due to their potential relevance for the study of cognition. An 
additional brief exposition of ideas related to those of Jung, such as the ideas 
Giambattista Vico, who was one of the first modern thinkers to formulate a philosophy of 
mythology and to base both philosophical and historical knowledge on a conception of 
narration, will be helpful in establishing tentative support for a connection between 
cognition and archetypes. 
The principle common to most branches of archetypal criticism is the hypothesis 
that the structures of myth and ritual are connected with, continuous with, or extend 
themselves into, the structures of literature, and that therefore a knowledge of myth and 
ritual are primary to the critical understanding of literature. Archetypal criticism focuses 
on images, symbols, metaphors, characters, plots, events, and themes that continually 
recur in works of literature, but which cannot be satisfactorily explained or explicated as 
matters of biographical, historical, or social influence because they are in some way 
linked to sources prior to these contexts. These literary elements are thus called 
“archetypes.” While the first task of archetypal literary criticism is to examine the 
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presence and function of these recurring forms in the literary text, however they got there, 
most archetypal critics go on to theorize the more difficult matter of the nature and origin 
of such forms. Predictably, this sees archetypal criticism engaging fields such as 
psychology, psychoanalysis, religious studies, anthropology, and comparative mythology 
in an interdisciplinary fashion.  
The single most important idea that Jung contributed to the endeavor of 
understanding the human was probably his notion of the collective unconscious. He 
believed that, over the hundreds of thousands of years of human evolution, human beings 
and their precursors shared many common experiences of the objects and events of the 
physical and social world around them. Every common human experience, of objects, 
events and people, repeated again and again for thousands of generations, left its imprint 
in the collective unconscious of all human beings, and he called the imprints of these 
common human experiences archetypes. Jung describes archetypes as “universal and 
inherited patterns which, taken together, constitute the structure of the unconscious” 
(Symbols 288). Jung thought of archetypes as ancient and inherited predispositions that 
help the human mind respond to, organize, or interpret the world in certain ways. As 
such, his interpretation could be considered as foreshadowing the hypothetical 
metaphorical basis of some of the most fundamental human experiences, which, in terms 
of Lakoff and Johnson, are the basis for orientational and ontological metaphors (MWLB 
14-21; 25-24), and have already been discussed at the beginning of this chapter.  
Archetypes typically manifest themselves in myths, rituals, symbols, fantasies and 
dreams, and Jung believed that an 
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investigation of the products of the unconscious yields recognizable traces 
of archetypal structures [. . .] among them certain types which deserve the 
name of dominants. These are archetypes like the anima, animus, wise old 
man, witch, shadow, earth-mother, [. . .] It is evident that knowledge of 
these types makes myth interpretation considerably easier and at the same 
time puts it where it belongs, that is, on a psychic basis. (390-91) 
Here Jung indicates that archetypes are hierarchically structured, that, in fact, there are 
dominant representatives of a theme or concept, holding a position above the various 
manifestations in which they can occur. Several studies have shown this hypothesis to 
hold some merit. In The Hero with a Thousand Faces (1949), Joseph Campbell’s (1904-
1987) writes, “beneath its varieties of costume [. . .] mythology everywhere [is] the 
same” (4). Following in Jung’s theoretical footsteps, this work is probably the most 
prominent example showing how one of the archetypes Jung identifies, the archetype of 
the hero, exists in numerous variations within and across cultures.  
 However, Jung was not the first to form a hypothesis about the existence of 
unconscious elements of the human mind and their expression in myth. Predating Jung by 
almost two centuries, Giambattista Vico is one of the first modern thinkers to formulate a 
philosophy of mythology and to base both philosophical and historical knowledge on a 
conception of narration. Vico’s major work, the Scienza Nuova (New Science), published 
first in 1725 and then in a fully rewritten version in 1730, is a large and varied work that 
treats many subjects, of which only a few can be touched on here.  
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In their introductory remarks to their translation of Vico’s New Science, Bergin 
and Fischer point out that if there was a primary objective Vico attempted to pursue in his 
book, it was to develop “a theory of knowledge according to which we can know, or have 
scienza of, only what we ourselves make and do” (xxxi). The semiotician Marcel Danesi 
further suggests that, even though “it is not a scientific ‘textbook’ in the usual sense of 
the term, the NS [New Science] is nevertheless a treatise that any contemporary science 
of the mind would do well to consult, given the relevant insights it contains on the 
interrelation among thought, language, and culture” (Vico 31). Here Danesi takes a stand 
he has also taken elsewhere, for example, in his review “Language and the Senses: New 
Directions in Linguistics,” suggesting that cognitive science in general, and cognitive 
linguistics as exercised by Lakoff and others, would benefit from tapping into the 
resource of insights the New Science holds. 
Vico says in his Autobiography (1725-28) and in the New Science itself that his 
“new science” is based on a nuova’arte critica. This “new critical art” is a means to elicit 
the ‘common nature of nations” (par. 348). The new critical art of the philosophical 
examination of philology shows, in Vico’s view, that all nations follow a common pattern 
of development. This pattern shows the providential structure of human events. A further 
dimension to the new critical art is Vico’s axiom that “doctrines must take their 
beginning from that of the matters of which they treat” (par. 314). He says that the first 
science to be learned must be mythology (par. 51) and that the ‘master key” to his new 
science is the discovery that the first humans thought in “poetic characters” or 
“imaginative universals, the universali fantastici (par. 34).  
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All nations begin in the same way by the power of the imagination, fantasia, to 
make the world intelligible in terms of gods. This age of gods gives way to a second age, 
in which fantasia is used to form social institutions and types of character or virtues in 
terms of heroes. Finally, these two ages, in which the world is ordered through the power 
of fantasia, decline into an age of rationality, in which the world is ordered in purely 
conceptual and logical terms and in which mental acting is finally dominated by what 
Vico calls a “barbarie della riflessione,” a barbarism of reflection (par. 1106) 
Of particular interest to the scholar of literary criticism, in addition to Vico’s 
conception of a “new critical art,” are two products of this art: sapienza poetica, or 
“poetic wisdom,” which is the title of the second and largest book of the New Science, 
and his “discovery of the true Homer,” the subject of the third book. Put in modern terms, 
Vico’s “poetic wisdom” is a conception of a science of mythology. He regards mythic 
narrative as having a logic of its own that is achieved through the power of imagination, 
or fantasia. Fantasia is a primordial power of the mind through which the world and 
human experience are first given order. In Vico’s view, fantasia is an active power 
through which the things of the civil world are first made. Fantasia is a type of learning 
that precedes reason in the history of human affairs. It is the original form of myth that 
literature later attempts to recover. Vico’s conception of myth as a primordial form of 
thought has affinities with various and diverse modern theories of myth, such as those of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, who has been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Vico’s insight that orality, performed through mythical storytelling and 
symbolized by the ritualistic reenactment of mythical stories, prominently uses the logic 
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of metaphor provides a key to better understanding the otherwise puzzling myths and 
beliefs of people in oral societies. Vico argues that myth is simply a product of the human 
mind working in its poetic, metaphor-rich, mode. Those who generate myths were “poets 
who spoke in poetic characters. This discovery, which is the master key of this Science 
has cost us the persistent research of almost all our literary life because with our civilized 
natures we cannot at all imagine and can understand only by great toil the poetic nature of 
these first two men” (par. 315). After a long and careful study of Vichian writings, 
Danesi concludes that Vico makes the case that the extension of the body into the mind is 
made possible by the imagination. This idea is not only “highly compatible with current 
thinking in the cognitive and social sciences,” but it is, as a matter of fact,  
the unifying principle that Vico utilized to tie together all the thematic 
threads that he interspersed throughout the NS [. . .] Two and a half 
centuries later, some cognitive scientists have finally started to include on 
their research agendas the serious investigation of this fundamental feature 
of human thinking [the imagination]. Their research is starting to show 
how the main products of the human imagination—the structural and 
transformational relations among metaphor, affect, imagery, and narrative 
discourse—sustain the whole architecture of cognition [. . .]. (34) 
The patterns formed by these units constitute the “imaginative universals” that signal the 
advent of consciousness in the human species and of the capacity to reflect upon beings, 
objects, and events away from their contexts of occurrence and existence. Vico’s 
assertion that the mind works fundamentally in a poetic or imaginative fashion, and 
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constructs its environment and itself (the two are inseparable) according to non-rational, 
that is to say, non-Cartesian principles, is also one of the most prominent tenets of 
cognitive linguists (PITF 391-415), and contributes to the long-standing debate about 
what is innate in language production. 
Donald Phillip Verene’s (1937-) Vico’s Science of Imagination (1981) is 
generally credited with being among the clearest and most thorough interpretations of 
Vico’s thought. He defined the Vichian imagination, suggesting that Vico created the 
awareness that it is a universal tendency of the human mind to transform the biologically 
programmed affective and sensorial responses to urges and environmental stimuli into 
mental units. Elsewhere, Verene argues that fantasia, or, less satisfactorily, imagination, 
turns out to be “a primordial power of mind that makes cognition itself possible,” because 
it is a power “upon which the human world or the world of civil things depends both for 
its origin and its continued existence [. . .] Fantasia is the power to make something true 
through the shape of the metaphor” (“Imaginative Universals” 207). 
 Even without giving a full account of the specific concept of the Vichian 
imagination,  it is possible to discern that Vicho’s “imaginative universals” and Jung’s 
“archetypes” are formed over generations in response to the same biological and 
environmental stimuli. They are products of the transformational/metaphorical processes 
that underlie much, if not all, of human cognition, made possible by the imagination. As 
such, these notions bear a striking similarity to Mark Johnson’s discussion of the 
imagination as “our capacity to organize mental representations (especially percepts, 
images, and image-schemata) into meaningful, coherent unities” (The Body in the Mind 
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140). In this work, one of Johnson’s goals is to “support the sweeping claim that all of 
these structures [i.e. image-schematic structures, my comment] and patterns are matters 
of the imagination” (139). Johnson thereby touches on a highly relevant aspect of the 
foundation of human cognition—an aspect that often receives a rather peripheral 
treatment because of the ‘unscientific’ implications of the concepts of imagination as 
generally held among scholars who follow what Johnson calls the “objectivist 
orientation” (x). 
 In short, Johnson’s theory attempts to explain how cognitive processes, such as 
metaphorical mappings, the creation of image-schemata, and the creation of categories 
and concepts, are made possible by the imagination, without which “we could never 
make sense of our experience” (ix). Categories, schemas, concepts, percepts, and many 
other phenomena are “forms of the imagination that grow out of bodily experience” (xiv), 
just as Vico proclaimed of his “imaginative universals,” and just as Jung proclaimed of 
his “archetypes.” In other words, when we combine the findings discussed so far in this 
chapter, it becomes possible and viable to understand archetypes not only as products of 
the imagination that grow out of bodily experience; as such, they could also be 
understood as models structuring cognitive processes. They can, in fact, be considered 
even more fundamental than image-schemata, because as a kind of mental image shared 
by humanity (see, for example, Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious) 
archetypes such as the father-figure, the mother- figure, or the quest-motif can effectively 
“become ‘source domains’ for early metaphors, and thus constitute the basis for myths,” 
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narratives, and other human activities expressive of cognitive processes (Danesi, pers. 
comm.).  
One specific instance that supports this hypothesis can be found in the Biblical 
Tale of Jonah, where, in the context of the ‘death and rebirth’ archetype (see, for 
example, Guerin et al. 1992), one can discern a correlation between the archetypal 
dichotomy of East and West and metaphorical UP-DOWN spatialization as described by 
Lakoff and Johnson (MWLB 14-21). This concept is based upon the binary opposition of 
up and down which in return is based on human orientation in space. The spatialization 
concept has been described as a structuring principle of thought that has become 
engrained in the very core of language: in western civilization, life is dominated by the 
desire for upward movements. Most likely emerging as a concept based on the daily 
observation of the rising and setting sun, and earth rotation causing the change of night 
and day,  upward movements as archetypically performed by the sun have come to 
represent birth, growth, strength, fulfillment of potential—all these are things humans  
consider to be positive. Downward movements however, have come to indicate death, 
declining health, weakness, loss of value—to sum up, developments that are negatively 
charged for us.  
According to the concept of orientational metaphors, in the Tale of Jonah we can 
see that ‘up’ is analogous to ‘arise’ (or ‘move up’) (3.3) and thus analogous to moving 
east; ‘down’ is analogous to “the inner part of the ship” (1.5.) and “asleep” (1.5.) and thus 
analogous to moving west. This structural parallelism reinforces our notion of binary 
oppositions and the privileging of one of the elements. At the same time however, the tale 
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deconstructs the privileging of east and the representations of consciousness or growth: 
without the westward movement that heroes like Jonah undergo, there could be no 
cathartic and insight-bringing turning point in the hero’s struggle that takes him onto a 
journey eastward. It appears that both linguistic metaphors and cultural beliefs in the 
form of archetypes are motivated by the cognitive process of cross-domain mapping on a 
fundamental level. 
The story of Jonah depicts an engulfed hero, and the narrator makes use of the 
image of descent/engulfment several times in the course of the Jonah story: Jonah goes 
“down to Joppa” (l.3), he “had gone down into the inner part of the ship” (l.5), he tells the 
sailors to “throw me into the sea” (l.12), etc.; and the narrator amplifies the idea that 
Jonah is fleeing from the light of God’s presence (l.3) by positioning Jonah in different 
representations of depth. With these representations of depth, Jonah becomes immersed 
in a darkness that is both physical (lack of light) and metaphorical (lack of understanding 
his purpose). Since seeing is knowing, darkness, making it impossible for humans to see, 
indicates not knowing. Darkness is inherent to the time when Jonah is in “the inner part 
of the ship” and “fast asleep,” and in the image of the great fish that swallows him. 
Nevertheless, the tale includes even another representation of darkness. Parallel to many 
popular myths and legends, Jonah’s flight to the west is also to be interpreted as a 
plunging into darkness.  
Here, the Tale of Jonah only serves as an illustrative example. In the context of 
the more detailed and more elaborate analysis of The Great Gatsby in Chapter Five, the 
argument for the hypothesis of archetypes functioning as scripts continues. Chapter Five 
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also takes a closer look at the implications of the East-West dichotomy—clearly relevant 
for the directions in which the characters of The Great Gatsby travel—in the specific 
context of American history. As Esra Sandikcioglu has pointed out in “The Otherness of 
the Orient” (2001), the reversal of the values traditionally assigned to the East-West 
archetype has become a major source of controversy in the recent political debate 
between the East and the West. The East-West dichotomy thus also serves as an 
illustrative example of how cultural scripts can be assigned competing or even 
contradictory values (see, for example, Sperber 1985). 
 
The Center (East)/Margin (West) Metaphor 
The notion of representations of the East applies to the ideas developed within 
contemporary literary and sociological theory. Its theoretical base stems essentially from 
the work of Foucault, who has taken discourse analysis as a starting point for 
understanding the mechanism of the transfer of ideas and the relationship between 
ideology and other forms of power. When Foucault questions the growth of bureaucratic 
control over populations after the eighteenth century as something that requires more 
systematic forms of knowledge, he concludes that power and knowledge directly imply 
one another—that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field 
of knowledge. What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact 
that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces 




Foucault’s discourse analysis provides the basis for Edward Said’s (1935-) study 
of Orientalism as a discourse of difference in which the neutral Occident/Orient 
dichotomy finds an expression in power relationships. With the increased involvement 
with Eastern countries, the term Orient has acquired an ambiguous status. Not only did it 
take on a mystic dimension as the East became the object of literary fantasy, but it also 
appeared to be a concrete reality through which the West accumulated knowledge about 
the region. It is the problematic nature of this knowledge and its relation to western 
cultural and political ideology that have led to the current debate on Orientalism. Said 
examines Orientalism as a dis course which represents the exotic, erotic, strange Orient as 
a comprehensible, intelligible phenomenon within a network of categories, tables and 
concepts by which the Orient is simultaneously defined and controlled. He also argues 
that the Orientalist discourse is a persistent framework of analysis, expressed through 
theology, literature, philosophy and sociology, and that it not only expressed an imperial 
relationship, but also actually constituted a field of political power. It also creates a 
typology of characters, organized around the contrast between the West (Self) and the 
East (Other) in which the exotic Orient is represented in a systematic table of accessible 
information, and so, a typical cultural product of Western dominance.  
 When Said expresses the opinion that there can be neither canonical and 
scientific nor unchangeable validity in the terms referring to geographical entities in the 
world, he goes back to the origin of the issue, and discusses the terms ‘Orient’ and 
‘Oriental’ as the West’s fictional construct which evokes negative connotations and 
mysteries with exotic fantasies, and above all, the Other. As opposed to the idealization 
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of Orientalism—as a result of scholarly or scientific thinking about the Orient in the 
nineteenth century—he criticizes Orientalism as a western phenomenon which can 
function in western literature as a mode of thought for defining, classifying, and 
expressing the presumed cultural inferiority of the Islamic Orient. In other words, it is a 
part of the vast control mechanism of colonialism, designed to justify and perpetuate 
European dominance.  
Therefore, defining the concepts of East and West through the Center 
(East)/Margin (West) image-schema is particularly relevant because of the many 
interpretations it has motivated, and because a scrutinizing analysis reveals, above all 
else, that the dichotomy of East and West is always relative to the geographical position 
of the respective agents, and the values ascribed to either concept can be of a competing 
and even contradictory nature (see, for example, Geertz, 1973; Shore 1996; Sperber, 
1985). This premise coheres with conclusions researchers have drawn about the 
characteristics of scripts and frames as mental models, but further clarification may be 
necessary. 
By using money as an exemplar, it may be possible to clarify how East and West 
can, depending on context and perception, be ascribed either positive or negative values. 
Many people, for example, would agree, that a lot of MONEY IS POWER. Similarly, 
however, people can hold the concept MONEY IS WEAKNESS, because having a lot of 
money always carries the risk of losing a lot of money. This could be seen as turning the 
person with a lot of money into an extremely vulnerable (and likely) potential victim of 
loss—a basis for a concept probably shared by at least some members of Western culture. 
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Furthermore, the English proverb MONEY IS THE ROOT OF (ALL) EVIL, with its 
German equivalent GELD IST DIE WURZEL ALLEN ÜBELS, as instances of the 
CAUSATION IS PROGENERATION metaphor, clearly are expressive of a negative 
perception of material wealth as a result of money. However, according to Puritan 
doctrine, there is a concept, contradictory to the belief that money is the root of all evil, 
where God will show his love for his followers by providing them with material wealth, 
i.e. money. This Puritan concept, one of the concepts underlying the idea of the American 
Dream, is likely to express a metaphor along the lines of MONEY IS A SIGN OF 
GOD’S LOVE or even MONEY IS FREEDOM, which carries overtly positive 
connotations. 
Many centuries old, the East/West division traces back to the divided Christianity 
in Europe and to its Catholic and Orthodox churches (Lewis and Wigen 49). The East has 
been defined by the Westerners, which can be seen in the development  of the meanings 
of the East. Defining the rest of the world through otherness is a way to building identity 
related to what others are and Westerners are not. This has happened not only in Europe: 
we can see in the Indian world maps from the early modern era that Europe is just a few 
marginal circles labeled “England, France, [and] other hat-wearing islands” (69). The 
West has defined itself related to the East, but the East has not considered itself Eastern, 
Japan being the exception (69). Many value-based assumptions about individualism, 
rationalism, democracy, economic development and market economy are related to the 
definitions of the West. The so-called developed and modern countries are classified as 
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members of the West which has traditionally led to the assumption that ‘modern’ is the 
same as ‘Western.’  
The Orient was a European invention, and had been since “antiquity a place of 
romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences” 
(Said Orientalism 1). For a brief period during the eighteenth century Enlightenment, 
attitudes towards the East were sometimes remarkably positive (Lewis and Wigen 76). 
However, in the nineteenth century, imperialistic views of the world gained a strong 
influence in Oriental studies, with the French and British taking the leading role. 
Imperialism in Oriental studies can be seen in the way that Western civility was 
considered superior to non-Western ‘barbarianism’ (74). Even though Orientalism is a 
rich and diversified field of study, it only uses Western techniques and tools to make the 
Orient visible and clear (22). In Orientalism, the Orient became the negative imprint of 
the Occident. The Orient was seen as a stagnant, irrational, and despotic in contrast to the 
Occident, which was dynamic, rational, and democratic by nature. In the context of this 
argument, Max Weber’s (1864-1920) theories of rationalism are a suitable and well-
known example of this, for he describes Protestant ethics and its demand for ascetic 
spirituality in contrast to the sensuality of Islam (Bryan Turner 96-100). 
Consequently, the two theoretical and discursive entities of the ‘West’ as ‘Self’ 
and the ‘East’ as ‘Other’ have long been assumed by Americans to be ultimate and 
irreducible, comprising an assumed cultural essence contained in the constructed 
representation of the “Western mind” differentiated from the “Oriental mind” (Northrop 
455). This very assumption guides many interdependent and related American 
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foundations of knowledge and power, including the multimedia, mass culture, and 
foreign policy decisions of the American government.  This influential ideological force 
is the inheritance of a long history of cultural interaction between Europe and Asia, 
involving anti-Muslim crusades, imperialism and colonization (Pannikar 481).  From the 
beginning of this interaction, a dichotomy was set into place: even with the later 
historical developments of nationalism, Marxism, and capitalism, social identities 
worldwide remained largely a matter of Eurocentric discourse (Prakash 1475).  
The postmodern analysis of Orientalism presented above suggests that we could 
understand the ICM of Orientalism as characterized by two parameters. These parameters 
are on the one hand, the view of the Judeo-Christian tradition and Islam as antagonistic or 
competitive cultural-religious systems, and on the other hand, the neo-colonial 
approaches of the West toward the East as an attempt to preserve vital national interests. 
The linguistic, and thus presumably, conceptual, link between this ICM and the culture 
that thinks and acts accordingly exists through various metaphors that have been proven 
to be cognitively real. FREEDOM IS UP (MTCR 149), RATIONAL IS UP (MWLB 17), 
and HAVING CONTROL IS UP (15) are the metaphors correlating with the Western 
understanding of itself as “dynamic, rational, and democratic”—this is why, at least in the 
view of many Westerners, WEST IS UP By the same token, the Western understanding 
of the East as “stagnant, irrational, and despotic” finds a basis and representation in 
LACK OF FREEDOM IS DOWN, BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL IS DOWN 
(figuring the East as either controlled by the West, or the lives of Easterners thoroughly 
controlled by the Koran due to a lack of secularization of everyday life), and 
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EMOTIONAL IS DOWN (15). The table below, reproduced from Sandikcioglu’s “The 
Otherness of the Orient” (2001), comparing the conceptualizations of East and West as 
opposing entities can help illustrate this argument (175): 
(WEST IS UP)    (EAST IS DOWN) 
Self-representation     Other-representation  
of the West      of the East    
Civilization     Barbarism 
Power      Weakness 
Maturity     Immaturity 
Rationality     Irrationality/Emotionality 
Stability     Instability 
The connection between these conceptual metaphors and the ICM of Orientalism is made 
by means of what Pamela Morgan, using a term introduced by Erving Goffman (1922-
82), calls “frames.” Frames have been identified as organizational premises (or scripts) in 
the mind that structure our activities or behavior (19-27); the term also refers to a 
“knowledge structure or structured set of elements drawn from various conceptual 
domains and consisting of encyclopedic knowledge” associated with linguistic forms of 
expression, or patterns of behavior (Dirven, et al. 1). The main function of the Orientalist 
frames is to maintain the asymmetry in the power relationship between the West and the 
East as well as the seemingly unavoidable incompatibility of the respective cultures and 
civilizations. As a theoretical and structural framework, Orientalism depends on two 
interdependent image frames, ‘frames of Self-presentation’ by the West versus ‘frames of 
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Other-representation,’ that is, the West’s view of the East. Each frame, structured by 
conceptual metaphors as well as linguistic and non- linguistic mechanisms, is rooted in an 
almost unchallenged belief in the superiority of Western culture and civilization over 
Oriental cultures and civilizations (Sandikcioglu 173-178).  
On another level of argumentation, the understanding of the East as the archetypal 
place of intellectual and spiritual growth is coherent with the image-schema for 
KNOWING IS SEEING (MTCR 48, 158, 190-191) and UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING 
(94), because for any mappings to be possible from the domain of sight to the domain of 
knowledge, it is clear that one must be able to see. Light, primarily provided by the sun, 
which rises in the East, is the key to the human ability to see, as much as the sun is 
essential to the possibility of life on earth. The directions of east and west symbolism are 
closely tied to observing the daily cycle of sunrise in the east and sunset in the west, 
which portrays a universal human and bodily experience. Relating to the daily cycles of 
birth and death of the day, the east represents the birth of the day while the west 
represents the death of the day. In An Illustrated Encyclopedia of Traditional Symbols 
(1978), Jean C. Cooper remarks that east stands for the rising sun of dawn, spring, hope, 
childhood, the dawning of life and youth. Worship is oriented, especially for all solar 
gods, in this direction. In China, it is symbolized by the green dragon, in Egypt by a man, 
in Mexico by a crocodile and in Tibet by a man-dragon. Ceremonies concerned with 
death and resurrection stress the East as sunrise and life and the West as sunset and death. 
All over the world, cultural practices of the last millennia have repeatedly centered 
attention on the Sun-god, creating a connection between the sun and divinity, and the 
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East and civilization. Because ESSENCE IS CENTRAL (MTCR 148) and IMPORTANT 
IS CENTRAL (148, 158), the East has been figured as central to human life, and to 
human civilization.  
Ultimately, this suggests that Western cultures conceptualize the East-West 
dichotomy along a reversible set of parameters. There is the archetypal journey east with 
its promise of birth, and perhaps the eternal rebirth of the sun, with all the connotations of 
light, intellect, and understanding, and there is the archetypal journey west, with the 
connotations of darkness, ignorance, a plunging into the depths, and, finally, death. But in 
the light of Orientalism, and more recent cultural scripts than those based on primarily 
bodily experience, the value-based assumptions of the East/West dichotomy can also be 
reversed: as we have seen, today the West, at least from a Eurocentric position, is 
essential and central, and the East is marginal and peripheral. Depending on the 
ideological and geographical perspective one takes, and depending on which part of 
conceptual frame receives preferential treatment, the journey to the cultural center can 
move in either direction—east or west, by default delineating the other direction/location 
as marginal and peripheral.  
In Philosophy in the Flesh (1999), Lakoff and Johnson refer to these types of 
concepts, which are metaphor pairs, as duals. In their discussion and comparison of the 
two concepts of MOVING TIME and the MOVING OBSERVER, we find a correlation 
to the phenomenon of the East/West dichotomy with its reversible value assumptions. We 
have to remember that STATES ARE LOCATIONS, which means that the central or 
peripheral state, ascribed to either the East or the West, allows our discussion to fit the 
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way Lakoff and Johnson explain the duality of two seemingly mutually exclusive 
concepts: 
   The two metaphors are, strictly speaking, inconsistent with each other [. 
. .] but these are actually minimally differing variants of one another. In 
short, they are figure-ground reversals of one another. [. . .] It is common 
for metaphors to come in pairs that are figure-ground reversals of each 
other. Object- location duality occurs for a simple reason: Many 
metaphorical mappings take motion in space as a source domain. With 
motion in space, there is the possibility of reversing figure and ground. 
(PITF 149) 
These premises describe the foundation upon which Fitzgerald built his directional 
reversal of the East/West dichotomy in Gatsby. Incidentally, he thus not only 
deconstructed the geographic directionality of the original American imperialist thrust, 
but perhaps also critiqued the European dichotomy which comfortably rests on the 
conceptual metaphors that THE WEST IS THE (cultural/political/economical) CENTER 
while THE EAST IS THE (cultural/political/economical) MARGIN. Chapter Five looks 
at this concept in the specific context of American history and Fitzgerald’s Gatsby in 





THE COLONIZERS AND THE COLONIZED: THE IMPERIALIST 
SUBTEXT OF THE GREAT GATSBY 
Metaphor is right at the bottom of being alive. 
Gregory Bateson (1904-1980) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is at the core of the scholarly endeavor to explore the correlation 
between conceptual metaphor and archetypes as a previously neglected, supplemental 
structuring cognitive model. The following analysis of Fitzgerald’s novel The Great 
Gatsby attempts to reveal how authoritative a comprehensive investigation can be that 
combines a cognitive linguistics approach with that of cultural criticism influenced by the 
methodologies of cognitive anthropology—the approach tentatively synthesized in 
Chapter Four. Just as in the Tale of Jonah, the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, this time 
scrutinized in the context of a post-colonial reading of Fitzgerald’s novel, is principally 
structured by the archetypal journey eastward. However, the analysis of the text reveals a 
number of surprising results.  
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As Lakoff and Johnson have argued in Metaphors We Live By and other works 
(see, for example, Johnson 1981, 1987; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Lakoff 
and Turner 1989) we conceptualize a part of human life via the PURPOSES ARE 
DESTINATIONS schema (MTCR 3-83). In Gatsby, we find this concept coded through 
the assumed or desired superiorities over the othered characters, as one of the driving 
motivations for a person’s agency. The supremacist attitudes of Tom Buchanan are a
clear indication that these motivations correlate with attitudes of racial supremacy.  
Furthermore, Gatsby dreams of reaching equality and acceptance among the Easterners; 
fulfilling his dream is his ultimate purpose in life, the motivating force behind all his 
actions. It is noteworthy here that we are using the verb “to dream” not in the sense of 
seeing images when sleeping at night, but in the sense of a having deep desires. This is an 
understanding that is both suggested and justified by common usage in the English 
language. For James Gatsby, Nick Carraway, and Tom Buchanan, to have dreams is to 
have goals or purposes. If this is true, this fact suggests that the major actions in Gatsby 
are guided by the respective characters’ dreams, and this would lead to the conclusion 
that DREAMS ARE MOTIVATING FORCES FOR REACHING DESTINATIONS. 
We also know that Gatsby ‘invents’ himself, and we know that Tom Buchanan’s 
claim for his own white supremacy rests not on his own accomplishments, but on
inheritance, remote and distorted myths of history, and pseudo-science. Tom Buchanan, 
as well as Jay Gatz, are supposed representations of men, when in actuality they are, in 
Jean Baudrillard’s (1929-) terms, merely ‘simulacra’—images without an original model 
they refer to. In other words, both Tom and Gatsby’s DREAMS ARE ILLUSIONS. 
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When we analyze the traces of the truly fictional realities from where these men claim to 
have sprung, we can detect and reveal the traces of imperialism which form one subtext 
of The Great Gatsby, a novel that is written from within and about a colonized, and, 
simultaneously, colonizing culture, and the individuals who live in it. 
In Gatsby, the forces and principles active in the nexus of colonial and post-
colonial experiences surface in the space of a finely articulated conceptual difference. 
While Fitzgerald drew from a variety of conceptual metaphors and archetypal, that is 
culturally universal, concepts, for the portrayal of the heroes’ respective quests, he 
highlighted a conceptual space that so far seems to have escaped literary critics. Surely, 
LIFE IS A JOURNEY (MTCR 3-5), but really, because of the culturally motivated 
purposes of life in America, we must also understand that it is possible to hold the 
concept that LIFE IS A CONQUEST, a constant struggle for domination with “Space” as 
“the Final Frontier” (Star Trek Introductory Monolog). This concept may underlie 
expressions such as “might makes right”—a thought pattern evident in much political 
debate concerning military strikes against potential terrorist targets in what has been 
called the “post-9-11 world.” Said expresses his understanding of the LIFE IS A 
CONQUEST metaphor and its reflection in American cultural and political practice as 
follows:  
   The United States experience was from the beginning founded upon the 
idea of an imperium. The U.S. was founded as an empire, a dominion state 
of sovereignty that would expand in population and territory and increase 
in power. There were claims for North American territory to be made and 
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fought over with astonishing success. There were native peoples to be 
dominated, variously exterminated, variously dislodged. Then, as the 
American republic increased in age and hemispheric power during the 
nineteenth century, there were distant lands to be designated “vital to 
American interests,” to be intervened in and fought over. For example, the 
Philippines, the Caribbean, Central America, the Barbary Coast, parts of 
Europe and the Middle East, Vietnam and Korea. (“Lecture” 1) 
This chapter attempts to provide evidence suggesting that the basic conceptual metaphor 
LIFE IS A CONQUEST is “part of the common conceptual apparatus shared by [the] 
members of [the American] culture.” However, basic conceptual metaphors are ‘largely 
unconscious,” and their “operation in cognition is mostly automatic” (MTCR 51). 
Because of the strongly negative connotations that LIFE IS A CONQUEST imposes on 
the American way of life, it seems prudent to suggest that this concept is not shared by all 
members of culture, but that it is one of “many conventional metaphors” used to 
“conceptualize the wealth of our experiences” of the domain of life (52). After all, “not 
every person possesses the same conceptual metaphors to the same degree of detailed 
elaboration as suggested by linguistic analysis,” just as “partial representations of cultural 
conceptual metaphors may not always be pre-stored in their entirety in people’s lexicons 
and encyclopedias” (Steen and Gibbs 3). In other words, one cannot a priori dismiss the 
possibility that the concept LIFE IS A CONQUEST is cognitively real simply because 
certain members of a culture do not use this concept, or are not aware of its existence. 
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Leading up to this crucial revelation about American life in general, and the view 
The Great Gatsby enforces in particular, are several underlying image-schemas. The 
subsequent sections of this chapter explore evidence ranging from metaphoric linguistic 
expressions taken from The Great Gatsby to concepts expressed in political, historical, 
and literary discourse, as well as cultural practices, in the attempt to present an empirical 
basis for these image-schemas. Since Gatsby is “a creature of myth in whom is incarnated 
the aspiration and the ordeal of his race” (Bewley 43-44), and because “the implication, 
generally shared by critics, is that Gatsby the mythic figure is an embodiment of certain 
American ideals and characteristics” (Matterson 5), this novel seems an ideal corpus for 
the analysis of CCMs, which are most often “emotionally laden [with] values” (Dirven et 
al. 7). CCMs have been established as “another type of Lakoff’s ‘Idealized Cognitive 
Model’” (1-2), and it appears that they form the juncture between linguistics and 
anthropology proposed in Chapter Four of this work.  
The analysis of linguistic metaphors found in Gatsby follows a modified version 
of the pattern established by Gerard Steen in his article “From Linguistic to Conceptual 
Metaphor in Five Steps” (1997). Steen outlines a procedure that “is meant to constrain 
the relation between linguistic and conceptual metaphor” (57), and thus allows us to 
determine metaphorical mappings based on the “used” part of metaphor, since not 
everything from the source domain gets mapped onto the target domain (MWLB 52). “It 
is important to see that [. . .] metaphorical structuring [. . .] is partial,” because, “if it were 
total, one concept would actually be the other, not merely understood in terms of it” (13). 
Lakoff and Johnson validate their claim through numerous examples; one of the most 
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prominent ones is the concept TIME IS MONEY, which helps one understand the partial 
structuring of one concept in terms of another: 
[. . .] time isn’t really money. If you spend time trying to do something and 
it doesn’t work, you can’t get your time back. There are no time banks. I 
can give you a lot of time, but you can’t give me back the same time, 
though you can give me back the same amount of time. [. . .] Thus, part of 
the metaphorical concept does not and cannot fit. (13) 
Descriptions of the partial nature of mappings such as TIME IS MONEY could be 
elaborated even more by a discussion of how humans can play with money in their 
pockets or in the palms of their hands, whereby one could further indicate that these 
qualities cannot be transferred from the domain of money to the domain of time.  
This analysis and the conceptual metaphors presented in capitalized letters also 
cohere with another one of the most basic principle s of the theory of metaphor outlined 
by Lakoff and Johnson as early as 1980: there are conventional metaphoric associations, 
or mappings, between some concepts, but not between others (7-13; 77-105). The simple 
fact that “any metaphor highlights some aspects of an event and hides others does not 
mean that just any view can be imposed [. . .] on any target domain, with equal ease” 
(MTCR 39). For example, the concept DEATH IS WINTER (18) is a specific instance of 
the broader concept A LIFETIME IS A YEAR (18, 27-28), where the four seasons spring 
summer, fall, and winter are mapped onto the corresponding segments of a life cycle—in 
this case, youth, maturity, old age, and death. However, it would be a rather 
unconventional mental mapping to think DEATH IS HEAT; the experience of death, 
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with the accompanying loss of temperature the body undergoes, does not allow for this 
mapping that would be inconsistent with, for example, LIFE IS HEAT (87-89, 98). 
Moreover, the idea to search for empirical validation for the suggested metaphors 
outside the realm of linguistic expressions derives from the “incorporative spirit in 
cognitive linguistics [. . .] that sets it apart from many other contemporary approaches to 
linguistic theory” (Hawkins 3). By deciding to expand the corpus from purely linguistic 
evidence to an inclusion of cultural scripts and cultural practices, scholars could manage 
to explore “basic metaphors [. . .] [as] part of [our] conceptual resources, part of the way 
members of our culture make sense of the world” (MTCR 26). This dissertation is 
furthermore an attempt to respond to the claim that “contemporary metaphor theory in 
cognitive linguistics appears to rest on several questionable assumptions about the 
psychological processes involved in metaphor use.” Even though  
metaphor in linguistics is a two-way affair that can go from linguistic 
metaphor to conceptual metaphor or from conceptual metaphor to 
linguistic metaphor, we must not forget that a cognitive theory of 
metaphor is not necessarily an adequate portrayal of what individual 
speakers/hearers do when they think metaphorically or understand 
linguistic expressions motivated by enduring conceptual metaphors in 
everyday speech and written texts. [. . .] Simply put, there may not be a 
direct mapping between linguistic metaphor and conceptual metaphor, on 
the one hand, and between linguistic metaphor and individual cognition, 
on the other. (Steen and Gibbs 2-4) 
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It seems prudent to conclude that if metaphor is primarily a mode of thought, then 
evidence for metaphorical concepts cannot be limited to linguistic expressions or 
evidence from neurophysiology, neurobiology, and other “hard” sciences. This is the 
reason this work intends to set in motion an addition to the fundamentally important 
“convergent evidence” (PITF 82-87) on which the field of cognitive linguistics rests; as 
discussed in Chapter Four, there seems to be sufficient evidence to regard cultural 
practices as capable of providing equally important and valid proofs of mental concepts. 
A decision such as this also positions this work in the context of some of the most recent 
developments of cognitive linguistics, where scholars (see for example, Balaban 1997, 
Gibbs 1994, Holland and Quinn 1987) focus on “conceptual metaphor [as] closely related 
to the cultural context” (Steen and Gibbs 6) in the hope that we will be able to more 
accurately hypothesize about culture in mind. This constitutes the theoretical framework 
which can encourage scholars in the undertaking of reading The Great Gatsby from the 
outlined perspective—a perspective that combines an investigation of linguistic 
expressions, literary discourse, and cultural practices, using what has been called a 
cognitive poetics approach, because  
recent discoveries about the nature of metaphor suggest that metaphor is 
anything but peripheral to the life of the mind. It is central to our 
understanding of our selves, our culture, and the world at large, [. . .] 
because to study metaphor is to be confronted with hidden aspects of one’s 
own mind, and one’s own culture. (MTCR 214, emphasis added) 
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Additionally, in the recent past, several scholars have undertaken “Discourse Coherence 
Studies” for the field of cognitive linguistics. These studies have proven that “examples 
of the uses of metaphor” in the rhetoric of war (see, for example, Lakoff, 1992) or in 
news stories about international economics (see, for example, Narayanan, 1997) “require 
conceptual metaphor to make coherent sense of such examples of written discourse” 
(PITF 86).  
Noticeably, next to linguistic metaphors, the realm of culture, which is always 
expressive of some form of ideology (see our example of burial rites on page 11), and 
which has been defined as “the customs, habits, and practices common to a given social 
group” (Murfin and Ray 164), is a vitally potent corpus for the exploration of basic 
mental concepts. Thus Hawkins’ “incorporative spirit” not only allows, but perhaps even 
demands, a cross-disciplinary approach  that bonds the study of language to the study of 
ideology, which is a “relevant domain of [cognitive] linguistic inquiry” (2).  
Interest in the direct relationship between language and ideology has recently 
been increasing in a variety of fields. This increased interest is based on the perception 
that “there are a number of ways in which ideology is akin to language” (4). In an 
interview with Roberta Pires de Oliveira, George Lakoff stated, “we use our conceptual 
system to function socially and to comprehend social life” (33). He characterized the 
relationship between ideology and language in the following way: 
   Any ideology is a conceptual system of a particular kind, including a 
moral system. However, ideologies have both conscious and unconscious 
aspects. If you ask someone with a political ideology what she believes, 
 
 169  
she will give a list of beliefs and perhaps some generalizations. A 
cognitive linguist, looking at what she says, will most likely pick out 
unconscious frames and metaphors lying behind her conscious beliefs. To 
me, that is the interesting part of ideologies—the hidden, unconscious 
part. It is there that cognitive linguist have a contribution to make. (37) 
As a linguist, Lakoff would be intent on and content with analyzing the “unconscious” 
aspects of linguistic expressions, for metaphors on both the linguistic and the conceptual 
level are largely unconscious. Despite this self- imposed limitation, Lakoff still asserts, 
“within cognitive linguistics, the study of worldview [ideology] is an enterprise of 
considerable importance” (PITF 511). For a more holistic cognitive science, it becomes 
paramount to respond to the necessity to introduce a broader basis for the study of mental 
concepts—a basis that not only includes linguistic, psychological, and neurobiological 
evidence, but also other kinds of potential evidence such as cultural practices.  
The move to read the ideological/political in the linguistic/literary borrows from 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1895-1975) notions of discourse in the novel as “ideologically 
saturated” (271). The language of a novel is never neutral but politically charged since 
“there are no ‘neutral’ words and forms.” For Bakhtin, language is read as a “world 
view,” one that “has been completely taken over, shot through with intentions and 
accents”—in other words, a world view that is “interested.” He writes:  
Language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a 
concrete heteroglot conception of the world. All words have the “taste” of 
a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular 
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person, a generation, an age group, the day, the hour. Each word tastes of 
the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all 
words and forms are populated by intentions. (293) 
Bakhtin’s statement can be understood in a way that allows a reading of The Great 
Gatsby as structured by and structuring cultural metaphors and linguistic metaphors that 
are equally expressive of cognitive processes. Therefore, following Foucault’s 
formulation, one can read this novel as fiction inducing the “effects of truth”—the truth 
of the historical reality of American imperialism and American neocolonialism with their  
respective physical and psychic markings on a colonized as well as colonizing people. 
This truth forms part of a discourse which “’fictions’ history on the basis of a political 
reality” (Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 193), which in turn always constitutes experience 
mediated through culture. Nonetheless, this manifests bodily experience, for example, in 
the form of ideologically charged burial rituals.  
These rituals vary from culture to culture in their constituting elements as well as 
their implicitly and explicitly inherent understandings of the DEATH IS DEPARTURE 
metaphor (MTCR 7-8, 10-11, 51-53, 107, 125). Through the analysis of numerous 
cultures, anthropologists have found concepts varying in their understanding of where the 
body and the mind go in or after death. Thus, the conceptualization of DEATH IS 
DEPARTURE, along with the culturally differently understood destinations implicit in 
the concept DEATH IS GOING TO A FINAL DESTINATION (6, 7-8, 14-15), can be 
seen as bodily experiences mediated through culture. As such, they also can be seen to 
constitute the kind of (bodily) experience that Lakoff, Johnson, and other cognitive 
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linguists regard as fundamental for the emergence of mental concepts (PITF 12; 13; 16-
44). In this context, and in the manner established by Lakoff and Johnson, the most 
relevant mental concepts expressed in The Great Gatsby and reflected in much of 
mainstream American cultural practices are:  
LIFE IS A JOURNEY  
THE EAST IS THE CIVILIZED CENTER OF THE UNIVERSE 
THE WEST IS THE UNCIVILIZED MARGIN OF THE UNIVERSE 
THE WEST IS DEATH 
THE EAST IS THE STRONGHOLD OF CIVILIZATION 
THE EAST IS THE STRONGHOLD OF LEGITIMACY 
WAR IS A TOOL OF LEGITIMACY 
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS 
DREAMS ARE PURPOSES  
DREAMS ARE MOTIVATING FORCES FOR REACHING DESTINATIONS 
DREAMS ARE ILLUSIONS 
MEN ARE SUBJECTS 
WOMEN ARE OBJECTS  
TERRITORY IS FEMALE/WOMEN ARE TERRITORIES  
LIFE IS A PLANT  
PEOPLE ARE PLANTS 
DAISY IS THE HOLY GRAIL  
DAISY IS A (UNATTAINABLE) STAR  
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The analysis begins with a quick look at previous mainstream interpretations of 
Gatsby. It then discusses how the concepts of post-colonial criticism are applicable to this 
novel that has so far not been scrutinized under this methodology—certainly not with a 
focus on the underlying conceptual metaphors. By beginning the process of collecting 
convergent evidence, ranging from linguistic expressions and discourse analysis to 
cultural scripts, with a focus on various dichotomies and image-schemas, we develop the 
idea that by combining the analysis of metaphorical concepts and cultural scripts in the 
form of archetypes it becomes possible to reveal yet another story of Gatsby. Gatsby is 
not merely the story of a romantic in a pink suit, but also the story of a culture that lives 
to conquer territory in its various representations, from east to west, and from west to 
east.  
 
Criticism of The Great Gatsby 
In 1985, Emory Elliot (1942-) characterized Gatsby criticism of recently 
preceding decades from a postmodern perspective. He observed that “there was a sense 
that [. . .] many American novels had come to be taken for granted [. . .] as having an 
established set of recognized interpretations [. . .] that the canon was established and that 
the larger thematic and interpretative issues had been decided” (Bruccoli vii). In Matthew 
Bruccoli’s introduction to New Essays on The Great Gatsby (1985), we furthermore read 
that “[f]or a long time, The Great Gatsby was classified as ‘a book about the Roaring 
Twenties.’ It is one of those novels that so richly evoke the texture of their time that they 
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become, in the fullness of time, more than literary classics; they become a supplementary 
or even substitute form of history” (6).  
It is true that Fitzgerald’s Gatsby has shaped the history and understanding of the 
American Dream-become-nightmare (Freese 59-61; see page 46-48 below). This is due, 
among other reasons, to the fact that, “before The Great Gatsby became a required 
textbook in the fifties and sixties, some half million [sic] copies were in the hands of 
readers who were reading it because they wanted to read it” (6). The figures regarding the 
“growth of readership” and the “equivalent explosion of critical and scholarly 
commentary” (26) led Richard Anderson to the conclusion that “no other figure in our 
literature has become so eponymous” (23) as Gatsby, and that consequently, “only a few 
writers [. . .] receive more attention” (27)—both critical and biographical—than 
Fitzgerald.  
Responding to the various critiques of the concept of the author in literary theory, 
Foucault’s essay “What is an Author?” undertakes a specific analysis of the author in 
terms of the interrelationships in/of power and discourse. As a constructing and 
constructed part of a discourse, the author’s name enacts or embodies the assertions set 
forth by the discourse itself. The author’s name is a form of classification that groups 
together certain texts and differentiates these texts from others. This classification not 
only distinguishes texts attributed to one author from those attributed to other authors, but 
also distinguishes them from all the texts that do not have authors. Foucault points out 
that although private letters, contracts, anonymous wall posters, etc., all have writers, 
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they do not have authors. The author-function thus distinguishes certain discourses within 
society from other discourses (“What is an Author?” 101-112).  
Foucault’s notion of the construction of the author through discourse is relevant  
here because it forces us to acknowledge “ideology will also govern our construction of 
the author, especially but not only if the author becomes un sujet a aimer, a someone to 
love” (Walker 556)—an apposition certainly applicable to Fitzgerald. Foucault suggests 
that the author exists in a variety of functions in discourse. As a rational entity that the 
reader constructs, a person can become a cultural category through the influence they 
exert on our understanding of what it means to be human or how the human mind 
functions. This is the case with Marx and Freud, whose names can be used adjectivally, 
as in “Freudian” or “Marxist,” perhaps expressing the classificatory “function” they serve 
in our culture.  
Similarly, we can—and perhaps must—regard Fitzgerald as a representative 
American novelist in this respect. Accordingly, The Great Gatsby could typify an 
American colonialist agenda that cloaks itself in some naive reading of the story as a 
romantic narrative, as opposed to Bakhtin’s notion of a politically interested agenda. 
Foucault’s construction of the author function explains how, since the eighteenth century, 
the author has become an ideological figure (“What is an Author?” 112-119). Some 
critics have regarded Fitzgerald as an author “whose writing transcended the narrow 
concerns of one particular time and place” (Bicknell 556). But other critics see in this a 
“premature judgment” because “the weight of critical opinion is in favor of viewing The 
Great Gatsby as a novel about the 1920s” and because “readers still regard Fitzgerald as 
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a writer firmly rooted in the 1920s” (Matterson 2). In this sense, Fitzgerald is the 
ideological figure of the Jazz Age, and not of American Imperialism. This fact could 
certainly explain the dearth of post-colonial criticism of Gatsby. Gatsby is an American 
classic that has often been read as a story about a forlorn romantic who is willing to deny 
his family origins and engage in illegal transactions in the name of financial success, and 
even lose his life for the woman tha t, to him, represents ultimate emotional and material 
fulfillment. 
In addition, critical examinations of the novel have long furthered the notion that 
“the strongest feeling generated by The Great Gatsby is regret” (Bruccoli 10). However, 
this “is not regret keyed to [the] mutability” of Gatsby or anyone or anything else. 
Instead, Fitzgerald supposedly evokes a profound “regret for depleted emotional capacity, 
a regret as intense as the emotions that inspired it” (10). These readings should come as 
no surprise; in a letter to his life- long friend Ludlow Fowler, Fitzgerald himself states that 
“the whole burden of this novel” is “the loss of those illusions that give such color to the 
world that you don’t care whether things are true or false as long as they partake of the 
magical glory” (Bruccoli & Duggan 145). The “depleted emotional capacity” is a regret 
engendered by the enforced recognition of historical, mythical, and conceptual truths that 
had been avoided, in furtherance of Gatsby’s “romantic readiness”—a readiness that 
partakes of “magical glory” (Bruccoli 6) and that repeatedly has been regarded as a 
crucial force in the development of the myth of the American Dream. 
 And yet, the novel has accomplished even more than the creation of a now 
eponymous character. As a widely read, appreciated, and discussed cultural artifact, it 
 
 176  
necessarily influences what Foucault calls an episteme, which can be defined as an 
anonymous formation of knowledge (see, for example, Foucault 1971). The Renaissance 
Period, characterized “by a shift in human perspective—from a predominantly Christian 
to an increasingly secular point of view” (Murfin and Ray 334) may serve as an 
illustrative example of the paradigm shift from one episteme (predominantly 
Christian/religious) to another (predominantly secular). The various ways people think 
and talk about the world they live in—artistic, literary, social, political, religious, and 
technological—depend on this  unifying principle or pattern, Foucault’s episteme, which 
is a rather changeable cultural phenomenon. The critical discourses revolving around 
Gatsby—that is, the inherited principles governing how we view this novel—have 
changed before. In order to take into account the ideas and analytical methodologies 
pertaining to the realization of new realities at the dawn of a new millennium, these 
discourses will have to change again. The modes and categories inherited even from the 
recent past seem to no longer do justice to the realities experienced by a new generation, 
“since the erosion of theoretical assumptions and presuppositions that support the social 
sciences in their conventional form has proven fundamental” (Ashcroft et al. vii).  
While this part of our discussion may sound tautological, we see it as 
fundamentally important to point out this development in relation to Gatsby criticism. For 
we anticipate arguments questioning the authority of a post-colonial reading of this novel, 
which, in fact, may initiate a paradigm shift, and consequently will  require a change of 
the episteme of Gatsby criticism. We understand that a paradigm shift, or the replacement 
of one episteme by another, is not a simple process; the Catholic Church, for example, 
 
 177  
refused to denounce its erroneous geocentric view of the Earth, postulated by Claudius 
Ptolemaus (ca. 83 BCE-ca. 161 BCE) in favor of the heliocentric view, postulated by 
Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543), until the late nineteenth century. The Church saw in 
this change a threat to its established authority regarding the creation of the universe 
according to the creation story in the Bible. We believe that scholars that have developed 
their own, ‘valid’ interpretations of The Great Gatsby may feel equally challenged to 
defend their positions against our new reading. Apart from the recent development in 
post-colonial theory and criticism, the rise of cognitive poetics, with its basis on 
empirical evidence about human cognition, allows for a new literary critical approach 
like ours that promises to yield compelling readings previously unattained.  
 
The Great Gatsby: A Post-colonial Novel? 
Few Americans like to remember that the US was once a colony. Still fewer are 
aware of imperialist forces at work even today, for these forces, rather than launching an 
outdated military adventure, work through capitalist exploitation of other countries with 
less advanced infrastructures and subsequently create economic dependence. In recent 
decades, the modus operandi of colonial and post-colonial versions of reality has been 
scrutinized and analyzed based on obvious historical examples of international struggles 
deriving from the relationship of mother country and colony (see, for example, 
Mohanram and Rajan 1996). Often, however, we do not even have to look beyond a 
country’s borders to be confronted with the power mechanisms that are traditional 
components of the relationship between colonizing and colonized cultures: colonialist-
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imperialist forces and mechanisms, under the precepts of post-colonial capitalist 
democracy, can also be found at work within a nation, discriminating against religiously, 
geographically, or ethnically marginalized groups.  
After a privileging norm is established as part of the mainstream of a culture, it 
often functions “as a template for the denial of the value of the ‘peripheral,’ the 
‘marginal,’ the ‘uncanonized.’” Then, certain elements of the periphery and margin can 
rise up to threaten “the exclusive claims of the centre they were rapidly incorporating” 
(Ashcroft et al. 4). The relationship between margin and center, in other words, is not 
one-sided and exclusive, but reversible, and the result of the colonizing flow is a 
countercurrent, where the margin seeks in some sense to capture the center. What exactly 
Bill Ashcroft (1946-) and his colleagues, authors of The Empire Writes Back (1989), 
mean here can be illustrated through an obvious example of “the Empire writing back to
the centre” taken from American popular culture. African-American music, as a formerly 
marginalized element of American culture—from Jazz, Gospel, and Rhythm and Blues, 
to Rap and Hip Hop—was once a distinctively black means of expressing hope, criticism, 
agony, and anger against a culturally dominant white center.  
Today, each one of these ways of expression has found its way into mainstream 
white culture after a process of adapting to ‘the exclusive claims of the centre’. True to 
the model proposed by Said in his seminal work Orientalism (1979), white Americans 
sing traditional gospel-slave songs, listen and dance to R&B music, and get up on stage 
on karaoke nights to sing along to the music of white rappers like Vanilla Ice or the 
Beastie Boys. In Said’s terms, this phenomenon can be described as a  
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process [. . .] of conscious affiliation proceeding under the guise of 
filiation [. . .] a mimicry of the centre proceeding from a desire not only to 
be accepted but to be adopted and absorbed. It caused those from the 
periphery to immerse themselves in the imported culture, denying their 
origins in an attempt to become ‘more English than the English’. We see 
examples of this in such writers as Henry James and T.S. Eliot. (Ashcroft 
et al. 4). 
Following the definitions provided in the Oxford English Dictionary, to affiliate is to 
“bring into close connection as a member or branch,” in other words and to the point, to 
be “typically in a dependent or subordinate position” (Vol. 1 217) while filiation is “the 
adjudication of paternity” and, also more pointedly, “descent or derivation[,] especially 
from a culture or language” (Vol. 5 906). In other words, if affiliation—subordination—
can be seen to proceed under the guise of filiation—“legitimate” descent in some form—
then we have elaborated the mechanism of Rudyard Kipling’s (1865-1936) imperial 
apologia of the white man’s burden, whereby a deliberate subordination is carried out 
under the guise of a legitimate and even charitable act. Now, this is somewhat different in 
an American context, to be sure, but realistically only insofar as the costumes of the 
actors on the world’s stage are concerned. In America, we had Bluecoats and Gray-coats, 
instead of Redcoats, and enslaved Africans and dispossessed Native Americans instead of 
Hindus and coolies. To go still further, the countercurrent of affiliation/filiation is also 
manifest in the American capitalist colonization of even white Americans, at least in 
terms of economic exploitation—labor relations instead of warfare, or the riot in 
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Haymarket Square of 1886 instead of the Battle of the Khyber Pass of 1842. It is in this 
sense that a post-colonial dissection becomes possible in an American context. 
Largely, the ignorance of the workings of subtler modern forms of imperialism in 
American society derives from our capitalist-based culture, with its “set[s] of control 
mechanisms—plans, recipes, rules, instructions” (Geertz, qtd. in Bressler 243) for the 
governing of behavior. A novel like Joseph Conrad’s (1857-1924) Heart of Darkness, 
published in 1899, obviously invites analysis from a critical perspective based on the 
theories and methodologies of post-colonial criticism, because of its setting in the 
Belgian Congo at a time when European imperialism was at its peak. However, The 
Great Gatsby, published only 26 years later, seems a much less likely target for post-
colonial theories, for Gatsby is set on the mainland of the United States, and not in the 
wilderness of a barbaric, uncharted continent. Hence, overlooking The Great Gatsby as a 
subject for analysis according to the methodologies of Post-colonialism seems reasonable 
at first. 
Still, as the authors of The Empire Writes Back have suggested, the term post-
colonial can and must be used to cover “all the culture[s] affected by the imperial process 
from the moment of colonization to the present day [. . .] because there is a continuity of 
preoccupations throughout the historical process initiated by European imperial 
aggression” (Ashcroft et al. 2). This statement may endorse post-colonial criticism of the 
Heart of Darkness, Henderson, the Rain King (1959), or Beloved (1987), but on an 
intranational level, a “continuity of preoccupations” is also a structuring principle of The 
Great Gatsby, often masking the interested discourse that has surrounded it. Frantz Fanon 
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(1925-1961) has written that only through the appropriation and re-telling of the past can 
a people move toward a future that is liberated from the claims, abuse and exploitation of 
the colonizers (210). Suddenly, we realize that narration, such as in Gatsby, could be 
essential to the empowerment and liberation of colonized peoples. Of course, such 
projected liberation can hardly ever be total—after all, as Gatsby shows, one cannot 
relive the past. 
Consequently, a re-reading of The Great Gatsby from a previously unoccupied 
post-colonial perspective reveals one more reason why this novel, as a “supplementary or 
even substitute form of history,” has enjoyed such popularity. It deploys and displays 
subtle mechanisms of imperialist power structures that surround readers even in today’s 
post-colonial world. Similarly, one could of course argue that post-colonial readings of 
The Great Gatsby have received so little critical attention because of the apparent denial 
of the forces of colonialism the novel represents. Because of these factors, it seems all the 
more plausible to consider the novel’s imperialist subtext, for Fitzgerald is likely to have 
been aware of the underlying cultural attitudes of American Imperialism of his time and 
of America’s not so innocent past. Late in his life, Fitzgerald wrote to his daughter, “You 
speak of how good your generation is. But I think they share with every generation since 
the Civil War the sense of being somehow about to inherit the earth” (qtd. in Callahan 9). 
The American generations “since the Civil War” are the same generations that brought 
the European conquest of North America to final fruition. Moreover, far from arriving at 
some putative enlightenment, Fitzgerald’s daughter perpetuates the same implicit 
attitude—that these generations and their heirs, ad infinitum, are the rightful owners of all 
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they survey, regardless of any other current  or previous residents. Fitzgerald himself may 
have been more subject to such attitudes than he knew.  
Strongly influenced by the traumatic experiences of historical events like World 
War I, Fitzgerald lived in a time when his contemporary epistemes, the dominant 
ideological discourses of the 1920s, suggested that overt imperialism as an excessively 
European militarist version of the American Dream was not politically correct, that it was 
immoral, and everything but admirable. Clearly, from our perspective at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century, we cannot expect to find lucid symbols or explicit signs promoting 
imperialist views in The Great Gatsby. A stance anticipating a lack of explicit evidence 
of an imperialist ideology also seems to be in accordance with the largely unconscious 
nature of conceptual metaphor.  
So instead, we have to examine cultural artifacts like Fitzgerald’s novel that shape 
our perception of reality in our search for understanding what Derrida calls the “trace, 
[which] is not a presence but rather the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, 
displaces, and refers beyond itself” (156). Traces of an Americanized colonialist 
ideology, inherently based on the (not so) original European colonizers’ postulation of 
superiority, permeate The Great Gatsby as well as American mainstream culture at any 
given moment during the past, extending into the twenty-first century. Said commented 
on exactly this fact during a lecture on Culture and Imperialism, which he presented at 
York University in Toronto, Canada. He stated: 
   Curiously, though, so influential has been the discourse insisting on 
American specialness, altruism and opportunity, that imperialism in the 
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United States as a word or ideology has turned up only rarely and recently 
in accounts of the United States culture, politics and history. But the 
connection between imperial politics and culture in North America, and in 
particular in the United States, is astonishingly direct. American attitudes 
to greatness, to hierarchies of race, to the  perils of other revolutions—the 
American Revolution being considered unique and somehow unrepeatable 
anywhere else in the world—these have remained constant, have dictated, 
have obscured the realities of empire while apologists for overseas 
American interests have insisted on American innocence, doing good, 
fighting for freedom. 
Following the major theoretical tendency of one of Foucault’s works, which is to regard 
the literary text as part of a larger framework of texts, institutions, and practices 
(Foucault, The Order of Things)—a tendency that seems to be in accord with the notion 
of CCMs—scholars should strive to be sensitive to the political impact of the text and the 
political unconscious behind The Great Gatsby. Both the language of this novel and the 
relevant historical, political, and social practices related to it can serve as expressions that 
we can analyze to find and explore underlying mental concepts to learn more about the 







The Center (East)/Margin (West) Metaphor in 
American History and Gatsby 
The Great Gatsby is an excellent artifact with which to discuss the possibility of a 
modernist counter-migration, a reversal of the archetypal East-moving-West direction of 
the American literary tradition implicit in the PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS 
concept—at least from an American perspective. Gatsby discusses an attempted raid on 
the center by the margin, and we find nowhere a more artistic expression of both its 
process and its cost. Preceding this discussion, we must first clarify the theories and 
implications of the archetypal East/West dichotomy, which forms the basis for the 
directional journeys in Gatsby. 
Based upon our discussion so far, it is safe to suggest that the historical and 
mythological movements of Western cultural scripts and their artifacts in one direction 
surely beget movement in the other direction, as we find it to be the case in Gatsby. If 
adoption (affiliation) is mythically transformed into a true filial relationship, then filiation 
(father/offspring, the correlative of center/marginal relations) may likewise shift, echoing 
even so dated an idea as Frederick Jackson Turner’s (1861-1932) seminal Frontier 
Thesis. He argued that the frontier had meant that every American generation returned 
“to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line.” Along this frontier—
which he also trenchantly described as “the meeting point between savagery and 
civilization”—Americans again and again recapitulated the developmental stages of the 




begins with the Indian and the hunter; it goes on with the disintegration of 
savagery by the entrance of the trader, the pathfinder of civilization; [. . .] 
the pastoral stage in ranch life; the exploitation of the soil by the raising of 
unrotated crops of corn and wheat in sparsely settled farm communities; 
the intensive culture of the denser farm settlement; and finally the 
manufacturing organization with the city and the factory system. (J. F. 
Turner  11)  
Ray Allen Billington (1903-1981) interprets Turner’s thesis as a process of “atomization 
and reversion” of institutions and cultures on the American frontier, reiterated in 
subsequent redevelopment as the frontier moved west, such that each region in the 
westward movement ultimately and notably differs from earlier-settled eastern 
counterparts (1-2). Following Billington, the western frontier has been figured as a safety 
valve, in that nonconformistssuch as Huckleberry Finnrather than stay in the sedate 
east, and either disrupt it or be ultimately subsumed, “light out for the territories,” thus 
nipping in the bud any counter-current praxis. As Richard Chase (1914-1962) has pointed 
out, if Gatsby is a myth of America, then it is about America’s failure to live up to its 
stated ideals and to its past of frontier and pioneer (299-302). Unlike Natty Bumpo and 
Huck Finn, who had a frontier or a territory to which they could escape, Gatsby has 
nowhere; “significantly in the novel, he moves from West to East, reversing the pattern of 
the pioneer and settler,” while mirroring their attitude of conquest (Matterson 5). 
Turner and others have characterized the frontier as the nursery of democracy, in 
that as institutions moved westward with the line of the frontier, the impact of shifting 
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cultural and environmental circumstances created and conditioned continuing democratic 
development. The frontier has also been describedmost often in self-congratulatory 
termsas the incubator of stereotypically American traits, such as diversity, mobility, 
and ultimately, abundance, in the conjunction of the economic exploitation of the 
occupied landscape with the successive remix of and addition to the ever-more-polyglot 
population. Such cross-pollination of cultures gives rise in American history to 
distinctively American stories of distinctively American circumstances, and the Frontier 
Thesis sets out the trappings of a sort of westward-mobile environment within which all 
this other flux may be thought to have occurred.  
But the fact that this permutation westward might, in Said’s terms, be a very 
similar cultural looting of the margins by the center, also stereotypically American, has 
not heretofore been much discussed by literary critics. This is perhaps because it presents 
us with a reversal of the original historical and archetypal (for the notion of archetypes, 
see, for example, Joseph Campbell, 1972) eastward movement of initially mercantile, and 
subsequently, military, colonization starting with the endeavors of Marco Polo (1254-
1324) and proceeding to those of James Cook (1728-1779). After all, the desire to go 
west was motivated by the longing to find a more suitable route for exploiting the 
treasures of the East. Nor has the possibility of a modernist counter-migrationan 
attempted raid on the center by the margin, so to speakapparently been discussed at all, 
except perhaps by John F. Callahan (1940-) in The Illusions of a Nation (1972), and there 
evocatively in terms of “those myths summoned to explain the facts of history” (3). For 
Callahan, myth is the body of narrative created to justify those “facts of history” that 
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might otherwise be readily construed to the discredit of the originating culture. Certainly, 
since all cultures have an ample share of such facts, the mythos of American culture is no 
exception. 
The US is indeed a former European colony, but unlike most other colonies of 
European powers, it is descendants of white Europeans who inhabit it predominantly. In 
the course of the development of post-colonial theories as critical models for political, 
cultural, and literary discourse, the term “white diaspora” was coined to describe the 
process of settlement for countries such as the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 
among which the US was “the first post-colonial society to develop a ‘national’ 
literature” (Ashcroft et al. 16). The alienation of self and vision described in The Empire 
Writes Back leads to the “widely shared discursive practice [. . .] which can be identified” 
as “the construction of place” (9). This is even more important in our case, since early in 
colonial history it led to emblematic terminology like “the New England States,” “the 
Tidewater,” or “the Old Dominion”—suggestive of conceptual metaphors for the new 
territories—as descriptive phrases for several of the thirteen founding states of the new 
country.  
These labels point toward the necessity not to merely dismantle and abolish the 
central importance of the motherland, but to replace one set of values with another while 
maintaining the same conceptual value structure. This value structure receives its 
organizational elements from “orientational metaphors, [. . .] which organize[s] a whole 
system of concepts with respect to one another.” As such, 
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most of them have to do with spatial orientation” such as “up-down, in-
out, [. . .], central-peripheral. These spatial orientations arise from the fact 
that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do 
in our physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a concept a 
spatial orientation. (MWLB 14) 
It seems that the entire concept of supremacy, of being in an elevated position, is based 
on the existence of orientational metaphors. There is ample evidence that GOOD IS UP, 
HIGH STATUS IS UP, VIRTUE IS UP (15-16), that CONTROL IS UP (MTCR 149), 
and that DIVINE IS UP (150-151). It is not at all surprising, then, that white Europeans, 
as well as white Americans, understood, and to some extent, even today understand 
themselves as being ‘up’ since ‘up’ “organizes a whole system of concepts with respect 
to one another.” White Caucasians are also conceptualized (or perhaps more aptly, 
conceptualize themselves) via the GOOD IS WHITE (185) concept. This is the 
knowledge that allows us to conclude that American nationals, former colonists, were 
able to create an American antithesis of the thesis of European supremacy while 
maintaining the same conceptual value structure, still basing supremacy on Anglo-
Germanic European descent: in a word, white supremacy.  
The term “New England” is in wide use today, and while metropolitan centers 
have developed all across the US, the East coast is still looked upon as the metropolitan 
center. The American Northeast represents the intellectual stronghold of the entire nation: 
Washington D.C. is the nation’s capital; New York City, the “city of luxury and mystery” 
(Fitzgerald, The Beautiful and Damned, 282) is the home of the stock market; more 
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importantly, it is home to most major publishing houses as the creators and guardians of 
archives of knowledge; the American Northeast is the seat of a number of traditionally 
conservatively oriented Ivy League schools. Americans, now colonizers in their own 
right, broke off the colony-to-motherland relationship, only to reinstate several new 
versions of their own.  
One new version was incorporated into American culture on a national level, long 
before Turner, in the relationship of West-East. Gatsby’s dichotomies of East and West, 
of money and a “romantic” quest embedded in signifiers of acquisition, against death and 
the “rugged edge of the universe” (Fitzgerald 6), can thus be viewed as an example of 
cultural traits which “depend upon the relationship [. . .] with the colonizing power, 
particularly the defining contrast between European metropolis and ‘frontier’” (Ashcroft 
et al. 16). That the American Northeast can be understood as an imitation of the 
“European metropolis” is not a far- fetched suggestion. One only needs to think of the 
name New York with its allusion to the cultural and religious center of the city of York in 
England; one may also think of the city’s original name New Amsterdam, instituted by 
the Dutch, as a clear reference to the capital of the Netherlands, which has been one the 
world’s largest and foremost trading centers for centuries.  
The identification of Nick Carraway with the frontier also is inevitable and 
obvious, for only shortly after his arrival on West Egg, he defines himself as “a guide, a 
pathfinder” (Fitzgerald 7), ascribing to himself activities inherent to life on the frontier. 
Gatsby is also depicted as Western: he is the protégé of Dan Cody, whose name, it has 
been suggested, is derived from two larger than life figures of American history—the 
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pioneer Daniel Boone, and Bill Cody, the Westerner (Matterson 6). Unfortunately, Cody, 
whose photograph hangs in Gatsby’s bedroom, is characterized as the “pioneer 
debauchee” who “brought back to the Eastern seaboard the savage violence of the 
frontier brothel and saloon” (Fitzgerald 78). Residing in one of the “white palaces of 
fashionable East Egg” (8, emphasis added), and having spent “a year in France, for no 
particular reason,” the Buchanans’ identification with the metropolitan center, and the 
allusion to GOOD IS WHITE, are just as obvious. Critics have gone as far as suggesting 
that “the Buchanans represent a kind of wealthy aristocratic class in America, a class 
based on inherited money and the manners and attitudes that supposedly go with it” 
(Matterson 28). They form, so to speak, a natural contrast both to the Jeffersonian dream 
of a society open to all, and to Gatsby, who lacks the manners and background that would 
designate him as a member of the leisure class. 
If Nick Carraway is indeed “a guide, a pathfinder, an original settler,” then he is 
also an echo of earlier, more blatant, and more violent American colonizations. His 
movement East, from the not- long-before colonized and pacified West, recapitulates in 
reverse the thrust of nineteenth-century American history. Yet Gatsby recalls most 
explicitly, in his juxtaposition with Tom Buchanan, the pairing in Herman Melville’s 
(1819-1891) The Confidence-Man of Colonel Moredock—“he never let pass an 
opportunity for quenching an Indian” (134)—and the Indian Mocmohoc, practitioner of 
“circling wiles and bloody lusts” (129). The Indian-hater is a figure of long standing in 
America, from colonial times to the climactic subjugation of Native American power at 
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Wounded Knee in December 1890. Buchanan’s racism is the echo of Moredock’s; 
Mocmohoc’s tactical treacheries are reflected in Gatsby’s deceptions.  
In the battle over Daisy, Gatsby and Buchanan employ wiles “circling and 
bloody” indeed. There is Gatsby’s camouflage of Eastern legitimacy on the one hand, and 
Buchanan’s brute establishment force in a “cruel body” on the other (Fitzgerald 9). Of 
course, the climax of their conflict is three useless deaths. Yet these are the deaths of 
marginalized peoples—Myrtle and George Wilson, and, of course, Gatsby himself—and 
in the case of Gatsby, a marginalized person of emblematic Western origin. The Indian 
Wars are thus carried on, against a new set of the economically dispossessed. Buchanan 
and Gatsby, like Moredock and Mocmohoc, are linked in that they are on opposite sides 
of some essential conflict, presumably (from both viewpoints) a war of all that is good 
against all that is evil—and yet in the practice of that war, they are not different in any 
fundamentally important way. 
The Indian Wars in Texas provide a correlative from history itself, where the 
Native Americans were given the same choice that ultimately is given to Gatsby—to “go 
elsewhere or be exterminated” (Curtis, qtd. in Newcomb 333). Buchanan gives Gatsby 
essentially the same choice in a modern circumstance, with the result that Gatsby is, in 
fact, exterminated—ironically, by a member of what had been his own class. If, in the 
end, Gatsby is an emblem of “the failure of the American idealist either to integrate 
himself with or change the course of American history” (Callahan 24), he is also an 
emblem of this doppelgänger, looking-glass aspect of the conflict, and, too, of the tactical 
truism that the entrenched position is always the stronger. 
 
 192 
But our suggested pairing is complicated by the pairings that follow it. A series of 
shifting alliances are enacted, as the loyalties of first Carraway and then Daisy are 
influenced by Gatsby and Buchanan’s conflict of margin and center. The initial 
situation—Gatsby vs. Buchanan—becomes sequentially Gatsby/Carraway vs. Buchanan, 
Daisy/Gatsby/Carraway vs. Buchanan, and finally Gatsby/Carraway vs. Daisy/Buchanan. 
The prize itself—Daisy—is ultimately marshaled to the arsenal of resources of the victor, 
Buchanan, in the same way that the resources of the newly possessed land were 
marshaled to fuel the conquest of the land. In the end, of course, it is Carraway alone 
against Tom and Daisy Buchanan. 
The point is that the lines between colonizers and the colonized are anything but 
clearly drawn, and in fact almost seem to have been intentionally blurred—most likely, 
originally, for reasons relating to the similarity of Gatsby and Buchanan, with respect to 
Daisy. The sympathy of the reader shifts, that is, according to the most recent revelations 
about Gatsby. Our sympathies are fully engaged by Gatsby’s “romantic readiness” in the 
first place, just as Fitzgerald seems to have intended. Gatsby’s readiness to falsify the 
impoverished reality of his Midwestern history, to risk the physical danger of combat in 
World War I, and, later, the more subtle dangers of the war with Buchanan over Daisy, in 
some sense display Gatsby’s readiness to dispossess his historical dispossessors. But the 
shifts of sympathy on the part of the readers, just like the shifting alliances within the 
narrative, speak as clearly to the moral ambivalence of the relationship between 
conquered and conqueror—in whatever direction it flows—as they do to the concerns 
Fitzgerald himself brought to his text initially. 
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The quest for legitimacy—legitimacy at the East/Center—is the guiding 
behavioral principle of Nick Carraway, and of Jay Gatsby. Both characters are examples 
of “the special post-colonial crisis of identity” through their “concern with the 
development or recovery of an effective identifying relationship between self and place,” 
a phenomenon that critics such as Desmond Ernest Stewart Maxwell (1925-) have made 
the defining model of post-coloniality (Ashcroft et al. 8-9). Nick fled the world of the 
Middle West because it was, to him, “like the ragged edge of the universe” (Fitzgerald 6). 
While grammatically this expression is a simile, it is nonetheless an expression that 
serves as a telling metaphor of the margin, which, as we read earlier, can also be 
characterized by the “savage violence of the frontier brothel and saloon.” Incidentally, 
this quote seems to provide proof of the correlation between the West and the concept 
that THE WEST IS THE UNCIVILIZED MARGIN OF THE UNIVERSE. This concept 
is consistent with other concepts such as ESSENCE IS CENTRAL and IMPORTANT IS 
CENTRAL, and the implied LESS IMPORTANT IS PERIPHERAL (MTCR 148). 
Accordingly, the West is far from the right place for a young man wanting to find 
his way to prosperity. Gatsby declares that he, too, is from the West: “I am the son of 
some wealthy people in the middle-west—all dead now” (52). Gatsby’s statement is 
particularly important, because it clarifies how he views the West, whether his statement 
is actually true or not. He not only associates the West with death, and thus turns it into a 
location he fears and despises and wants to put behind him, but he associates West and 
Death by analogy, by a metaphorical mode of transference through which THE WEST IS 
(cultural, political, economical and emotional) DEATH. As we have already seen, this 
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cultural concept is coherent with the bodily experience of seeing the sun “die” in the 
West, and it is coherent with other mental concepts that form one of the frames of the 
East/West dichotomy. 
Once Gatsby declares that his ties with the West have been severed, it becomes 
much easier for him to associate with the East—the archetypal locus amicus of 
intellectual growth and fulfillment. Albeit recently established by European measures, 
THE EAST IS THE STRONGHOLD OF CIVILIZATION whence the colonization of 
the West sprang up, and the model toward which the altered Western institutions look for 
example. The East embodies the source of political authority, and of wealth by its 
ultimate American measure: not property, but money. Even so marginalized a character as 
Myrtle Wilson can attest to the absolute importance of money over other commodities: 
“[T]hese fellas” she says, “all they think of is money.” (27) While Myrtle makes this 
statement in reference to Mrs. Eberhardt, who is in charge of Myrtle Wilson’s pedicure, 
with the East as an enigmatic metaphor for money, this statement also holds validity for 
all the characters in the novel.  
For Fitzgerald’s Western characters, the East is a metaphor and model for the 
cultural, and consequently, political, economical, and emotional center; the East is 
everything the West merely imitates. It is this Eastern authenticity that Gatsby seeks—the 
authenticity that will make him legitimate in the eyes of Daisy Fay. The relationship 
between the traditionally privileged center of white European descent and traditionally 
marginalized and dispossessed minorities of color is recapitulated in this relationship 
between dominant and subordinate segments of the larger privileged white culture. In that 
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equation, THE WEST IS THE UNCIVILIZED MARGIN OF THE UNIVERSE and THE 
EAST IS CIVILIZED CENTER OF THE UNIVERSE, displaying the directional reversal 
of the arguments Said and others have presented, in which THE EAST IS THE 
STRONGHOLD OF CIVILIZATION/LEGITIMACY. 
In spite of living in the East, both Carraway and Gatsby still live on West Egg, not 
on the more prominent East Egg, and the macrocosmic East/West dichotomy is continued 
on a microcosmic scale between the eastern and western counterparts of Long Island. 
Nick himself describes West Egg as, “the—well, less fashionable of the two” (8), and 
despite the “proximity of millionaires” (8), he only is able to rent a place he considers “an 
eye-sore” among mansions. Furthermore, Gatsby’s mansion is, after all, not only “a 
factual imitation of some Hotel de Ville in Normandy” (8, emphasis added)—a fake that 
can only constantly defer to the trace of old money, the physical sign of legitimacy 
neither Gatsby nor his house possesses—but also a “huge incoherent failure of a house” 
(140) inasmuch as it fails to grant legitimacy or protect its inhabitant as it is supposed to. 
The “eye-sore” and the “imitation” are testimonies to the peripheral nature of West Egg 
and the Westerners, and to the stigma of their illegitimacy. 
In contrast, the Buchanans’ house is “even more elaborate than [Nick] expected,” 
for it is “a cheerful red and white Georgian Colonial mansion” (9). The reference is the 
British King George III, ruling monarch when the American settlers began to struggle for 
independence. In a sense, George III is the last European colonizer of the Long Island 
Shore; the fact that the Buchanan’s house is located in a favorable tactical position that 
ensures control, “overlooking the bay” (9) aids in making the connection between 
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royalty, old money, legitimacy, and a colonizing force—all of which are evoked as parts 
of the frame of eastness. The “effective identifying relationship between self and place” 
pointed out by Ashcroft and his colleagues (9), and mentioned earlier here, is in this 
sense a distinct liability for Gatsby. Beyond historical and cultural differences between 
various examples of post-colonial literatures in English, place, displacement, and a 
pervasive concern with the myths of identity and authenticity are features common to all 
cultures. They appear in Gatsby as well, as correlatives of an East/West duality that 
privileges the East and devalues the West. These findings seem to suggest that “effective 
identifying relationship between self and place” is not based on absolute, but relative 
values. It seems plausible to conclude that the status as Eastern or Western is always 
defined in relation to the geographical position of the other; Gatsby and Nick, now living 
in the East, still live west of the Buchanan’s. 
Furthermore, when Jordan Baker addresses Nick for the first time, her statement 
carries a judgmental tone: “‘You live in West Egg,’ she remarked contemptuously” (12). 
Eventually, Nick acknowledges his stigma, conferred through his westness, when he 
says, “You make me feel uncivilized, Daisy” (18), implying that Daisy and her kind, the 
kind of people who live on East Egg, are more civilized than Westerners in general, and 
more civilized than the people who live on West Egg in particular. Even if, as some may 
argue, Nick is being ironic here, it seems that our understanding of Nick’s self-
stigmatizing attitude remains valid. The ironic, as a stylistic device based on the idea of 
expressing the opposite meaning of one’s real thoughts, is completely lost on Daisy in her 
conversation with Nick. She is too self- involved, too bored, and reveals a belief in her 
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sophistication, as opposed to Nick’s lack thereof, when she laughs with “thrilling scorn” 
and exclaims “sophisticated—God, I’m sophisticated!” (17).  
From this perspective, Gatsby becomes the symbolic quest of the uncivilized 
Westerners, or genuinely othered people like Wolfsheim, who “are in the East to earn 
their livings, to pursue ‘the shining secrets’ that only Midas and Morgan and Maecenas 
knew” (Lewis 50-51). These “shining secrets” are just such as the US itself had pursued 
in the Indian and Mexican wars of the preceding century, the quest for land as the 
ultimate wellspring of wealth. In a process of protracted and bloody conquest, the events 
of American history gave rise to myths such as that of the Frontier—vitally important 
myths, since they help us draw “back from the horrors of [our] history” (Callahan 5). The 
myth that makes horror permissible is itself the process of filiation, overriding the earlier, 
contingent affiliation of the frontier period. The facts of history are subsumed within the 
larger and far more flattering narrative about the US. 
“Affiliation through filiation,” then, following Callahan’s “anatomy of American 
history,” proceeds in three stages. The first is “the coming west to the new world and the 
response of Europeans to that world.” No longer Europeans, the new Americans 
affiliate—that is, bring themselves into close connection—with the land they 
successively dispossess the Native Americans of and occupy; yet they do not consider 
themselves so much Americans as European colonists. The second stage begins with “the 
nineteenth-century transition from republic to empire,” where the citizens of the new 
republic attain, through the mythologies generated in what is essentially a heroic age, a 
sense of legitimacy as occupants of the new land. Present-day Americans are the heirs of 
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that age, at and perhaps even beyond Callahan’s third stage, of “the full tide of empire in 
the twentieth century” (5-6). At the dawn of a third, or, stretching the point, fourth 
American century, it is now not only possible, but also imperative to look back across the 
twentieth century, and begin to understand both the means and the cost of that process of 
affiliation through filiation. It is a process that has anchored these new people to the land 
and, at least contingently, to one another—the land, in Robert Frost’s (1874-1963) 
memorable phrase, “vaguely realizing westward” (348). 
In following the colonizing pattern subconsciously laid out by Easterners in the 
previous century, the Westerners begin, as Gatsby attests, an attempt to subdue the 
politically dominant discourse by reversing the direction of the conquest. After Easterners 
subdued the West, now the Westerners must attempt to conquer the East. Additiona lly, 
Gatsby’s eastward journey is motivated and fueled by a dream—his dream-wish to 
reinstate the past, to “fix everything just the way it was before” in some “transitory, 
enchanted moment” (Fitzgerald 86), some Edenic, revolutionary epoch, before the 
nation’s promise was bought and sold in places like Wall Street, where Carraway 
ironically works to establish his own legitimacy. We accept this, however, more fully 
from Gatsby than we do from the equally likable Carraway. Whatever “qualification 
independent of class” (12) Carraway may possess, Gatsby possesses his own infinite 
virtues in still greater abundance—just because he, “wild, unknown man” (5) that he is, 
has achieved his heroic deeds against steeper odds than the advantaged Carraway will 
ever be required to face. It becomes apparent that the power that drives both Gatsby’s and 
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Carraway’s quest eastward is conceptualized through the DREAMS ARE 
MOTIVATING FORCES FOR REACHING DESTINATIONS metaphor. 
 
Dreams are Motivating for  
Reaching Destinations 
The lives of prototypical US-Americans were, and still are, centered on the ideas 
of progress, success, Manifest Destiny, and liberty and equality. American lives are 
shaped, willy-nilly, by the Declaration of Independence, signed in 1776, and the Bill of 
Rights, signed in 1789, as much as they shape and are shaped by novels like The Great 
Gatsby, which is “yet the most cogent literary comment” (Freese 59) on the American 
Dream—a dream that, according to Nick Carraway’s own words, was 
the last and greatest of all human dreams; for a transitory enchanted moment man 
must have held his breath in the presence of this continent, compelled into an aesthetic 
contemplation he neither understood nor desired, face to face for the last time in history 
with something commensurate for his capacity to wonder. (140) 
Peter Freese (1939-) suggests that if Jay Gatsby “is understood as a representative 
of America, then the novel insists that the [American] Dream was ruined because the 
idealistic promise was tainted by materialism, was betrayed by egotism and greediness” 
(59). Many American artists have explored this theme. William James (1842-1910) 
exclaimed, “the excessive worship of the bitch-goddess success is our national disease” 
(qtd. in Freese 24). In his travelogue The Air-conditioned Nightmare (1945), Henry 
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Miller (1891-1980) flatly declared, “there is only ‘one thing America has to give,’” and 
that with emphasis: “MONEY” (48).  
Incidentally, in their idiosyncratically shaped versions of the American Dream, 
both Gatsby and Carraway work to acquire wealth. Both men also begin with superiority 
based on a kind of personalized origin-myth that, if less than wholly truthful, also derives 
from something more substantial than class. Carraway has come east for the purpose of 
making money, implicitly shunning the comfort and ease of the hometown scion; Gatsby 
has come east for a similar purpose, from real origins even more humble than 
Carraway’s. Yet Gatsby’s conquest of the East is actually at the cusp of complete 
success—all he lacks is Daisy, the necessary symbol of success, and his ultimate dream-
desire. The idealized model of action—relevant for any attempt to understand what 
motivates Gatsby as well as Nick—concerns an agent with an intention, who performs an 
action that has consequences.  The belief that action A (in Gatsby’s case, moving east, 
and making money) will produce consequence C (winning over Daisy, and being 
respected as a legitimate member of Eastern society) and the desire to produce 
consequence C constitutes the intention to produce consequence C.  In this model, 
intentions cause actions and actions cause their intended consequences.  This model is  
what underlies Americans’ (and D’Andrade 1987 suggests the model holds for many 
Europeans as well) interpretations of their own and each other’s actions.   
Our default assumption is that all human acts are caused by intentions. If we 
observe a person performing an action (e.g. opening a door) we assume that the act is 
caused by the person’s intention (the intention to open the door). We do not mention 
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intentions in our description of actions because it is implicit to the very notion of action 
that it be mediated by an intention.  It is not adequate to explain an action by pointing to 
the intention that caused it.  Because all actions are assumed to stem from intentions, this 
information is seen as trivial.   
However, it is considered relevant to specify the cause of the intentions. Because 
desires, wishes, needs, beliefs, and combinations of these can cause intentions, one might 
explain another person’s actions by having recourse to the desire that gave rise to the 
intention, which, in turn, gave rise to the action.  Alternatively, one might simply refer to 
the external cause which gave rise to the desire (wish, need, etc.) which, in turn, gave rise 
to the intention and, consequently, to the action. 
While it is arguable that Gatsby is the more admirable for pulling himself up so 
far, the context of the times demeans his origins—and thus suggests the necessity for an 
invention of an origin-myth. In effect, Gatsby dreams himself a novel legitimacy, while 
Carraway’s father already has dreamed it for Carraway, in the delusion that the sense of 
“fundamental decency” (Fitzgerald 5) of father and son alike is inborn rather than 
learned. In either case, the goal for both men is the accumulation of wealth through effort, 
by means however dubious, rather than through inheritance. Sympathy between 
Carraway and Gatsby grows naturally out of this affinity. For both, at heart, are much less 
than secure about their positions in East Egg; on the one hand, they are bereft of family, 
and on the other, their social standing is poised on a precarious structure of lies which 




In Robert Emmet Long’s intricate study The Achieving of The Great Gatsby 
(1979), we read that 
This Side of Paradise announces Fitzgerald’s theme of romantic 
disillusionment but does not focus it clearly; in The Beautiful and 
Damned, influenced by Mencken, Fitzgerald social perspective is 
sharpened. His view of contemporary society is wholly depreciatory, and 
his protagonist, who is committed to a higher aspiration than his culture’s, 
is doomed to failure. The novel is an attempted study in the ironic mode 
endorsed by Mencken, and although it fails, it does lead Fitzgerald toward 
The Great Gatsby, in which the irony of the aspiration has been maturely 
grasped. This Side of Paradise and The Beautiful and Damned both reflect 
Fitzgerald’s preoccupation with illusion, and in a number of 
apprenticeship stories, such as “The  Diamond as Big as the Ritz” and 
“Winter Dreams,” [. . .] he schooled himself further in the subject of 
illusion—that of both the individual and the nation—before the vision of 
The Great Gatsby was achieved. (10, emphasis added) 
Additionally, “in all his novels’” John B. Chambers (1931-) aptly writes of Fitzgerald, 
“his treatment of man’s most fundamental illusion – that he is destined to achieve 
happiness – is centred upon the illusion that it is love which will transport him to a 
magical world of eternal happiness” (96, emphasis added). Even worse, Gatsby’s 
fundamental mistake, as described by Carraway, is the belief in the illusion of “the 
unreality of reality, a promise that the rock of the world was founded securely on a fairy’s 
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wing” (Fitzgerald 100). Gatsby is ‘great’ because of his dream, which distinguishes him 
from the other, disillusioned, characters, who have lost their capacity to wonder and to 
dream. As for Gatsby, it is not just Daisy that must have “tumbled short of his dreams [. . 
.] because of the vitality of his illusion. It had gone beyond her, beyond everything” (97).  
Compelled to choose between Gatsby and Tom, Daisy makes it clear that her 
loyalties are, after all, with Tom’s world. Gatsby’s illusion that nothing can violate the 
integrity of their romance is ultimately shattered when she admits, “I can’t say I never 
loved Tom” (104). Eventually, after Gatsby’s death, even Carraway, eager to reserve 
judgment toward anyone and anything, begins to grasp the spiritual emptiness of the great 
city, reflecting Anthony and Gloria’s beginning disillusionment with the East in The 
Beautiful and Damned: “New York [. . .] was home of preposterous hopes and exotic 
dreams. Here on the outskirts absurd stucco palaces reared themselves in the cool sunset, 
poised for an instant in cool unreality, glided off faraway, succeeded by the mazed 
confusion of the Harlem River” (282). And so, all of Gatsby’s, and perhaps all of 
Gatsby’s, DREAMS ARE ILLUSIONS to the point where characters could be regarded 
as utterly delusional if they have any dreams left. 
In the first chapter of The American Dream and the American Nightmare (1987), 
Freese eloquently sums up the uniqueness of the US and grounds its current role in world 
politics and the inhabitants’ self-perception in the historical myth of an America: 
Long before “America” became a country, it was a continent, and long before it 
was known to exist as a continent, it was a vision and a dream. Thus, before Americans 
ever began to dream their national dream, Europeans of all nations used to dream their 
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dream about an America of the mind and, later, about an America which slowly emerged 
from the reports of the first discoverers, exploiters and settlers. (5) 
Freese does not stand alone in his assessment of this sentiment. Among many 
others, Robert Frost expressed the same feelings in “The Gift Outright,” the poem recited 
at John F. Kennedy’s (1917-1963) 1960 inauguration—an event also notable as the final 
entry of a previously marginalized group, the Catholic Irish-American, into the center of 
American life and culture. “The land was ours before we were the land’s,” Frost wrote. 
“She was our land more than a hundred years /Before we were her people” (Frost 348). 
Thus Turner’s Frontier Thesis—the continuous frontier impact on institutions of cultural, 
economic, demographic, and social circumstance, of the morphing landscape itself, and 
of sheer remoteness from the putative center—is rendered into an aesthetic formulation, 
but one which articulates the necessity of possession. The religiously motivated Puritan 
dream of a city upon a hill had become Horatio Alger, Jr.,’s (1832-1899) materialistically 
motivated dream of the rise from rags to riches, and the endless, resource-rich land 
westward, with all the wealth that could be extracted from it. The mythical west that had 
existed for centuries in the minds of yearning Europeans was the place of new origins, the 
place where the past supposedly did not matter, and where a new future lay waiting. In 
Gatsby, however, because of the reversed thrust of the dreamers Nick and Gatsby, all this 
also becomes emblematically true of the East.  
Apart from Carraway’s geographically distant family in the Midwest, there is one 
extraordinary person in the narrator’s life. This singled-out person is “only Gatsby” 
(Fitzgerald 5), a late urban echo of Daniel Boone, as is Carraway himself, in his 
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“pathfinder”/Natty Bumpo aspect—certainly a truer echo of the Jeffersonian Yeoman 
than the brutish Buchanan. According to the description provided by the narrator, Gatsby 
is unlike others; there is “something gorgeous” about Gatsby, because he possesses “an 
extraordinary gift for hope, a romantic readiness such as I have never found in any other 
person and which it is not likely I shall ever find again” (6, emphasis added). Nick finds 
in Gatsby someone special, someone who stands out from the rest of the people he has 
encountered on his “riotous excursions” (5) because of Gatsby’s romant ic readiness 
manifested in the apparent and all-encompassing pursuit of a dream.  
On a more material level,  Gatsby’s special status is repeatedly highlighted in the 
novel—for example, one day on the way to lunch, when Nick and Gatsby are pulled over 
by a police officer:  
With fenders spread like wings we scattered light through half Astoria—
only half, for as we twisted among the pillars of the elevated I heard the 
familiar “jug-jug-spat!” of a motor cycle, and a frantic policeman rode 
alongside. “All right, old sport,” called Gatsby. We slowed down. Taking 
a white card from his wallet he waived it before the man’s eyes. “Right 
you are,” agreed the policeman, tipping his cap. “Know you next time, Mr. 
Gatsby. Excuse me!” (54) 
It is, of course, possible to argue that this practice of “manus manum lavat” [literally: one 
hand washes the other hand; the equivalent of the English saying, “I’ll scratch your back 
if you scratch mine.”] is a de facto standard practice among members of a community and 
the local law. Then Gatsby would not be receiving any special treatment at all. Yet, we 
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are rather hesitant to ascribe such a notion of playing favorites to common practice; at 
any rate, this practice would only be common among the accepted/integrated members of 
a community. Outsiders, like Gatsby, would be very unlikely to receive preferential 
treatment, especially if their illegal actions—the selling of liquor during the Prohibition—
are publicly known, as Tom can attest about his rival: 
You’re one of that bunch that hangs around with Meyer Wolfhiem—that 
much I happen to know. [. . .] [Gatsby] and this Wolfhiem bought up a lot 
of side-street drug stores here and in Chicago and sold grain alcohol over 
the counter. That’s one of his little stunts. I picked him for a bootlegger 
the first time I saw him and I wasn’t far wrong. (104) 
Rather, we understand the picture that we get here of Gatsby as similar to Nick’s self-
image, and reminiscent of the portrait of the colonizer in Albert Memmi’s (1920-) The 
Colonizer and the Colonized (1961; translated into English 1991). Memmi reveals the 
mechanisms at the base of colonial oppression, thereby also revealing the springs of all 
oppressions of one group by another. Memmi’s model provides a powerful template for a 
brief analysis of Gatsby’s colonial attitudes displayed in the pursuit of his dreams. From 
the previously quoted scene of the novel, we can discern that Gatsby is granted 
“astounding privileges” of the colonizer, “not by virtue of local laws, but by upsetting the 
established rules and substituting his own” (9). Gatsby himself states, “I did the 
commissioner a favor once, and he sends me a Christmas card every year” (Fitzgerald 
54). This trading of favors is his means of achieving the status of a privileged being when 
everyone should be treated equally in the eyes of the law. Not that Gatsby has committed 
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an apparent violation of traffic laws, but to escape a frantic policeman by waving a card 
before his eyes is much like what Memmi must have had in mind when he declared that, 
“if he [the colonizer] is in trouble with the law, the police [. . .] will be more lenient to 
[sic] him” (12). 
 It suddenly becomes more difficult to see a resemblance between Gatsby and an 
idealized romantic dreamer who simply and innocently possesses “an extraordinary gift 
for hope” (Fitzgerald 6), at least for the readers alert to Gatsby’s illegal transactions and 
to his connection to members of the underworld like Wolfsheim, whose name may very 
well be an allusion to its German translation ‘wolf’s home,’ and which may evoke the 
negative connotations readers could have when thinking of wolves as carnivorous 
predators that hunt in packs. One way or another, Gatsby is presented by the imperialist 
subtext as someone who “appears doubly unjust. He is a privileged being, and an 
illegitimately privileged one; that is, a usurper” (Memmi 9). Instead of revealing any 
overtly negative judgment of Gatsby for desiring superiority, the text indeed seems to 
obscure Gatsby’s illegal dealings. As Bruccoli writes, “Fitzgerald deliberately used a 
strategy of vagueness,” because he “wished Gatsby to be mysterious” (6). Fitzgerald’s 
main motivation for the vagueness regarding Gatsby has been suggested to be the  
requirement that the reader should not be allowed to become morally 
critical of Gatsby. It is essential that his bootlegging activities should not 
be particularly clear or prominent, otherwise the reader’s sympathy for 
him, directed by Carraway, is likely to recede. (Matterson 3)  
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Furthermore, through Carraway, the text not only obscures Gatsby illegal transactions, 
but also elevates him to the status of an ultimately legal, legitimate, and superior being: 
“Jay Gatsby of West Egg, Long Island, [. . .] was a son of God” (Fitzgerald 105, 
emphasis added). The text hereby seems to suggest that, quite naturally, only as a 
(illegitimately) privileged being—a usurper—can anyone possibly be successful as long 
as one keeps up appearances Thus, if there is one statement we can make about Gatsby 
safely, it must be this: that in his dreams of success, his agency as a colonizer is not 
condemned—at least not by the narrator Nick Carraway.  
Nevertheless, perhaps because he is, in the words of rival Tom Buchanan, a 
“nobody from nowhere” (136), Gatsby’s dream breaks on the reef of history, on 
Callahan’s “horror of history,” which proves, in Gatsby’s “depleted emotional capacity,” 
the insufficiency and final falseness of “myths summoned to explain the facts” of a 
history “conceived, carried out, and justified in the crucible of American myth” (Callahan 
13). Gatsby dies, and the narrator Nick Carraway returns to the West. He has taken a bite 
of the Big Apple, and found in it a moist, healthy worm. On the other hand, the Eastern 
American proto-male, Tom Buchanan, stands strong as an apostle of race supremacy. 
Daisy’s characterization of him states that he is a “brute of a man, a great big hulking 
specimen” (Fitzgerald 13) who believes in the ideas of white supremacy—in other words, 
his supremacy.  
By reading The Rise of the Coloured Empires, Tom has found a scientific 
validation for his behavior; his attitude of superiority towards virtually everybody else in 
the novel now stands on scientific ground. “Civilization’s going to pieces,” he says 
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“violently.” Knowing that “we are Nordics”, and that “we’ve produced all the things that 
go to make civilization” (14, emphasis added), Tom is readily able to discriminate against 
the real outsiders—that is, colored people—and also to apply the conceptual principles of 
white superiority to discriminate against less apparent outsiders like Wilson or Gatsby. 
Since ‘knowledge,’ as Foucault has pointed out in Power/Knowledge, and Said has amply 
demonstrated in Orientalism, cannot escape power, and indeed may remain one of its 
major modes of operation, Tom’s voice is the frightening “paternal voice” expressing the 
“dicta of Western civilization” that has found absolute truth (Griffin xv-xvi). In other 
words, Tom is a representative of ethnocentric power and knowledge par excellence, 
perhaps foreshadowing the defeat of the ‘other’ in the persona of Gatsby.  
Our first view of Tom Buchanan reveals a very physically powerful man, with a 
“cruel [. . .] body capable of enormous leverage [. . .] standing in “riding clothes with his 
legs apart on his front porch.” He likes his power, and like the potentates of Eastern 
kingdoms, he expects the obedience of his subjects. Readers are ushered into the living 
room with a “frosted wedding cake” ceiling, its wine-colored rug, and its enormous 
couch on which are seated two princesses, both “dressed in white” with their ‘king’ 
presiding: Jordan Baker and Tom’s wife, Daisy Buchanan. Fitzgerald controls the whole 
scene through his use of colors—white and gold mainly—suggesting a combination of 
beauty and wealth (Fitzgerald 9-10) and alluding to several concepts such as WHITE IS 
GOOD. Fitzgerald thus sets the mood for the climax of the conflict between East and 
West, and perhaps foreshadows that Tom, “whose racism and manner of the plantation 
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revolts even Daisy and Jordan” (Callahan 51), will disappear at the novel’s end, with the 
definitively beautiful and desirable woman still firmly in his grasp.  
The Western dream of usurping the Eastern center of power has failed, and “the 
American male, isolate[d], beyond continuity and society” (15) who ultimately “lives by 
death, by killing, but who is pure white” (D.H. Lawrence, qtd. in Callahan 15), rides off 
into the sunset. “Immediately,” Callahan writes, in a similar connection, “history murders 
sensibility” (18). Consequently, the wishful “sensibility” of “romantic readiness” is 
impaled and deflated at the twentieth century intersection of an overarching, colonizing 
ethos with an internal, counter-colonizing counter-ethos.   
 
War as a Tool of Legitimacy 
Military metaphors have become part of our language over hundreds, if not 
thousands, of years. There exists, after all, a normal metaphoric process by which people 
tend naturally to draw upon experiences in one area of life in order to give fresh insight 
and understanding to experiences in another. The transfer of a set of metaphors from one 
domain of experience to another is evident through various expressions. One can find 
examples in the language that sailors have brought from the sea to the land—“to know 
the ropes”—, that urban dwellers have adapted from farms—“to put the cart before the 
horse”—, or that people have brought home from places of work—“to strike while the 
iron is hot.”  
As integral parts of most human societies, soldiers have had vivid, sometimes 
traumatic, experiences during military duty that they have then applied in non-military 
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situations. Today, we may ask someone to “spearhead the discussion” or to “get off your 
high horse.” From marching, someone may “get off on the wrong foot” or “mark time;” 
from strategy, we might “close ranks” or “beat a hasty retreat;” from weapons, we can 
“cross swords” with an adversary or “look daggers” to the extent that words are weapons 
and “looks can kill.” From the military hierarchy, we refer to “the top brass” or “the rank 
and file.” There are scores of military metaphors used in everyday speech and writing. 
One may well argue that at the relatively shallow level of vocabulary, or even of 
metaphorical expression, the use of militaristic language is harmless, and serves to make 
our communication more colorful, more precise, and perhaps, as Aristotle claimed, to 
convey fresh meaning or perspective. Indeed, there are words in use that we do not link at 
all to their origins with the military establishment, such as the word “harbinger,” which 
refers to someone who went before an army to find accommodations, especially for 
officers. If no violence or military meaning is associated with the word, surely its use is 
innocuous (Smith 3-6). 
However, what has concerned some linguists and philosophers is not the use of 
military language per se, but patterns of metaphorical thinking at the cognitive level. 
Lakoff and Johnson give clear examples of such metaphorical thinking. They assert that 
in English-speaking society we conceive of “argument as war” as shown by the following 
set of linguistic metaphors:  
Your claims are indefensible. 
He attacked every point in my argument.  
I have lots of ammunition in my arsenal.  
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His criticisms were right on target.  
I demolished his argument.  
If you use that strategy, she’ll wipe you out.  
You disagree? O.K. Shoot.  
He shot down all my arguments. (MWLB 4) 
While there are many alternative metaphors, we may often think of “love as war”:  
She fought for him, but his mistress won out. 
He is slowly gaining ground with her.  
He won her hand in marriage. 
She is besieged by suitors.  
She has to fend them off.  
He made an ally out of her mother.  
He is known for his many conquests. (49) 
Both of the concepts ARGUMENT IS WAR and LOVE IS WAR consist of coherent and 
consistent sets of metaphorical expressions. Such related clusters are referred to as 
structural metaphors, and these metaphors may become part of our generally 
unarticulated, “largely unconscious,” belief system (“De-Militarizing Language” 6). 
In Language and Peace (1995), Christine Schäffner and Anita Wenden assert that 
structural metaphors like these do not exist in our belief systems as separate ideas, but 
that they relate to one another as systematically organized into metaphors at an even 
higher, ideological level. The metaphor “Life is a (an uphill) battle” would be one such 
ideological metaphor. In presenting the research of linguists and philosophers over the 
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past ten years, the authors conclude that the language of journalists and diplomats 
frequently represents a particular set of ideological stances. These stances accept and 
promote war as a legitimate way of regulating international relations and settling inter-
group conflict (legitimization); that language unquestioningly promotes values, sustains 
attitudes and encourages actions that create conditions that can lead to war (propagation); 
and that language itself creates the kind of enemy image essential to provoking and 
maintaining hostility that can help justify war (justification). In Fitzgerald’s The Great 
Gatsby, we can find a similar stance toward legitimacy through a close inspection of the 
attitudes displayed by the major characters. 
Throughout the novel, the various characters engage in verbal scrimmages such as 
the heated argument between Tom and Gatsby on the afternoon everybody meets in a 
suite at the New York Plaza Hotel. The narrative describes “compressed heat exploding,” 
Jordan Baker’s father dying, “music [that] died,” warnings of caution, insults, and events 
of World War I (Fitzgerald 99-101), creating an atmosphere clearly indicative of the 
concept ARGUMENT IS WAR, (MWLB 4-6). The tides of this ‘war’ move back and 
forth between the two combatants as they gain and lose ground on the verbal battlefield; 
this is evident when Nick, observing Tom and Gatsby argue, wants to “get up and slap 
him [Gatsby] on the back,” because he had one of those renewals of complete faith in 
him that I’d experienced before,” after Nick has observed Gatsby regain “substantial 
ground.” Tom is attacking Gatsby because he suspects him to be “trying to cause [. . .] a 
row” in his house. Tom sees Gatsby as subverting civilized values. Once Tom would 
allow Gatsby to “make love to your [Tom’s] wife, [. . .] people will throw everything 
 
 214 
overboard and have intermarriages between black and white” (Fitzgerald 101). Tom is 
vehemently arguing Gatsby into the ground for he feels that he is not only defending his 
own realm and his white princess Daisy, but he is also, “flushed with his impassioned 
gibberish, [. . .] standing alone on the last barrier of civilization” (101). Finally, Gatsby, 
who looks “as if he had ‘killed a man,’” loses this battle, not against Tom, but against 
Daisy, while he is “defending his name against accusations that had not been made.” He 
gives up, “and only the dead dream fought on as the afternoon slipped away” (105).  
This verbal battle represents Gatsby’s ultimate and final opportunity to win over 
Daisy. A victory would have bestowed on him the legitimacy of whiteness, the 
legitimacy of publicly being the significant other of a princess dressed in white, and the 
legitimacy that comes with defeating your opponent. But this scene in the novel is not the 
only evidence we can find for the concept that WAR IS A TOOL OF LEGITIMACY. In 
a European context, the concept that WAR IS A TOOL OF LEGITIMACY is probably 
derived from Carl Phillipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz’s (1780-1831) notion that war is the 
continuation of politics through different means. Diplomacy, the prototypical activity of a 
legitimate government, is thus possible both in a conference room and on the battlefield.  
For Americans, the best-known historical example of war as establishing 
legitimacy is the American Revolution. Though the Declaration of Independence was 
signed and delivered to George III in 1776, it was not until the British Army had been 
defeated by the Colonial Army—indicating that the United States defined and defended 
its borders—that the United States came into being as a nation, legitimized by military 
victory, despite the inevitable cost in human life, while defying its continuing 
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colonization by the British. Today, the two main sources for the idea that “war is a 
continuation of diplomacy by other means” are found best in the Eastern writings of Sun  
Tzu (ca. 544-496)—The Art of War (ca. 510 BCE)—and the Western writings of Alfred 
Thayer Mahan (1840-1914)—The Influence of Sea-power upon History (1898). Both 
these texts are part of the curriculum at West Point, and most major military academies 
around the World.  
Both authors set as one of the philosophical cornerstones of their works the ideas 
that war is of critical interest to the state and that it should be prepared for constantly. 
Each takes the view that war is an inevitability, or at least that a good ruler should act as 
though it were. While Mahan has more of an eye toward colonialism and empire 
building, Sun's main concern is survival itself. For Sun, a nation risks its very existence 
every time it goes to war, and as such war should not be entered into lightly. With respect 
to issues of legitimacy, there is  nothing more illegitimate than a nation that does not exist. 
Mahan, as a colonialist, is more concerned with the acquisition and preservation of 
Empire and all the trappings that go along with it. As a nineteenth-century observer, he 
was of the opinion that in order to be a proper power, one had to have the proper 
accessories to be legitimate. Part of this is the usual colonialist egocentrism, but it is also 
rooted in pure preservation, which brings us back to Sun’s argument that the first priority 
of any government is to ensure its own survival, its own legitimacy. 
We may indeed hope that the concept that WAR IS A TOOL OF LEGITIMACY 
is a thing of the past. However, as the various pieces of evidence presented above show, 
the time is not long past—indeed, it is as reasonable to assert that the time is not past 
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altogether, nor likely ever will be. The same Americans who bemoan the maltreatment of 
Native Americans were stirred at least as deeply by the narrative mythologies of West, 
Midwest, South, Northeast—Oriskany, Lewis and Clark, the Alamo, the Civil War, 
Adobe Walls, Little Big Horn—mythologies, that is, of a heroic age that was also an age 
of hidden conquest and ongoing pillage. Gatsby’s readiness, however romantic, cannot 
but be tempered by the altogether different historical record of omnipresent warfare 
motivated by what we have come to know as the American Dream.  
 While the territories of what has now become the US were colonies of the 
Russians, French, Spanish, and British, the white colonials were the marginalized people. 
After the Declaration of Independence, the white European settlers, once colonists under 
the auspices of European powers, the “old countries” and former homelands, became 
colonizers in their own right, and the new margin lay to the unexplored west. Under the 
pretext of Manifest Destiny, they invaded the North American continent, subjecting 
Native Americans and other incipient nationalities to an imperialist agenda, thus giving 
this former colony a unique status.  
Indeed, the warfare between Europeans and Native Americans was continuous 
from the first European settlements, in New England and elsewhere. For example, in 
Texas—a kind of geographic and cultural crossroads of nineteenth-century American 
history—white Americans—Anglos, in the terminology of the region—subjugated other 
peoples in a complex 50-year history comprised of least three other streams of American 
history. These streams were: the enslavement of African Americans, imported into Texas 
from the antebellum South; the (at least in part) racially motivated revolutionary conflict 
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with Catholic Mexico, which led directly to the most successful and baldly imperial war 
the US ever fought, the Mexican War of 1846-1848; and finally, the at least equally 
racially motivated contest with Native Americans, such as the Comanches, for 
irrevocable possession of the land. Gatsby, as a mirror image of historical events guided 
by imperialist efforts, could be said to mirror the concept that WAR IS A TOOL OF 
LEGITIMACY.  
Initially, the novel presents an alliance of two characters—a fact mentioned 
earlier, but requiring further clarification in the context of the assumption that WAR IS A 
TOOL OF LEGITIMACY. The first character introduced to the reader is the narrator 
Nick Carraway, who, according to his father, must “remember that all the people in this 
world haven’t had the advantages that you’ve had” (5). Furthermore, as the narrator’s 
father “snobbishly suggested and I [Nick] snobbishly repeat, a sense of the fundamental 
decencies is parceled out unequally at birth” (5). With these few words, young Carraway 
tries to present himself as a privileged person. He begins to draw a picture of his social 
status that we recognize as analogous to the colonizers’ assumption of superiority. He is  
at an advantage in comparison to other people, and he has reasons to be snobbish, 
because the way he talks about fundamental decencies implies that he and his father think 
he was born with them.  
Hence, from the very beginning of this novel, the narrator puts himself “in a 
position which is common to all Europeans living in a colony” (Memmi 17). Through the 
cultural power of paternal authority and through the rhetorical power of repetition, Nick, 
who comes from a family of hardware store owners, attempts to convince us that he, 
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“from the time of his birth [. . .] possesses a qualification independent of his [. . .] actual 
class” and his “father’s stock of proverbial truth and material hardware” (Fitzgerald 12). 
Both these possessions provide Carraway with “nourishment and identity” (Callahan 60). 
In other words, Nick not only has similar roots, but also is actually engaged in a project 
similar to Gatsby’s—that is, the project of disassociation from the conceptually and 
pragmatically lower class of Westerners. This statement remains true even if one takes 
into consideration that Nick and Gatsby are repeatedly referred to as “mid-Westerners,” 
for the classification of who or what is Western does not depend so much on how far 
West one’s origins are located. Rather, the relevant parameter lies in the relative 
perspective occupied by Easterners such as Tom Buchanan, for whom everybody who 
lives further east than he does is in some sense a Westerner. 
The alliance between Nick and Gatsby is multileveled. In their first encounter at 
one of Gatsby’s parties, the two speak, but Nick does not know at first that he is talking 
to the host. Interestingly enough, the war in Europe is the topic of conversation when the 
character who gives the novel its title eventually appears, as something more than “a 
figure [. . .] emerged from the shadow” (Fitzgerald 20). This conversation, however, fails 
even to touch on the devastating personal experiences that come automatically with 
participation in any armed conflict. Erich Maria Remarque (1898-1970), in All Quiet on 
the Western Front (1929), meticulously constructs a reality for this particularly modern, 
industrialized war in stomach-wrenching detail. The war, as Gatsby and Carraway are 
said to have experienced it, is akin to the picture provided in Mark Meigs’ Optimism at 
Armageddon (1997), where the comparatively brief American experience of World War I 
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trench warfare is described as notably different in its sociological and psychological 
effects from the four-year bloodletting endured by European armies, in that first truly 
technological, twentieth-century war. The practice of obscuring the gory, devastating, and 
senseless aspects of military conflict as we find it in Gatsby and other writings as well as 
political discourse, seems a condition sine qua non. If indeed war were thought of as 
being about severed bodies, mourning families, and countless body bags, then it would be 
impossible to think of war as a ‘civilized’ legitimizing process, or, for that matter, of life 
as a conquest. It is not surprising then, that the presentation of war in Gatsby emphasizes 
the more civilized aspects of combat—promotions, camaraderie, and so forth. In fact, war 
becomes party-talk. 
The characters use the topic of the war as a means to establish their connection as 
would-be colonizers. Like Carraway, Gatsby participated in World War I, and the two 
characters come to realize that they met before, some years earlier in France. Apart from 
the fact that Nick “was one of the few guests who had actually been invited,” the honor of 
Nick’s presence “would be entirely Gatsby’s” (34-35). This constitutes a gesture 
suggesting that Gatsby regards Carraway as a welcomed equal, even an asset to the party. 
The shared endeavor of going east connects the two men as would-be invaders. 
Moreover, of course, since the war commenced with a German invasion, this is yet 
another reversal.  
If we can believe anything that Gatsby reveals about his past to Carraway, then 
Gatsby’s participation in the war was utterly successful. Nick tells us that Gatsby “did 
extraordinarily well in the war. He was captain before he went to the front and following 
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the Argonne battles he got his majority and the command of the divisional machine guns” 
(117). Considering the amount of time and the outstanding service normally required for 
a promotion, this is an impressive record, manifesting Gatsby’s virility in a time of 
conquest, in a time of invasion and subjugation of a nation, however justified it may have 
been by the metaphors of political discourse (see, for example, Lakoff 1992).  
Moreover, even before Gatsby became actively involved in World War I, the 
conceptual metaphor that LIFE IS A CONQUEST found expression as the predominant 
structuring principle of his life. He had managed to invade Daisy’s house, even if it had 
been “by a colossal accident,” and “he took what he could get, ravenously and 
unscrupulously—eventually he took Daisy one still October night, took her because he 
had no real right to touch her hand” (Fitzgerald 116). Callahan has suggested that the 
October month of love, which Gatsby and Daisy had shared, is a reference to Christopher 
Columbus’ (1451-1506) discovery of America in October of 1492 (20). Gatsby, by 
association, then, becomes linked to the man who ultimately initiated white colonization 
of the Americas; Gatsby similarly invades the Buchanan marriage, just as the culture in 
which he is embedded had invaded and appropriated the North American continent in the 
preceding three centuries (Matterson 24-26).       
Paralleling these conquests in Gatsby’s life, we must recall that Nick, in the 
beginning passages of the novel, talks about his endeavors, his traveling, as “riotous 
excursions.” He describes the war he participated in as “that delayed Teutonic raid” (6). 
Readers may very well associate these phrases with Roman imperial warfare of the first 
century BCE in general, and with military leader and politician Gaius Julius Caesar’s 
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(100-44) De bello gallico (58-52) in particular. For these accounts of the conquest and re-
conquest of Gaul and Germania use the Latin word excursiones [ekskursiónes; military 
endeavors] to refer to military campaigns. Incidentally, virility and warfare also are 
common correlatives in American literature and popular culture—even today, in 
ostensibly liberal American society. This is quite evident from the latest successes of an 
unusually large number of recently released, high-profile war movies such as Saving 
Private Ryan (1998), A Thin Red Line (1998), Savior (1998), Three Kings (1999), The 
Patriot (2000), Pearl Harbor (2001), No Man’s Land (2001), Enemy at the Gates (2001), 
Band of Brothers (2001), The Lost Battalion (2001), Captain Corelli’s Mandolin (2001), 
Behind Enemy Lines (2001), Black Hawk Down (2001), Windtalkers (2002), and We 
Were Soldiers (2002). The cavalier attitude toward combat evident in these narratives is 
also emblematic of Fitzgerald’s own experience—but it is emblematic of nothing else so 
much as that conquest and violence are seemingly indispensable ingredients of virility 
and manhood. To claim manhood, one must have killed one’s man. Gatsby’s “success” in 
the World War is viewed as his ticket to legitimacy, and to Daisy—he shall henceforth 
have the real right to touch her hand. Such a narration of masculinity certainly can be 
seen to indicate a latent colonizing ethos. 
 Nick admits that he “enjoyed the counter-raid [. . .] thoroughly” (6) as if he were 
not talking about the first war in human history in which weapons of mass destruction 
had been used, and in which almost ten million humans died senseless deaths. This 
cavalier attitude is recapitulated in a new counter-raid. We come to realize that at the 
party, some years after the war, both Carraway and Gatsby repeat and relive the wartime 
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quest eastward, but they do so without any reference to the horrors of World War I, for 
that would invalidate the practice of war as a legitimizing, culturally tolerable tool. Nick 
decided to go East in order to “learn the bond business” (6)—in other words, he went 
East to fulfill his dreams of making money, and eventually becoming rich by taking 
advantage of the possibilities and resources available in the East.  
James Gatz, on the other hand, after he had realized “his Platonic conception of 
himself” resided in the East for seemingly completely different reasons (77). Eventually 
these reasons turn out to be hardly different after all, but only a conquest of a somewhat 
different kind—that is, a reversed migration, equally aggressive, and, in the end, simply 
one more of those “riotous excursions.” Gatsby’s “platonic conception of himself serves 
as a reference indicating the possibility that Gatsby has utilized something like Said’s 
‘othering’ to justify his aggression against the East, transforming himself thereby into Jay 
Gatz the officer, and later on, Jay Gatsby the millionaire. These examples expose a 
variety of subtle imperialist mechanisms, traces of an ideology of colonization surfacing 
through the language the narrator uses, and traces, too—though these are not important to 
the present analys is—of the largely submerged, almost effaced American revolutionary 
egalitarianism. While it seems that Nick, in the novel’s beginning passages, is merely 
giving an introductory setup for the story to follow, the subtext presents us with 
characters who think highly enough of themselves to be “boasting” (5) about their 
allegedly natural characteristics.  
The opening passages depict seemingly superior colonizer-type characters with 
their superiority complex. They see themselves at the center of the world, while the 
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colonized are at the margins. The colonizers regard themselves as the embodiment of 
what a human being should be, the proper ‘self’; outsiders to this group were ‘other,’ 
different, and therefore inferior. Thus, the allied characters of Nick and Gatsby carry 
traces of the stereotypical colonizers/invaders we encounter throughout politically 
motivated discourse. The work of Rudyard Kipling, for example—who built his highly 
successful career as a sort of apologist- in-chief for the British Empire—is saturated with 
just such attitudes; the same attitude is clear as well in such American cowboys-and-
Indians film epics as John Ford’s (1895-1975) Stagecoach (1939), to name only one. 
Carraway and Gatsby attempt a colonization/invasion in reverse, but they are themselves 
finally colonized, invaded, conquered. The East emerges triumphant and resists 
colonization with the help of the self-appointed superior other in the form of Tom 
Buchanan. The supreme irony rests, however, not with the differences between the likes 
of Buchanan and the likes of Gatsby, but with the similarities of their dreams of plunder. 
Possessing Daisy Fay explicitly correlates with this dream of plunder, and Gatsby’s 
dream of re-possessing Daisy is the imperialist dream motivating absolute possession.  
 
Conceptualizing Daisy 
 To explore more fully the enigmatically complex Daisy Fay, the text deploys a 
variety of conceptual metaphors as well as a number of extensions of basic metaphorical 
conceptualizations. Daisy’s complexity derives from the confluence of these various 
basic metaphorical perspectives; they are applicable to women as valuable commodities 
because WOMEN ARE OBJECTS, while, less significant for our context, MEN ARE 
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SUBJECTS. When Gatsby tries to conceptualize the wealth of his feelings for her, no 
single, consistent structuring of that emotional experience is sufficient; therefore, Gatsby 
needs to import structure from a wide variety of source domains to characterize the 
richness of the target domain Daisy Fay as a possessable object. Lakoff and Johnson refer 
to this cognitive mechanism as “cross-domain conceptual mapping” (PITF 71). Each of 
the following metaphors provides structure for comprehending a different aspect of the 
target domain.  
 
Daisy is an Object 
To Gatsby, Daisy is so important and valuable that he had “read a Chicago paper 
for years just to catch a glimpse of Daisy’s name” (63). She is a woman who might be 
able to help him “recover something, some idea of himself perhaps, that had gone into 
loving Daisy” (86). As we have seen, the story readers have been inclined to believe for 
decades is that of Gatsby’s “romantic attitude” (Mizener 193). Chambers argues that 
“Fitzgerald presents him as a man of tremendous potential who directs his energies 
towards an idea of happiness represented first by Dan Cody’s yacht and then by Daisy 
Fay” (100). The most important aspect about these two objects that supposedly can bring 
about happiness is that they can easily be regarded as tokens from seemingly different 
categories: while Dan Cody’s yacht represents desire for material goods, Daisy Fay, as 
“the first nice girl [Gatsby] had ever known” (Fitzgerald 116), was “extraordinary” (117), 
and, in Gatsby’s mind, represents the fulfillment of romantic desire.  
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Yet we have to understand that this separation of materiality and emotionality, as 
suggested by Chambers, stands or falls with the existence of a specific, conventional 
system of symbols, and our acceptance of its validity. When Walter Truett Anderson 
writes that “we repeatedly create symbolic systems of meaning [. . .] and then forget that 
they are our creations” (ix), and that we “live in a symbolic world, a social reality that 
many people construct together and yet experience as the objective ‘real world’” (x), we 
must understand that the dis-guising of the constructed dichotomy of materiality versus 
emotionality is essential to revealing the imperialist subtext of the novel.  
Thus, what Daisy Fay represents to Gatsby is not merely the fulfillment of his 
emotional desires, but their fulfillment through an attainable, objectified female—one 
that is worth possessing, and possessable, like Dan Cody’s yacht. And so the dichotomy 
of materiality versus emotionality collapses, and we see Nick and Gatsby residing in the 
East for the same material reasons. Daisy is much, much more to him than the mere 
promise of sex. Finally, all we have left of the romant ic dreamer we were initially led to 
believe in is a Gatsby eager to accumulate commodities that can endlessly be 
repossessed, because of his misconception that by conferring legitimacy, they will make 
him happy, be they yacht or trophy wife. This is the main process that makes Daisy 
appear to be an object; hence, it is a prerequisite development for any metaphorical 
mappings that discuss Daisy. Gatsby’s rival, Tom Buchanan, of course, through his 
marriage to Daisy, has eternally legitimized his claim over his wife. Marriage persists 
“till death do us part;” like Eve, who is “said to have said to Adam: My author and 
Disposer, what thou bidst /Unargu’d I obey; so God ordains,” Daisy is one of the 
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“women [who] should be subject to their men” (Griffin 19). Tom is now invested with 
the power of all men who have received the blessing of God through the ritual of holy 
matrimony—Tom has “God’s jurisdiction” over his sanctified possession (14). 
 
Daisy is the Holy Grail 
Both the quest eastward and Daisy’s objectification are reinforced when we read 
that, eventually, Gatsby “found that he had committed himself to the following of a grail” 
(116-117), a holy relic that has been a desired object in Western culture for centuries. In 
The Age of Fable, Thomas Bulfinch (1796-1867) recounts one of the versions of the 
quest for the Holy Grail. He describes it as an object which “conferred blessings upon the 
land in which it was held” (402), and made an “old [. . .] crooked man” who could not go 
“save with crutches [. . .] as whole as he ever was” (417). The phrase “as whole as he 
ever was” presents a problematic point, since it seems to us impossible that James Gatz 
could ever be whole, so roundly does he despise his very origins. The Midwestern ragged 
edge of the universe, which he seems to associate with death, is a space he rather would 
be distanced from, because it is the source of his illegitimacy.  
Legitimacy is the benefit Gatsby wants to realize with his possession of Daisy, in 
spite of the westness he still carries with him, which necessitates constant re-revisions of 
the past he articulates to Nick. Gatsby clearly believes that possession of Daisy will make 
him whole through the same magic Bulfinch describes. Gatsby values Daisy for her grail-
like holiness—a holiness that brings with it definite material advantages.  
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The text is able to present Daisy in this light, as a unique object, because from the 
dominant, patriarchal view of Western culture, MEN ARE SUBJECTS—that is, agents 
that can perform actions—and WOMEN ARE OBJECTS—that is, partly dehumanized 
beings lacking agency. The dominant male perspective has been analyzed by countless 
scholars and critics; among them is Laura Mulvey, who initially propagated the idea of 
the “male gaze” in her seminal article “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975). 
Mulvey did not undertake empirical studies of actual filmgoers, but declared her intention 
to make political use of Freudian psychoanalytic theory (in a version influenced by 
Jacques Lacan) in a study of cinematic spectatorship.  
Such psychoanalytically- inspired studies of spectatorship focus on how “subject 
positions” are constructed by media texts rather than investigating the viewing practices 
of individuals in specific social contexts. Mulvey notes that Freud had referred to 
(infantile) scopophilia—the pleasure involved in looking at other people’s bodies as 
particularly erotic objects. She declares that in patriarchal society pleasure in looking has 
been split into active/male versus passive/female. While, as both Silverman (1980) and 
Kaplan (1983) have argued, the gaze could be adopted by both male and female 
subjects—neither is the male always the controlling subject, nor is the female always the 
passive object. In the case of Gatsby, however, Daisy is resoundingly passive. She clearly 
manifests her inability to act or decide anything during one of Nick’s visits: “’What‘ll we 
do with ourselves this afternoon?’ cried Daisy, ‘and the day after that, and the next thirty 
years?’” (Fitzgerald 113), and accepts her husband’s love affair with discouraging 
indifference, based on implicit female passivity. After all, as Griffin suggest, “passivity is 
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the share of the women,” and Daisy emblematically represents this patriarchal notion 
(38). 
 
Women are Territories 
Annette Kolodny’s studies The Lay of the Land (1975) and The Land Before Her 
(1984), examine critically “the various ways writers in the United States have feminized 
nature, thus combining the aims of patriarchal and territorial domination, gender 
hierarchies, and the ideology of imperialism” (Rowe 205). These studies suggest we can 
interpret Daisy Fay as representative of a “woman’s body [that] has often been treated as 
a territory to be ‘conquered’” (199). Suddenly, the image of Daisy gleaming “like silver” 
(Fitzgerald 117) must be seen differently. Gatsby’s expression ceases to be a simple 
statement of appreciation and becomes a statement about Daisy’s value as a commodity 
to be possessed. Daisy, whose “voice is full of money” (Fitzgerald 55) as Gatsby says 
admiringly, is the colonizer’s dream, is a personification of the  land conquered in the 
process of American history. On a larger scale, Daisy is also the vic tim of the “infinite 
false polarities of patriarchy, [where] both the exploiter-rapists and the sexist ecology 
have lumped women and nature together in a view negative for [. . .] both” (Griffin, n.p.) 
As much as the texts Kolodny and Griffin analyze use the ICM TERRITORY IS 
FEMALE, this ICM is also evident in Gatsby through the descriptions the text uses for 
the female characters. Jordan Baker’s voice is “murmurous and uninflected [. . .] running 
in a soothing tune” like the waters of a river, and the colo r of her hair is “autumn-leaf 
yellow,” reminiscent of both a tree in autumn and the earth on which the leaves fall when 
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they reach this color (Fitzgerald 18). However, the more important aspect of this model is 
that, unlike is the case with most conceptual metaphors, the role of the source and the 
target domain is reversible—it is not an instance of novel metaphor to say that WOMEN 
ARE TERRITORIES. And so, for Gatsby, Daisy Fay actually constitutes a territory to be 
conquered as part of his quest for legitimacy. Given the centrality of bodily experience to 
cognitive theory, as suggested by the title of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s 
comprehensive recent overview, Philosophy in the Flesh, it is striking that the field has 
paid relatively little attention to gender as a possible category of analysis. Of the twenty-
four representative primary metaphors grounded in sensori-motor experience listed in 
Philosophy in the Flesh, for example, none suggests that the body’s biological sex plays 
any role in the formation of primary metaphors. 
 
People are Plants 
When we consider the sacrifices Gatsby makes with her in mind, Daisy’s image 
as a trophy wife becomes still more pressing, eroding her status as the fulfillment of 
idealized, almost mythical, romantic notions: 
His heart beat faster and faster as Daisy’s white face came up to his own. 
He knew that when he kissed this girl, and forever wed his unutterable 
visions to her perishable breath, his mind would never romp again like the 
mind of God. So he waited, listening for a moment longer to the tuning 
fork that had been struck upon a star. Then he kissed her. At his lips’ 
 
 230 
touch she blossomed for him like a flower and the incarnation was 
complete. (86-87)  
This stunning figure is the ground where physical facticity and Platonic idealism, 
“unutterable vision” and the “perishable breath,” meet, mingle, and meld. All things 
necessary to this moment of synthesis are present; a “tuning fork” has been “struck upon 
a star.” Vast change stirs in the shape of things. Daisy and Gatsby together, racially 
superior “white face” and transcendent “mind of God,” are an ideal, momentary co-
mingling of flesh and spirit, and in the kiss they are “forever wed.” It is a hushed moment 
of creation. When Gatsby reflects that his mind will never again “romp [. . .] like the 
mind of God,” he articulates his willingness to surrender at last his “Platonic conception.” 
He has become, for Daisy’s sake, physical, and now, also for her sake, he must engage 
with the material world. In order to do this, he must also be less than an ideal—he has to 
be real, he has to be human, and he has to be, not just spirit, but incarnated.  
Paradoxically enough, this process of Gatsby’s de-deification is also an aspect of 
the process of his own othering,  as distinct from the othering of the Easterners by Gatsby 
and Carraway. Daisy Fay, who becomes like a flower, is also dehumanized, or othered, in 
a different sense. The conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A PLANT, briefly discussed in 
Chapter Two of this work, is here logically extended to the concept that PEOPLE ARE 
PLANTS. More importantly, however, there appears to be a special instance of 
metaphorical concept in the underlying image-schema, and it forces the more specific 
notion WOMEN ARE PLANTS upon the readers’ eyes. In Woman and Nature (1978), 
Susan Griffin explores the ideologies of Western patriarchy and determines that “men 
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and women differ as much [. . .] as plants and animals do. And men and animals 
correspond just as women and plants correspond” (26). Indeed, floral imagery of various 
kinds, most prominently expressed in the use of plant names for the characters Daisy and 
Myrtle, is rather prominent in Gatsby. Daisy has a flower name and first appears in the 
novel against a background of a sunken Italian garden in bloom by her porch. Inside the 
house, Carraway describes Daisy as “opening up” to him “in a flower- like way” (17), 
early on establishing one of the concepts through which readers will be inclined to 
understand Daisy. Lakoff and Turner analyzed this concept in much detail in More than 
Cool Reason (1989). They assert that: 
In this metaphor, people are viewed as plants with respect to the life 
cycle—more precisely, they are viewed as that part of the plant that 
burgeons and then withers or declines, such as leaves, flowers, and fruit, 
though sometimes the whole plant is viewed as burgeoning and then 
declining, as with grass or wheat. [. . .] The plants and parts of plants in 
their yearly cycle correspond to the stages of life. (6) 
Once Daisy, whose name is also the common name for “Bellis Perennis [freely translated 
as beautiful throughout the year], a familiar and favorite flower of the British Isles, and 
Europe” (Murray 219), is objectified as something that blossoms for Gatsby, not with 
him, as a union of equals would require, this passage from the novel gains enormous 
power. Readers are inclined to understand Daisy both literally—through her name as a 
direct referent—and metaphorically—through the concept PEOPLE ARE PLANTS—as 
a flower. When Gatsby conquers and subdues Daisy with a kiss, this kiss correlates 
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explicitly with the mythologized conquest of the land  and its crop, this time “vaguely 
realizing eastward.”  
Of course, the concept PEOPLE ARE PLANTS is also applicable to Myrtle 
Wilson, George Wilson’s wife, and Tom Buchanan’s ‘woman.’ Myrtle’s name has a 
number of associations that confirm her role as a character double of Daisy, for she too, 
has a floral name. But if the daisy is a flower with a bright, petite, and particular 
distinctness, myrtle is an ivy, growing close to the earth with no individual distinctness at 
all. There is nothing of the ‘fay’ or elfin quality in Myrtle—nothing of the slight, 
beguiling, and graceful. Instead, the text captures her with a comic effect in her first 
appearance: “in a moment the thickish figure of a woman blocked out the light from the 
office door. [. . .] Her face [. . .] contained no facet or gleam of beauty” (Fitzgerald 22-
23). The text notes that she has “rather wide hips,” and in a sense, she is the heavy-hipped 
Venus of the valley of ashes, for “there was an immediate perceptible vitality about her as 
if the nerves of her body were continually smouldering” (23). She boards the train at the 
same time as Tom and Carraway, joining them when they arrive at the station in New 
York. There, before leaving for the Washington Heights apartment, she buys a puppy “of 
indeterminable breed” (24), an incident that suggests the idea of Tom ‘buying’ the 
mongrel Myrtle for his amusement as much as it suggests that Gatsby may be ‘buying’ 
Daisy through the wealth he accumulated for her (Long 23). 
Recalling Said, Daisy is the mechanism of Gatsby’s filiation following on the 
heels of his affiliation with the wealth and power of the established East. Naturally, the 
Easterners—Buchanan—react defensively with an othering of their own. The balance of 
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competing claims is struck in that Gatsby, by the same action, conquers and subdues his 
own god-ness—his Platonic conception—and in his new status as mere mortal, becomes 
fatally vulnerable. This fall into mortality, then, is simultaneously a voluntary sacrifice on 
Gatsby’s part, and the price exacted by the East for both his would-be reversal of the 
received mythology of conquest, and of normative social and economic class. 
 
Stars are Unattainable Objects 
The ultimate revelation that (the still not rich) Nick, as well as (the extremely 
rich) Gatsby, still carry the trace of westness in them is also provided by Gatsby. When 
Nick arrives home after his first visit at the Buchanan’s house on East Egg, he sees a 
figure—Gatsby—“regarding the silver pepper of the stars” (20). Gatsby is looking up 
into the sky, orienting himself toward the stars, objects that are beyond human reach, no 
matter how rich the human beings desiring them may be. He also looks eastward, towards 
the Buchanans’ house. Yet in the east, all Nick can see is “a single green light, minute 
and far away” (20). Just like the stars, the green light is almost undetectable, positioned at 
an indeterminable distance. By harmonizing the images of the stars and the green light in 
this manner, both of these objects of desire are made to appear out of Gatsby’s reach—an 
image that will shortly be amplified by the presentation of the stars and the tuning fork. 
During the last paragraphs of the novel, again looking eastward, Nick cannot help but 
invoke the image of a group of original settlers-invaders-colonizers of the land for one 
last time. He becomes “aware of the old island that flowered once for Dutch sailors’ 
eyes—a fresh, green breast of the new world” (140). 
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At this juncture in the story, however, the realization that both objects are 
unattainable has Gatsby “trembling” (20). Unmoved by either Gatsby’s fervor or his 
disquiet, the political subtext of the novel, on the other hand, blurs the line between 
conquerors and the conquered, since there is, in the end, so little difference between 
them. The blurring takes place in a rarified region like the stars, which are associated 
with Daisy. Gatsby has, in his turn, in the materials of the present, recapitulated the 
heroic past. He stands on the ground of myth, and in that region, the same man with no 
real right to so much as touch Daisy’s hand has his best chance to break through to the 
center; pioneer- like, soldier- like, Gatsby seizes his chance: he will recast the whole 
material in a shape to suit his purpose.  
Both Gatsby and Nick, anxious and insecure, are glancing eastward. If they have, 
at least to some extent, both conquered what they desire, they fail to realize that they have 
also been conquered by the ideological discourse that the Easterners have established as 
the episteme of all conflicts fought out on American ground. Gatsby is rich, but he still 
“stretches out his arms toward the dark waters” (20), in a gesture of either unfulfilled 
desire, or unconscious or even unwilling adoration of his colonizers, who are evermore in 
the east, and who came to the American shores across the water. Only for a moment can 
Gatsby, who is conquered, too, by his desire for Daisy, ever hold her. Daisy, the epitome 






The Power of a Classic 
Despite the traces of the successful conqueror that Gatsby carries in himself, he is 
merely “a figure [that] had emerged out of the shadow.” A moment later, “Gatsby had 
vanished” (20). As conquerors, Gatsby and Nick defy the dominant culture by making it 
into the East to begin with, and by associating themselves with members of the dominant 
class, who develop the dominant imperialist discourse. However, they are simultaneously 
subjugated by it, because in the mere act of migrating to the eastern Mecca that is New 
York City, in search for what-have-you, wealth or Daisy herself, they actually submit to 
this ideology. Ultimately, we come to realize that there is no single underlying 
metaphorical concept for these characters. For them, as for the novel as a whole, it is not 
only true that LIFE IS A JOURNEY, but also that LIFE IS A CONQUEST, a constant 
struggle for domination of what one renders, by the value narrated into it, worth 
dominating or exploiting.   
Richard Anderson asserts that “the character Jay Gatsby” influences modern 
American fiction like “no other figure from American literature.” He asserts further that 
the novel “is admired, emulated and used as a basis of reference and allusion to an extent 
only a few works—Huckleberry Finn, The Waste Land, arguably Moby Dick—can 
claim” (Anderson 18). But he fails to realize that the permanence of Gatsby, beyond 
literary achievement and the extraordinary skill of Fitzgerald, emerges from a conceptual 
subtext that is largely unconsciously incorporated in the novel. LIFE IS A CONQUEST, 
even if we desire to conquer only in an attempt to resurrect “those illusions that give such 
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color to the world that you don’t care whether things are true or false as long as they 
partake of the magical glory,” and in that even though 
[. . .] the long shadow of Jay Gatsby has faded from the lawns of West 
Egg [. . .] it falls more and more deeply across the hearts and minds of 
each succeeding generation of American readers and writers. Like Gatsby, 
even the most hardheaded Americans conceive of themselves [. . .] as 
idealists whose dreams can be made true, as eternal youths whose 
innocence can never really be lost, as magicians who can mesmerize the 
world into accepting their dreams. Fitzgerald, in tapping that cultural 
myth, made The Great Gatsby an American—indeed, a world—classic, a 
persistent and permanent presence in American culture.  (Richard 
Anderson 37) 
We can now understand that the novel is not simply an epitaph mourning the loss of 
American innocence. What Anderson is really telling us is that Gatsby is so popular with 
readers and critics in the US and around the world as a story with mythical appeal 
because it claims that the only way we can possibly get close to fulfilling our dreams, to 
reinstating a romanticized past, to following the grail and acquiring it, is to be obedient 
actors on the world’s stage, reading the lines the culture has given us.  
We have to constantly shift identities and fluctuate between existing as the 
colonizers and the colonized, because, in one way or another, “cultural syncreticity is a 
valuable as well as an inescapable characteristic feature” (Ashcroft et al. 30) not only of 
all post-colonial societies, but of all societies—all societies that is, which have opened 
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themselves to and become enmeshed in a contemporary, postmodern multicultural reality. 
Through this practice of constant role shifting, we may eventually be able to grow 
beyond the usual categories of individual and social alienation such as 
colonizer/colonized, master/slave, East/West and metropolitan/provincial by denying any 
of these categories superiority over any other. Fitzgerald, however, despite the fact that 
The Great Gatsby ends with the image of a benighted continent, of a “vast obscurity 
beyond the city, where the dark fields of the republic rolled on under the night” (141), 






One of the symptoms of an approaching nervous breakdown 
 Is the belief that one’s work is terribly important. 
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) 
 
Summary of Findings 
The overview of prominent contributions to the theory of metaphor in Chapters 
Two and Three, examined in reference to recent scholarship, suggests that the current 
theory of metaphor, as proposed by cognitive linguists such as George Lakoff, derives 
from a long-standing tradition that has regarded metaphor as a crucial process of human 
cognition. This overview furthermore calls to attention not only the possibility, but 
perhaps the necessity, of a closer inspection of previous theories of metaphor. Vico’s 
New Science is one example of an eighteenth-century text that puts forth a theory of 
metaphor that could hold insights pertaining to the recent undertakings of cognitive 
scientists.  
Chapter Four takes initial steps in synthesizing the views of various domains of 
inquiry into the cognitive processes of the human mind. As such, Chapter Four draws 
from cognitive models developed in cognitive linguistics, and cognitive anthropology, 
and takes into account hypotheses put forth by psychologists such as Jung. It sets the 
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stage for an analysis that intends to further understanding of how the dichotomy of the 
East and the West guides, influences, and is expressive of cognitive processes. Although 
eminent linguists such as George Lakoff have denied the existence of a connection 
between myth, archetypes, and metaphor, Chapter Four illustrates the possibility of a 
close relationship among these phenomena.  
As is evidenced by the interpretive analysis of The Great Gatsby in Chapter Five, 
by synthesizing theoretical approaches from linguistics and anthropology, Chapter Four 
has managed to initiate the development of a model suitable for the analysis of the East-
West dichotomy. Selecting the East-West image-schema (the terms ‘archetype’ and 
‘metaphor’ have been used interchangeably by various authors) was not a random choice, 
but rather one that crystallized out of an endless number of possibilities because of its 
importance as a guiding principle of action and thought throughout much of human 
history (see for example, Sandikcioglu 2003, in press).  
It has been suggested that the East-West image-schema is central to human 
conceptualization because humans experience the East as the place where the sun rises 
every day. The sun, without which any kind of life on earth would be impossible, and 
thus the East, and the way it is conceptualized, can be considered a function of this bodily 
experience. Similarly, the West, as the place where the sun disappears every day, can also 
be considered a function of bodily experience. As purely emergent from bodily 
experience, however, neither the concept of the East nor the concept of the West can be 
understood completely. There exist, so to speak, cultural experiences that may, depending 
on historical, social, and cultural context, override the bodily experience which is 
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inclined to favor the East over the West because of the respective connotations of “place 
of birth of the sun” and “place of death of the sun.” Moreover, the meanings ascribed to 
the East and to the West “depend on exactly what people are experiencing at the moment 
and the interpretive framework they bring to the moment as a result of their past 
experiences” (Strauss and Quinn 6). This kind of overriding cultural meaning is based on 
the “typical, frequently recurring and widely shared interpretations” of some type of 
object, abstract entity, or event evoked in people as a result of their similar life 
experiences (Spiro 163). To call these meanings ‘cultural meanings’ is to imply that a 
different interpretation would be evoked in people with different characteristic life 
experiences (Strauss and Quinn 6-7). As such, various interpretations of the East-West 
image-schema exist simultaneously in often mutually exclusive or competing forms, as 
the analysis of The Great Gatsby and the reversal of the values of East and West in the 
context of colonizing and counter-colonizing attitudes suggests.  
 
Future Research 
Practical reasons always restrain the scope and size of any scholarly project. In 
the case of this dissertation, however, this fact is not necessarily something to be 
lamented. Rather, because of the motivating results yielded in Chapters Three and Four, 
the current limitations are a circumstance that could culminate in a more thorough and 
more detailed investigation of the relationships only cursorily explored here. A logical 
extension of the setup of this dissertation, with is dedication of individual chapters to the 
domains of linguistics and anthropology, would consist of an expansion of these chapters, 
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and would also consist of the exploration of research from the field of psychology. The 
idea to synthesize a theory based on the relationship between myths, archetypes and 
metaphors can hardly do without meticulously consulting psychological research that has 
analyzed Jung’s concepts of archetypes and the collective unconscious, which are mostly 
treated as psychological phenomena. 
Moreover, the potential relevance of the study of myth to the study of cognition 
requires further probing into the cognitive function of narrative structure. Jerry Hobbs, 
for one, has cogently argued in favor of an amalgamation of literary criticism and 
cognitive science, for the simple reason that “imagining, fiction, and narrative” provide 
researchers with a valuable template for viewing how “communicating cognitive agents” 
have become “embedded in a world” which humans comprehend  and conceptualize via 
stories (34). Hobbs argues in a fashion echoed by Mark Turner in The Literary Mind, 
which explores “how narrative processes that might be thought merely ‘literary’ are 
essential to ordinary processes of constructing a sense of location in space and time” 
(Patey 1656). Approaches such as Turner’s theory—that humans use “storying” and 
conceptual projection to understand everything from pouring a cup of coffee to Proust—
put human ur-stories, human myths, at the forefront of human cognition, and suggest that 
the underlying premise of this dissertation, to examine the correlation between myths, 
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